Low Volatility - Low Beta ETFs - YouTube

Channel: Ben Felix

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- You may remember that market beta is a measure
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of the sensitivity between an asset or portfolio
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and the risk of the overall market.
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A portfolio with a beta of one moves with the market,
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so if the market drops 10%,
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we would expect the portfolio to do the same.
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A portfolio or asset with a lower beta
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would be less volatile than the market.
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In an efficient financial market,
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risk and expected return should be related.
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Based on this relationship,
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we would expect higher beta stocks,
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stocks with more risk relative to the market,
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to have higher returns.
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This is not what has happened.
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For the last 50 years,
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lower beta stocks have had higher returns
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and higher risk adjusted returns than higher beta stocks.
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So far, it sounds like low beta stocks are a free lunch.
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More returns with less volatility.
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This should be too good to be true.
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And it is.
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And I'm going to tell you why.
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I'm Ben Felix, portfolio manager at PWL Capital.
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In this episode of Common Sense Investing
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I'm going to tell you what you're really buying
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when you buy a low volatility ETF.
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(techno music)
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Low volatility stocks are, as it sounds,
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stocks that are less volatile than the market.
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The reason that they are interesting
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is that over the last 50 years,
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the lowest volatility stocks
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have not only been less volatile than the market,
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but they have had market-like returns.
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Market-like returns with less volatility
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seems to counter the idea of efficient markets.
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An opportunity to get more return
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without taking additional risk
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is what we would call an anomaly.
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In other words, it is something that is not explained
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by asset pricing models.
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The thing about anomalies when it comes to investing
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is that as our understanding
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of financial markets grows over time,
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anomalies are often explained away.
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The working hypothesis for much of the research
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on financial markets today
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is the efficient market hypothesis.
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In an efficient market,
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asset prices are accurate reflections
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of current information,
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including the riskiness of the asset.
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An efficient market allows us to use asset pricing models
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to understand the expected returns
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of assets and portfolios.
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For many years, the only asset pricing model
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was the capital asset pricing model,
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which uses only market beta,
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the sensitivity to market risk
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to explain differences in expected returns.
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Under the capital asset pricing model,
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about two thirds of the difference in returns
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between two diversified portfolios
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can be explained by their betas.
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Looking at the market through the lens of market beta,
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meaning that we were only comparing assets based
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on their sensitivity to market risk,
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certain types of stocks,
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specifically small cap and value stocks,
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have higher risk adjusted returns
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than they should based on their betas.
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Let me say that another way.
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If we look at value stocks and evaluate their riskiness
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only by their sensitivity to market risk,
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they will have higher returns
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than they would be expected to
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based their sensitivity to market risk.
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With the view of the capital asset pricing model,
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which only looks at market risk,
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the excess performance of small cap and value stocks
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would be described as an anomaly.
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Now, I know this was a bit of a digression
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and I'm not quite done with it,
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we are going to get back to low volatility stocks very soon.
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In 1992, Eugene Fama and Kenneth French
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introduced a three-factor asset pricing model.
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Instead of only looking at the sensitivity to market risk,
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the three-factor model accounts for sensitivity
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to small stocks and value stocks,
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which Fama and French had identified
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as independent risk factors.
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Through the lens of the three-factor model,
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about 90% of the differences in returns
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between diversified portfolios can be explained.
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This means that the independent risks of the market,
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small cap stocks and value stocks
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explain most of the differences in returns
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between any two diversified portfolios.
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The reason that small cap and value stocks appeared
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to be anomalies under the capital asset pricing model
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was that the model was flawed, as every model is.
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There were additional risks, independent of the market,
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baked into asset prices.
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Accounting for these risks
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in the three-factor asset pricing model
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eliminated the small cap and value anomalies.
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The higher returns of those types of stocks were not magic.
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They were due to those types of stocks being riskier.
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The higher returns were not a free lunch,
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they were compensation for risk.
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Boom anomaly is gone.
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The market is still efficient.
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Now back to low volatility.
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The low volatility anomaly is clear through the lens
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of the three-factor model.
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Stated another way,
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low volatility stocks have performed better
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than would be expected based on their sensitivity
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to the market, size and value factors.
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In 2013, Eugene Fama and Kenneth French
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published a paper detailing a new asset pricing model,
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a five-factor model.
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They included profitability and investment
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as new risk factors.
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With the updated five-factor asset pricing model,
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we can comfortably explain nearly 100%
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of the differences in returns
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between diversified portfolios
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based on their sensitivity
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to the five independent risks in the model.
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Think about that.
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If we take any two diversified portfolios,
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the majority of any difference in their returns
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will be explained that by their sensitivity to the market,
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small stocks, value stocks, stocks with robust profitability
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and stocks that invest conservatively.
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With the five-factor model,
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the low volatility anomaly becomes another victim
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of the efficient market hypothesis.
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In their 2014 paper titled
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"Dissecting Anomalies with a Five-Factor Model",
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Fama and French looked specifically at low beta stocks,
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and found that they have positive exposure
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to the new profitability and investment factors,
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which in addition to the size and value factors,
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explains their previously anomalous higher average returns.
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Low beta stocks are not magical.
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They have just had exposure to risk factors
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that had not been included in asset pricing the models
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until relatively recently.
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This could still be be a good thing
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for low volatility investment products.
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If low beta stocks offer consistent exposure to factors
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that explain differences in returns,
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then investing in the might be a good idea.
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However, there are some problems.
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In his 2016 paper,
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Robert Novy-Marx came to a similar conclusion
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as Fama and French regarding the low volatility anomaly.
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He explained that "While low volatility stocks
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"have performed well over the last 50 years,
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"their performance is not anomalous after controlling
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"for size, relative price and profitability."
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He concludes the paper stating that,
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"while investors would have benefited
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"from a defensive tilt over the period,
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"these benefits derive effectively
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"from an unprofitable, small cap growth exclusion,
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"which could have been implemented more efficiently
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"and at lower costs directly."
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This is an important nuance in product implementation.
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Novy-Marx is saying that instead of buying
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only low volatility stocks in a portfolio,
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it would be more efficient to buy the market
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and exclude the small growth stocks with weak profitability.
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Let's look at USMV as an example.
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It is Ishares Edge MSCI min vol USA ETF.
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It has only 213 holdings as of May 7th, 2019,
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compared to 3,552 holdings
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for the IShares core S&P total U.S. market ETF.
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Having 213 holdings in USMV
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clearly decreases diversification,
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which decreases the reliability of the outcome.
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The low volatility specification
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also increases the portfolios turnover.
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USMV turns over about 25% holdings each year,
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while ITOT generally turns over less than 10%.
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Turnover increases costs and decreases tax efficiency.
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Now, to be clear,
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ITOT does not exclude unprofitable small growth stocks,
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but they are a tiny portion of the portfolio.
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Portfolio efficiency is not the only reason
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that low volatility may not be a good place is to invest.
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We have talked about the potential benefits of exposure
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to the value, profitability and investment factors
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as driving the success of low volatility stocks.
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The problem is that while low volatility stocks
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have tended to have these characteristics,
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they do not always have these characteristics.
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We would call this time varying factor exposures.
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In a 2012 paper, Pim van Vliet found that on average
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low volatility strategies tend to have exposure
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to the value factor.
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Historically low volatility stocks have been
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in a value regime only about 62% of the time
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and a growth regime about 38% of the time.
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This regime shifting behavior over time
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affects the performance of low volatility strategies.
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When low volatility stocks have a value exposure,
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on average, they've outperformed the market by 2%.
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However, when low volatility stocks have growth exposure,
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they underperformed by 1.4% on average.
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The low volatility anomaly is no longer an anomaly.
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Under the capital asset pricing model
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and the Fama French three-factor model,
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it appeared that low volatility stocks
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were violating the relationship
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between risk and expected returns.
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Just like small cap and value stocks before them,
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the higher risk adjusted returns of low volatility stocks
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have now been explained by known risk factors
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as our understanding of asset pricing has evolved.
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It just took the science a little while to catch up
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to the empirical observation.
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Now that we understand where the additional returns
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for low volatility stocks have come from,
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we have to question the value, no pun intended,
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of investing in low volatility ETFs.
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When you buy a low volatility ETF,
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you are buying a basket of stocks
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that will probably give you exposure to value stocks
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with robust profitability most of the time.
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But sometimes you will be getting growth stocks
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depending on whether low volatility
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is in a value or a growth regime at the time.
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You will also be getting a concentrated portfolio
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with relatively high turnover
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and higher fees compared to a regular index fund.
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As Robert Novy-Marx pointed out in his paper,
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"Most of the benefits from low volatility
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"come from the fact that focusing on low volatility stocks
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"ends up excluding small cap growth stocks
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"with weak profitability,
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"which have generally performed a very poorly."
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A much more efficient approach
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would be to maintain exposure to the market as a whole
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and directly exclude small cap growth stocks
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with weak profitability,
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which is exactly how Dimensional Fund Advisors
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approaches this problem.
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But even if we look at a total market ETF, like ITOT,
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only 2% of its holdings are in small growth stocks.
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That's not an exclusion,
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but it is a very small portion of the portfolio.
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I think as usual,
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that investing in good old fashioned index funds
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is going to be the best approach for most people.
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I know that many of you have considered low volatility ETFs
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because it comes up a lot in the comments.
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Did this video change your view?
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Thanks for watching.
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My name is Ben Felix of PWL Capital
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and this is Common Sense Investing.
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If you enjoyed this video,
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please share it with someone who you think
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could benefit from the information.
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Don't forget if you've run out
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of Common Sense Investing videos to watch,
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you can tune in to weekly episodes
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of the Rational Reminder podcast
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wherever you get your podcasts.
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(upbeat music)