Efficient Capital Markets Explained - YouTube

Channel: Ben Felix

[0]
- The information in this video might be more important
[2]
than anything that I've ever told you.
[4]
In every one of my videos,
[5]
I tell you things that hinge on one of the landmark ideas
[8]
in financial economics,
[9]
the efficiency of the capital markets.
[12]
As fundamental as market efficiency is
[14]
to good financial decision-making,
[16]
it is poorly understood by most investors.
[19]
I have been telling you information
[20]
that is based on this foundational principle of finance,
[23]
but I've never taken the time to explain to you
[25]
why it is so important.
[27]
Condensing the foundations of modern financial theory
[29]
into a short video is ambitious,
[31]
but I'm going to do my best.
[33]
I'm Ben Felix, portfolio manager at PWL Capital.
[36]
In this episode of Common Sense Investing,
[38]
I'm going to tell you why the efficient market hypothesis
[40]
matters to your investment decisions.
[42]
(upbeat music)
[45]
Financial theory starts with asset pricing.
[48]
How do investors decide how much to pay for a stock?
[52]
Theoretically, rational investors are willing
[54]
to pay a price for a stock based on the present value
[57]
of expected future earnings.
[59]
All else equal, investors will pay more
[61]
for higher expected earnings
[63]
and they will pay less for riskier future earnings.
[66]
Whether or not investors
[67]
are rationally evaluating investments this way,
[69]
brings us to the concept of market efficiency.
[72]
As defined by Eugene Fama in 1970,
[75]
a market in which prices always "fully reflect"
[78]
available information is called "efficient".
[81]
This is a simple sounding concept,
[83]
but it is also extremely important
[85]
and terribly misunderstood.
[87]
Informational efficiency in a market
[89]
stems from competition for profits, low transaction costs,
[93]
and readily available information.
[96]
If there is information suggesting that an asset's value
[98]
will be higher in the future,
[100]
competitive traders with low cost access to the market
[103]
will buy that asset today, increasing its price.
[106]
The competition to incorporate new information into prices
[109]
for profit, means that prices should change quickly
[113]
as new information develops.
[115]
New information is random,
[117]
and therefore price changes should be random.
[120]
This point is at the core of index investing.
[123]
If price changes are based on new information
[125]
and therefore not predictable,
[127]
then trying to predict them
[128]
as any traditional active manager or stock picker does,
[132]
should not be expected to improve your outcome.
[135]
And that's before the higher costs and risks
[137]
of active management are considered.
[139]
In an efficient market,
[140]
low-cost index investing makes sense.
[143]
Explaining why market efficiency matters is easy to do.
[147]
I just did it in one sentence.
[149]
Explaining how we know that efficient markets
[151]
reflect reality is a much bigger task,
[154]
but it is a task worth undertaking.
[156]
To continue this discussion,
[158]
I need to make sure that we all have
[159]
the same baseline understanding of a few concepts,
[162]
starting with the meaning of the words,
[163]
"empirical" and "theoretical".
[166]
Empirical research means looking at real data.
[169]
For example, noticing that day-to-day changes
[171]
in stock prices are random, is an empirical observation.
[175]
Empirical observations are concrete,
[178]
but drawing insight from empirical observations
[180]
is more abstract.
[181]
This is where we see the importance of theory.
[184]
Theory is an idea about why things work
[186]
the way that they do.
[188]
In financial economics, empirical research and theory
[191]
are tied together by scientific method,
[193]
forming a hypothesis, collecting data,
[196]
and testing the hypothesis.
[198]
If economists make consistent empirical observations
[201]
about stock returns, they might develop a hypothesis
[204]
about what is driving that empirical result.
[206]
Once a hypothesis has been created,
[208]
it can be tested in the data.
[210]
If a theory ends up doing a good job of explaining reality,
[213]
it becomes a useful decision tool.
[215]
In 1900, 70 years before Fama published
[218]
his landmark work on market efficiency,
[220]
Louie Bachelier, a French statistician,
[223]
noticed that stock prices seem to follow a random walk.
[227]
In the 1950s and 1960s, more empirical work emerged,
[231]
suggesting that stock prices moved randomly.
[233]
With no theoretical explanation for this randomness,
[236]
economists at the time concluded that stock prices
[239]
did not have any economic meaning.
[241]
In 1965, Paul Samuelson brought forward the idea
[244]
that in a well-functioning and competitive market,
[247]
we would expect prices to change
[249]
as investors' expectations adapt to new information.
[252]
This theoretical explanation called the "fair game model",
[256]
started to bring meaning to the randomness of stock prices.
[259]
The work of Samuelson was followed
[260]
by Fama's now famous 1970 paper,
[263]
"Efficient Capital Markets:
[264]
"A Review of Theory and Empirical Work."
[267]
A simple summary of past work
[268]
is not what made Fama's paper famous.
[271]
Fama formalized an empirical approach
[273]
to testing the theory of market efficiency.
[275]
Fama never claimed that the market is perfectly efficient.
[279]
Perfect efficiency is an ideal state
[281]
that real markets can only approach.
[283]
That is not a shortcoming of the efficient hypothesis.
[287]
Theory is not meant to be reality.
[290]
The map is not the territory.
[292]
Theory allows us to predict what the world might look like
[295]
in an ideal state and compare that prediction to reality.
[299]
In the case of efficient markets,
[301]
reality does look very similar
[303]
to what we would predict an efficient market to look like.
[305]
Market efficiency predicts that prices should move randomly.
[309]
Active managers should not be successful
[311]
at beating the market,
[312]
and prices should change quickly based on new information.
[315]
Each of these predictions describe real markets.
[318]
Stock price changes are random.
[320]
Active managers do on average, trail the market after costs.
[324]
Even managers with the best returns are no more likely
[326]
to have strong future returns.
[329]
Event studies that is observing X post
[331]
how prices moved based on new information
[333]
have indicated that markets are generally very quick
[336]
to incorporate new information.
[337]
One of the challenges with the efficient market hypothesis
[340]
is that it cannot be definitively proved or disproved.
[344]
This was acknowledged by Fama
[345]
as the Joint Hypothesis Theorem.
[348]
Any attempt to test market efficiency
[350]
is really a test of two distinct hypothesis.
[353]
It is jointly a test of the efficient market hypothesis,
[356]
and a test of the model of market equilibrium.
[359]
What I just said will make sense in a second, stick with me.
[362]
The model of market equilibrium
[364]
is the model of how the market prices assets.
[367]
We can think about value stocks as an example.
[370]
Under the capital asset pricing model
[372]
that is defining risk as only the risk of the market,
[375]
value stocks produce higher average returns
[377]
than would be expected based on their riskiness.
[380]
Under the capital asset pricing model
[382]
for equilibrium pricing,
[383]
value stocks violate the efficient market hypothesis.
[387]
They create a systematic excess return
[389]
that cannot be explained by risk.
[391]
This result could mean one of two things.
[394]
Markets are not efficient,
[395]
or the model being used for market equilibrium is flawed.
[399]
The implication of the joint hypothesis theorem
[401]
is that the concept of market efficiency
[403]
is only as empirically useful as the model that we have
[406]
for market equilibrium.
[408]
Specifying this equilibrium model has been the grounds
[410]
for much of the work in empirical finance since 1970.
[414]
In the case of value stocks, later research revealed
[417]
that the single factor capital asset pricing model
[419]
for market equilibrium was not accounting
[422]
for the independent risk of value stocks.
[424]
Adding the independent risk and value stocks to the model
[427]
takes away the efficient market violation.
[429]
Value stocks do not violate market efficiency,
[432]
they're just riskier than we originally understood.
[435]
Improving the equilibrium model for asset pricing
[437]
by identifying independent risks
[439]
led to the Fama French Three Factor Model in 1992,
[443]
which includes the independent risks of the market,
[446]
small stocks, and value stocks.
[448]
And the Five-Factor Model in 2014,
[450]
adding the independent risks of stocks
[452]
with robust profitability,
[454]
and stocks that invest aggressively
[455]
to the Three Factor Model.
[457]
Without the efficient market hypothesis,
[459]
empirical finance would just be a collection of anecdotes.
[462]
Efficient markets as a framework,
[464]
has allowed financial economists to evaluate theories
[467]
by their rejectable predictions,
[469]
as opposed to observing the individual outcomes
[471]
of successful investors.
[473]
We now have the ability to gain insight
[475]
into how markets work,
[477]
as opposed to relying on anecdotes
[479]
that we hope to replicate.
[480]
An anecdote is like a story,
[482]
one sample of a successful outcome
[484]
with no theoretical explanation
[486]
and no empirical corroboration.
[489]
In a social science like economics,
[490]
we want to build an understanding of the world
[492]
that allows us to make better decisions,
[495]
while avoiding the type of bias
[496]
that anecdotes often promote.
[498]
Warren Buffet or anyone else
[500]
being successful at picking stocks is an anecdote,
[503]
but asking why he was successful
[504]
is not a productive question.
[506]
It might be similar to asking a doctor
[508]
why your grandpa lived to be 98,
[510]
even though he smoked a pack of cigarettes a day.
[512]
Science does not have the explanation for every outcome
[515]
but this does not make it a good idea
[517]
to start smoking or stock-picking.
[520]
Interestingly, Buffet's performance has now been explained
[523]
within the framework of an efficient market.
[525]
He simply knew which types of risks to maintain exposure to,
[528]
and used extreme discipline and leverage to do so.
[532]
Again, we see the joint hypothesis problem.
[534]
Buffet is not proof of market inefficiency
[537]
when the appropriate model for equilibrium pricing
[539]
is specified.
[541]
As the model for market equilibrium pricing
[543]
has developed over time,
[544]
it has gotten increasingly difficult
[546]
to find violations of the efficient market hypothesis.
[549]
With the Fama French Five Factor Model,
[551]
the vast majority of differences in returns
[553]
between two diversified portfolios can be explained
[556]
by differences in exposure
[558]
to the independent risks identified in the model.
[560]
Adding more factors to a model to make it explain returns
[563]
sounds like over-fitting or data mining.
[566]
But the way that this model was developed
[568]
is another critical aspect of modern financial theory.
[571]
In their 2006 paper,
[572]
"Profitability, Investment, and Average Returns",
[575]
Fama and French documented the body of empirical work,
[578]
showing that three specific common characteristics of stocks
[581]
predict higher average returns.
[583]
Price relative to book value
[585]
where cheaper stocks have higher average returns,
[588]
profitability where all else equal,
[590]
a more profitable stock must have a higher expected return,
[593]
and investment, where all else equal,
[595]
a stock that reinvests profits conservatively
[598]
must have a higher expected return.
[600]
They took these individual empirical observations
[603]
and use the framework evaluation theory
[605]
to construct a new set of empirical tests.
[608]
Valuation theory predicts that there should be
[610]
a relationship between these three characteristics.
[613]
Past empirical work had observed them individually.
[616]
Based on the theory, properly observing
[618]
the effects of each characteristic
[620]
must be done by controlling for the other two.
[623]
Fama and French verified this empirically in 2006,
[626]
which eventually led to the Five Factor Model,
[628]
the most complete model of market equilibrium to date.
[631]
This takes us to 2014, which is when the Fama French paper
[634]
introducing the Five Factor Model came out.
[637]
We're not talking about ancient history here.
[639]
Remember, equilibrium pricing is the theoretical model
[642]
for how the market prices assets.
[645]
The Five Factor Model suggests that the market
[647]
prices more risk into certain types of assets
[649]
as identified in the Five Factor Model.
[652]
The Five Factor Model can be used
[654]
to empirically test the concept of market efficiency,
[657]
subject, of course, to the joint hypothesis problem
[659]
that we talked about earlier.
[660]
In its current form, the Five Factor Model
[662]
is able to explain over 90% of the difference in returns
[665]
between any two diversified portfolios.
[668]
The room for arguments about market inefficiency
[670]
has gotten very small.
[672]
Any returned difference that appears to be an anomaly,
[675]
like the returns of dividend paying stocks, for example,
[678]
can most likely be explained by exposure
[680]
to the risk factors identified in the model.
[684]
Understanding that this was not an exercise
[685]
in blind data mining is important.
[688]
It comes from making empirical observations,
[690]
developing logical hypothesis, and testing the hypothesis.
[694]
Today, the theory of efficient markets
[696]
and equilibrium pricing is robust enough
[698]
that in empirical testing, it explains almost any difference
[701]
in returns over any historical time period
[704]
in any country that we have data for.
[706]
It is also able to explain anomalies like low beta stocks
[710]
and even the performance of Warren Buffet.
[713]
What used to seem like proof
[714]
that the market was not efficient,
[716]
has today been explained by how assets are priced
[719]
in an efficient market.
[720]
Asset pricing is extremely important
[722]
to how investors allocate their capital.
[725]
The price that you pay for a stock
[726]
defines your expected return.
[728]
If prices are constantly wrong,
[731]
investors will not know where to allocate capital.
[734]
Fortunately, there is a strong theoretical
[736]
and empirical case that markets are efficient.
[739]
They price stocks based on their expected future earnings,
[742]
and the riskiness of those earnings.
[745]
Market efficiency has sweeping implications
[747]
on how you should invest your money.
[749]
At a bare minimum, market efficiencies should push investors
[752]
toward low cost index funds.
[754]
There is no way to exploit random stock price changes
[757]
to generate higher average returns,
[759]
so taking what the market has to offer is a smart bet.
[762]
At a more advanced level,
[764]
there is a strong, theoretical, and empirical case
[766]
that the Five Factor Asset Pricing Model
[769]
is a good model of market equilibrium.
[771]
Based on this, allocating more capital
[774]
to the types of stocks that the model predicts
[775]
to have higher expected returns could be sensible.
[778]
Finally, I think it is worth mentioning the role of evidence
[782]
in decision-making.
[783]
The medical field has a hierarchy of evidence,
[786]
ranking types of evidence based on their quality
[788]
and their risk of bias.
[790]
The lowest form of evidence
[792]
in this hierarchy is expert opinion,
[794]
while the highest is systematic reviews
[796]
of randomized controlled trials.
[798]
In the world of financial economics,
[800]
we do not have randomized controlled trials,
[803]
but we do have a nearly unlimited pool of data
[805]
for empirical testing.
[807]
There is a scientific approach
[809]
to accessing the capital markets efficiently.
[811]
Despite this, investors will be quick to listen to the words
[814]
of a successful hedge fund manager,
[817]
or the CEO of a big bank,
[818]
while being quick to dismiss the theory and evidence
[821]
that we have discussed today.
[823]
As I mentioned earlier, the map is not the territory.
[826]
The models are not perfect reflections of reality,
[829]
but we have a choice between making decisions
[832]
based on the theory and empirical data,
[834]
or making decisions based on what we hope will do well
[837]
even if that hope is at odds with the data.
[839]
Thanks for watching.
[840]
My name is Ben Felix of PWL Capital,
[843]
and this is Common Sense Investing.
[845]
If you enjoyed this video,
[846]
please share it with someone
[847]
who you think could benefit from the information.
[849]
Don't forget, if you've run out
[851]
of Common Sense Investing videos to watch,
[852]
you can tune into weekly episodes
[854]
of the Rational Reminder Podcast,
[856]
wherever you get your podcasts.
[857]
(upbeat music)