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Just how well trained is the Russian army? (And are its logistics up to the task?) - YouTube
Channel: Binkov's Battlegrounds
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Previously, Binkov went in depth on the hardware
that the Russian ground forces are using.
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But an army doesn鈥檛 win wars just with tanks
and rifles.
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Training, experience and logistics is what
often decides battles.
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So this video will try to explore those, as
well as cover the other russian ground forces,
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such as airborne, naval infantry and even
their national guard.
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In Russia, everything can be bigger.
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Looking at the composition of Russian ground
forces, it鈥檚 apparent that Russia has fewer
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logistics and support units than the US.
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For the size of its combat component, that
is.
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It鈥檚 something Russia is aware of, as there
are plans to add more logistics units on the
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divisional level.
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Today, Russian regiments are light on support
units, compared to the US brigades.
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Which have almost as much command and support
units as combat ones.
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That ratio changes in favor of support, command
and overhead, once the total US army personnel
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is tallied.
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Back in the cold war, Soviet motor rifle divisions
and regiments were super heavy on combat stuff,
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leaving the same, meager 18 percent for support
and command for both levels.
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Russia has increased that ratio somewhat closer
to the current US army levels, but just by
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how much is hard to tell.
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lf the Russian army used a ratio of added
support and overhead personnel similar to
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the US one, using the known combat unit count
and personnel estimate - then the Russian
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army would have way more personnel than it
does.
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Which it clearly doesn鈥檛.
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Hence, the relative lack of support personnel.
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Once the adjusted figure of combat units,
including army aviation, is compared to the
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overall adjusted figure of personnel connected
to the Russian army.
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Basically, the ratio may be the reverse of
the one in the US army.
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It鈥檚 only a rough estimate, but it鈥檚 safe
to say it is higher than it was in the Soviet
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era.
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When it comes to budgeting, Russian land forces
have, on the average, required far more money
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than the air forces or the navy.
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Compare that with the average US spending
and its evident land forces are the king of
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the usual triad of branches.
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The same time period is helpful for looking
at where the Russian budget stands when it
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comes to personnel salaries.
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Budget money going to soldier鈥檚 pay amounted
to 46 percent.
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Compare that to the US military pay and benefits,
which constitute 34 percent of the US budget.
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Why is that important?
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Well, it shows that it鈥檚 quite hard for
the Russian military to grow any larger or
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more professional than it currently is, without
serious changes to budgeting or using more
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conscripts.
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And using fewer conscripts is exactly what
the Russian military, ground forces included,
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has been all about for the last 20 years.
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Where professional soldiers were few and far
between in the year 2000, they鈥檝e been hovering
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around 400 thousand for the last five years,
for the whole military.
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Which is kind of a problem, too.
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The Russian military wanted to increase their
numbers even more.
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At one time planning 500 thousand contract
soldiers by 2025.
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But money is not unlimited and those plans
shrank, to fewer professional troops, with
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the deadline now being 2030.
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Indeed, most contract soldiers in the Russian
military get close to or little over median
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Russian salary.
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So it鈥檚 not surprising that a part of the
russian military is still composed of conscripts,
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serving one year, which get a measly monthly
allowance
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Still, as said, the Russian military keeps
a decent number of professional soldiers.
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Allegedly, no maneuver unit; meaning units
primarily tasked with fighting, contain conscripts.
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Conscripts are relegated to support duties.
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Contract soldiers are rough analogues to US
army soldiers.
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They sign a contract for 2 years or sometimes
a few years longer.
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That鈥檚 similar to the US system where enlisted
serve a minimum of 2 years in the active duty.
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Though the US average is closer to 4 years
of active duty.
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However, the US servicemen have to serve 8
years in total.
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With the remaining years spent in reserves.
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Since the Russian army still doesn鈥檛 have
a fleshed out reservist system, the similarities
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end there.
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For the last decade, Russia has struggled
to create a large, trained reservist force.
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Local command efforts would sometimes yield
forces of 5 to 8 thousand reservist troops,
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undergoing refresher training courses.
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Recently, there鈥檚 been a new push in the
Russian Southern military district, to create
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a force of 38 thousand reservists.
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Ex military personnel will be able to sign
a 3 to 5 year reservist contract.
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They might then be called to mobilize, train,
or even do combat.
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It is still too early to say what will happen
with that plan.
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Right now, russian law considers most males
of suitable age reservist worthy.
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In theory that鈥檚 over 2 million men.
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In practice, though, Russian Generals Boldyrev
and Makarov said they expect 300 to 700 thousand
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ex-military to be successfully mobilized as
reservists, in case of a big war.
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One area where Russian ground forces are quite
strong, in theory, is storage of old military
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hardware.
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For use in the event of a total war, where
many reservists, and the civilian population
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as well, would have to be mobilized.
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While the US army also has lots of old equipment
stored, Russian stores are a few times bigger.
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Of course, there are issues.
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It鈥檚 impossible to tell just how well preserved
all that Russian hardware is.
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At the same time, stored amounts have been
dropping quite a bit, so maybe that signals
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that a part of what鈥檚 claimed is at least
somewhat usable in practice.
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There is also, of course, the matter of training
and experience.
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Though that鈥檚 much harder to quantify.
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The Russian army did increase their abysmal
training rates from the 2000s onwards.
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Including now regular exercises with other
countries.
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Since 2013, snap exercises, with no warning,
started.
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With the number of major snap drills rising
from 12 to 18 by 2014.
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Total exercise numbers rose further by 2015.
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Very large exercises such as Zapad, Vostok
and others are done regularly.
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Vostok 2018 famously involved 300 thousand
military personnel.
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Though, realistically not more than 100 thousand
combat troops might鈥檝e been involved.
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Now, all that still doesn鈥檛 tell us much
about capability levels, but given that professional
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soldiers increased in numbers, exercises increased
in numbers and complexity and actual participation
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in war ops continued - it鈥檚 safe to say
the russian military is probably better trained
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now than it ever was, now or in soviet era.
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Allegedly, one Russian general said it鈥檚
cheaper for the Russian army to fight in Syria
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than to organize training exercises in russia.
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Indeed, from 2015 onward Russia has been rotating
contingents of their military in Syria, keeping
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them 3 to 4 months in theater, to gain experience.
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Before that, Russian troops were gaining experience
in eastern Ukrainel.
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The Elite part of the troops meant to do ground
combat certainly train a lot.
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Airborne corps infantry would probably be
the first to react in any war.
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Their list of training exercises is impressive.
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A single airborne regiment was on record to
have performed these following exercises in
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a half year period.
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If one tried to answer the question of just
how well trained Russian troops are, compared
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to, say, US ones, a very rough estimate might
look something like this.
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Competency there meaning ability to wage war
in a broad set of surroundings and experience
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with cooperating with other military assets.
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Those items are also the reasons why the US
army reserve is last on its side of the list.
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Its units are not meant for combat, but are
various logistics and other support units.
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Also, unstructured Russian reserves still
score similarly to the Russian national guard.
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On one hand, the Guard is a part professional,
part conscript force, but on the other, it鈥檚
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not trained to do combined arms maneuvers.
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The reserves might still have some leftover
combined arms experience from the time when
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they served in the army.
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The Russian National guard is an internal
security force.
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Light infantry and police, in a sense.
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It鈥檚 not even part of the Russian military,
but a parallel organization reporting to the
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Russian president.
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Besides internal security, it is tasked with
anti terrorism and border defense, though
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in case of a war it鈥檇 perform certain other
defense duties.
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Overall personnel numbers are big, but the
operational field units suggest actual troops
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on the ground to be less numerous.
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Then again, some of its units do use military
grade armored vehicles and even a token number
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of light towed howitzers.
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As for the aforementioned airborne corps,
that too isn鈥檛 part of the ground army.
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But they are, of course, part of the military.
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In the Russian system, the airborne corps
is an independent force, reporting directly
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to the commander in chief or his delegated
operational commanders.
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Back in 2012, the Airborne corps numbered
35 thousand.
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Big plans were announced around that time,
that each division would get a 3rd regiment.
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Yet, it became evident that most of that size
increase did not happen.
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Perhaps due to finances.
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Even today, the downward revised personnel
goal is not yet reached.
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In actuality, the airborne corps today numbers
between 45 and 50 thousand.
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Comparing that to the US airborne units, it鈥檚
a slightly higher number.
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Though the US figure pertains only to Army鈥檚
units.
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The US marines also have additional air assault
units.
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Direct comparison is further hampered by the
fact the US units involve a greater number
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of aviation and logistic personnel.
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So the power projection far outside Russian
borders is probably not that effective.
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Though Russian airborne can airdrop armored
infantry fighting vehicles in large numbers.
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While the US airborne only recently started
to reintroduce similar vehicles, and mostly
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airdrops humvees.
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Let us also just mention the ground forces
of the Russian navy.
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The Closest US equivalent would be the marine
corps.
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Russian naval infantry has also grown in recent
years, even more so percentage wise than the
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airborne corps.
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Yet, it鈥檚 way smaller than the US marine
corps, possibly by three times over.
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As the average russian battalion is almost
half the size of the us marine battalion.
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That being said, Russian naval infantry units
have heavier systems.
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Those include Tanks, which the US marines
got rid of, as well as medium range SAMs,
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which the US marines again lack.
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Of course, Russian naval infantry is mostly
meant to protect the coast and perform limited
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scale operations taking various nearby islands.
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It鈥檚 far less capable of large scale amphibious
landings, compared to the US marines.
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Russia simply doesn鈥檛 have either the helicopter
or landing ship numbers of the US.
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Helicopters are just not meant to support
the Russian army, the way some other countries
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use them.
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In Russia, the transport helicopter fleet
is basically sized to handle the airborne
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corps.
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It lacks thousands of helicopters to be really
comparable to the US army helicopter fleet,
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which serves its entire army.
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Russian infantry units are just not as mobile
as US ones, as they prioritize other areas.
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All those Russian helicopters are officially
part of the air force, of course.
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So while we鈥檙e at it, why not mention the
combat helicopters as well.
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What is increasingly part of the Russian army
are drone aircraft.
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Allegedly Russia operates some 4000 drones,
though the vast majority of those are tiny
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ones.
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Right now, the three most used models are
the Forpost family, based on the Israeli Searcher
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drones.
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Homegrown Eleron 3, and the Zastava, based
on israeli Bird Eye 400.
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Besides Eleron, other homegrown drones are
increasingly joining the force.
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More potent Forpost-R has started production.Despite
all the novel additions, the future of the
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Russian ground army is murky, as always.
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It鈥檚 not just about the hardware but also
about personnel.
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It鈥檚 about finances.
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Training.
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Getting more non commissioned officers, which
is also one area where the Russian army stumbled.
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In past reforms, it got rid of many such positions
while it streamlined its numbers.
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And now the army is bringing back some of
those NCO positions as they realise they lack
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in that middle level command tier.
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Nevertheless, the Russian ground army is a
very powerful beast.
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Especially when protecting Russia's own borders,
for which it was, after all, created.
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Against a medium sized or even large but not
very united opponent, it might prove to be
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very capable in various near border wars.
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As long as it doesn鈥檛 have to project its
power a thousand miles away from its border,
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the Russian army might be very quick to react
and very lethal to its neighbours.
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If there ever comes to such a war.
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