The Zeebrugge Ferry Disaster | A Short Documentary | Fascinating Horror - YouTube

Channel: Fascinating Horror

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At around 6:29pm on the 6th of March 1987 the MS Herald of Free
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Enterprise (an eight deck car and passenger ferry) capsized just moments after
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leaving the Belgian port of Zeebrugge. The incident resulted in the deaths of
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193 passengers and crew. It was the most deadly sinking of a British ship in
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peacetime in more than 50 years. The Herald of Free
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Enterprise began active service in 1980, having been designed specifically for
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the popular ferry route between Dover and Calais. This ship, and the others in
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its class, were designed to facilitate quick loading and unloading and to have
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rapid acceleration. On the day of the incident the Herald of Free Enterprise
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was not on her normal route. Instead she was ferrying between Dover in England
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and Zeebrugge in Belgium. This caused some problems when loading and unloading
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passengers and cars - specifically the ramp at Zeebrugge could not be raised
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high enough to reach Deck E, the upper vehicle deck. To address this
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issue water was pumped into the bow ballast tanks on board the Herald, thus
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lowering the whole vessel in the water until the deck was low enough for boarding
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to commence. Once all the cars and passengers had been loaded, however, the
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ballast tanks were not emptied and the ship remained low in the water. This was
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further exacerbated by something known as the squat effect. When a vessel is in
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motion the movement of water beneath the hull creates an area of low pressure and
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causes the boat to sink slightly lower in the water
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this effect is strongest in shallow water or when a boat is moving rapidly.
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Both of these conditions were true for the Herald of Free Enterprise that day.
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The Zeebrugge Harbour was shallow and the boat pulled rapidly away from port
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in an effort to compensate for a slightly late departure. The result of
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these combined factors was that water at the bow of the ship was able to reach
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all the way up to G Deck. Normally this would not be an issue as
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the doors there would be sealed. However, on this day, the bow doors on G Deck were
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for some reason wide open. Water cascaded in flooding the deck and leaking down to
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the other decks below. The car decks on the Herald were large uninterrupted
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spaces not subdivided by watertight bulkheads. This allowed the water to
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slosh around freely, throwing off the balance of the ferry and causing it to
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capsize. The incident unfolded with astonishing rapidity. The ship left Zeebrugge
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Harbor at 6:24pm with a crew of 80 and 459 passengers. She began to capsize
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less than four minutes later. After listing to port almost 30 degrees she
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briefly righted herself before listing to port again and capsizing onto her
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side. The whole events took no more than a minute and a half. During that minute
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and a half contact between water and electrical
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systems plunged the ship into darkness. Floors became walls, walls became floors,
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passenger decks were inundated with water.
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Many people drowned in those first chaotic minutes, while others died from
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injuries sustained during falls or when crushed by falling objects.
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It was a stroke of good fortune that the ship capsized onto a sandbar. Were this
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not the case it would have undoubtedly sunk completely into deeper water. As it
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was the ship came to rest on its side partly submerged with hundreds of souls
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trapped inside. Here is an account of the incident from survivor
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Simon Osborne: "I was standing at a duty-free counter when I felt a sudden
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"violent jolt a woman behind me in the queue started screaming and I thought
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"she was overreacting but seconds later another more violent jolt shook the
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"vessel and then almost instantaneously the ship capsized. It happened so very,
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"very quickly. I fell onto my back and slid along the polished wooden decks of
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"the ship's lounge until I landed on the front of the bar, which had gone from
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"being vertical to horizontal. In the brief moments before the lights went out
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"I had a clear view of the horror around me. Everything that wasn't bolted to the
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"decks came crashing down. I recall fruit machines chairs tables and waste bins
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"tumbling through the air as the vessel suddenly flipped over. Much worse was the
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"sight of people somersaulting from one side of the ship to the other. One
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"man cried out as he crashed through a glass panel just feet from where I stood
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"rooted to the spot, wide-eyed, frozen in fear.Aa split-second later we were
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"plunged into darkness as the lights failed and I was instantly swept up by
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"the swirling wave of freezing water which had crashed through the ship's
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"doors and windows. I thought I was going to die."
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Passengers, like Simon, who survived the initial capsize of the ship were then
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stuck within the overturned hull, often submerged in freezing cold water. They
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had no choice but to wait for rescue - something that for many was too late in
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coming. An immediate inquiry was launched into the
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incident. It found that many different factors contributed to the sinking but
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that none were more prominent than the fact that the bow doors were open when
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the ship left port. Who was to blame for this terrible lapse?
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It was the job of the Assistant Boatswain, a man named Mark Stanley, to
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close the doors, and the job of the First Officer, a man named Leslie Sabel, to make
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sure that they were shut before departure. When the ferry left on its
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fateful voyage, however, Stanley was asleep in his cabin. Sabel left the
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vicinity of the bow doors to be on deck for departure without ensuring that the
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bow doors were closed, simply assuming that Stanley would turn up and do his
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job. The court placed the majority of blame on these men, but also criticized
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the working culture of the company as a whole. There was, it reported, "a disease of
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"sloppiness and negligence at every level of the corporation's hierarchy."
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Seven people from the ferry company were charged with gross negligence
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manslaughter and corporate manslaughter, but the case swiftly collapsed when a
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judge ordered the jury to acquit all concerned.
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Nobody was punished for actions contributing to the disaster. In the
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aftermath many changes were made to similar vessels. These included the
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addition of indicators on the bridge to show when the bow doors were open, water-
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-tight ramps fitted to bow sections, and flaps to allow water to escape from
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vehicle decks in the event of flooding. Regulations were also changed to require
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a greater minimum distance between the waterline and any car deck for all
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roll-on roll-off ferries. As for the Herald of Free Enterprise itself a
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salvage operation was successful in refloating the ship. The final bodies
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were removed from the vessel a month after its sinking and the damaged ship
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was towed to a shipyard near Zeebrugge. The owners attempted to sell her on the
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basis that she could be repaired and sail again... but, unsurprisingly, no buyer was
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found and she was eventually sold for scrap to a shipyard in Taiwan. More than
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a year after the disaster had concluded the ship arrived at its final
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destination and was broken down for scrap. The Herald of Free Enterprise is
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now nothing more than a memory, but the incident which cost so many of its
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passengers their lives is one that the survivors and the world at large will
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never forget.