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Paul Krugman, Globalisation, and the Point of Economic Theory - YouTube
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Hi everyone. In this video I want to
persuade you that when an economist says
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their analysis is more credible because
they have a model on their side, they are
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usually wrong and should be ignored.
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It's not that I'm better than this, it's just that I'm much cleverer than you need to be to work here.
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I want to use the example of globalization and how economists have approached it to
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illustrate my point. It's no secret that
the negative consequences of
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globalization have made themselves felt
over the past few years, and that
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economists have a best committed a sin
of omission by failing to notice them
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unfold. Globalization has been linked to
economic decline in former manufacturing hubs...
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Our town is dying. One out of every
four homes is an abandoned dilapidated
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structure and you get told "keep picking
up trash and let leaders do what leaders do".
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...creating unemployment, deaths of despair,
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and political backlash. This is despite
economists being consistent supporters
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of and even architects of trade deals. Surely there is no better person to use
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as a foil than Nobel Prize winning
economist Paul Krugman, who probably has
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the biggest public reach of any
economist today. Krugman won his Nobel
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for his work on trade, but before that he
made his name as a public intellectual
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in the 1990s, responding to critics of
globalization who were unhappy with
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economists' cheerleading for free trade. He
was dismissive of critics of
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globalization as unsophisticated,
ideological, and ignorant. In fact, he was
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so insufferable that the New York Times
eventually gave him a column. Centrist
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Twitter still salivates over his 1990s
articles to this day.
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Why are you the way that you are?
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These debates are useful for us as
they often dovetailed into
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discussions about economic theory. The
critics were convinced that the
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unrealistic assumptions used in trade
theory made it irrelevant, while Krugman
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defended them as a source of insights.
Krugman frequently denied the
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globalization would have a major impact
on wages and employments at home. His
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view is best summed up by the following
quote from the man himself:
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Yet Krugman has himself admitted he was
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wrong. In an article on Bloomberg a few
months ago - and don't worry I will link
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all of these sources in the bio - he said:
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The article is actually a limited admission
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of wrongness, and Krugman doesn't hesitate to
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take pre-emptive snipes at would-be
critics like me. But we have to ask why
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he was even wronger than he thinks. And
to do this we need to learn - and then
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unlearn - some trade theory.
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International trade theory begins - and for some, ends - with the 19th century economist David
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Ricardo's idea of comparative advantage.
Krugman called it 'Ricardo's difficult
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idea' and chided journalists and pundits
for not understanding it. An example like
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this one is usually used to illustrate
the principle. Here we have two countries -
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England and Portugal - who can produce two different goods - cloth and wine. With an
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hour of work the UK can produce either
five pieces of cloth, or ten bottles of
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wine. Portugal can produce 20 of either.
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Ricardo argued that although it appears
Portugal is dominant in this situation -
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which might lead an unsophisticated
observer to call for protectionism in
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the UK - both countries will benefit from
specializing in their so-called
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comparative advantage, which just means
using your own time most effectively to
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produce. Here the UK is better at
producing wine than it is at producing
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cloth, so it should specialize in wine. Countries never have the same
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comparative advantage in these examples
so Portugal should produce cloth. By
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doing this, then trading, each country
ends up with more in total than they
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could have produced alone. If the UK
produces ten bottles of wine while
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Portugal produces 20 pieces of cloth, the
two countries can then trade six bottles
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of wine for four pieces of cloth. Now
after an hour of work the UK has four of
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each, which would have taken them over an
hour to produce. Portugal has six bottles
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of wine and sixteen pieces of cloth, which would also have taken them over an
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hour to produce. Trade effectively acts
as a 'cheat': even if you are not the best
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of producing something, you can sneakily
access another country's ability to
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produce it via the magic of trade.
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It doesn't take much to see that this
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example is hugely oversimplified. One key
assumption of comparative advantage, as
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well as the more advanced
Heckscher-Ohlin model, is that countries
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have a kind of innate propensity to
produce particular goods, which doesn't
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change with trade policy. When applied to
the real world this amounts to saying
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that Germans just have some innate
ability or resource that makes them good
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at producing cars, or that Japanese people have an innate knack for producing video games.
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The Japanese!? Those sandal-wearing goldfish tenders?
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In fact, it turns out comparative advantage isn't so good at explaining trade.
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I'll let some guy explain why.
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Economists talked about international
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trade for a couple of centuries and for
about 180 of those 200 years there
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was a basic view which was that
countries trade because they're
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different: this country is tropical so it
exports bananas; this country's got lots
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of land so it exports wheat. And...there's
been this...there was this kind of
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building discontent because a lot of
world trade is between countries that
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don't look very different.
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Krugman's work on theories of trade addressed at least
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some of these concerns and is the reason
he won the Nobel Prize in Economic
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Sciences. Countries specialize because
they face increasing returns: the more
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they produce in a given industry, the
lower the costs, and as certain countries
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become established in certain industries
others are unable to enter the market
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and compete. As a result, different
countries specialize in different
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industries so they will benefit from
trading with each other. Many of these
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theories anticipate the problems we've
seen in the real world, with trade
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creating 'winners' and 'losers' in terms of
income - even if overall income increases.
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But Krugman recently admitted that even
these improved models:
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If you read his papers you will see
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that they routinely assume full employment and it's kind of hard to talk
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about unemployment when you assume that it doesn't exist. I don't want to get too
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bogged down in the details of the
theories because they are mathematically
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complicated but in case you do I have
linked Krugman's papers along with an
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excellent short explainer by Jonathan
Catalan in the bio.
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What I want to ask is the following:
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With Krugman's admission that despite
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all these supposedly sophisticated
developments in economic theory,
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economists like him still underplayed
the downsides of trade, what was the
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point in using theory to analyze trade? Why was he so sure of his models in the
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1990s - including comparative advantage -
when refuting critics of globalization?
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Paul Krugman is not stupid. In fact, he
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has anticipated my objection by several
decades, using a very clever argument.
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One of Krugman's most relevant articles from the 90s is entitled 'the fall and rise
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of development economics' which is what I
will focus on in this part of the video.
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Krugman discusses the evolution of
economic theory as a process of first
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building overly simplified models, only
to bring realism back in as techniques
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develop. Although there'll be a short-term
loss of knowledge, the end point will be
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a fuller understanding - or so his
argument goes. He compares this process
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to 15th century maps of Africa, which in
many ways were inferior to the
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non-scientific understanding the local
populations had before. Over time though,
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cartography gave us modern maps, which are superior to pre-scientific understanding
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in many respects. Once again, a key part
of this debate was increasing returns to
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production, which was not originally
feasible because the maths just didn't
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work out. Instead, theorists had to assume costs
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rose without put, an unrealistic
assumption which a tutor of mine once said:
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This assumption put the models at odds with theories
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of development that held the stage at
kickstart industry because these relied
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on industry benefiting from economies of
scale, growing in competitiveness until
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the government could step aside.
Krugman argues that the mathematical
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models with increasing returns which
were eventually developed by economists
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were worth the wait.
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Let's back up to summarize the debate so far:
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All in all this is starting to feel a bit like...
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I need to send this
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parcel with the profit projections to
Pete Porter in Pasadena. And it
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absolutely positively has to be there overnight.
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Pete Porter pass it on.
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Pasadena promptly. Package for parcel
processing pronto.
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For Pete Porter in Pasadena.
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Priority? Precisely.
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Here's your package, Mr. Burns!
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My name is the return address you
senseless dunderpate!
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Unlike 15th century maps, or Krugman's
other example of meteorology, the more
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advanced versions of economic theory do
not seem to say much more than the
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informal theories they replaced, and
perhaps even say less. Krugman argues
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that we had "no way to know" that the
hyperglobalisation that began in the
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1990s would happen, but this is false. A
book Krugman called "thoroughly silly" in
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the 1990s predicted globalization would leave:
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Towards the end of The Fall and Rise of Development Economics
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Krugman gives a list of reasons that models lead to greater
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clarity than the informal theories they
replaced. Instead of painstakingly going
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through them one by one and responding,
I'll just state my view on the matter
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and leave you to come to your own conclusions,
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including how my view relates to his
should you care to read his essay - which
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I do of course, recommend.
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The problem is that economists tend to believe there is
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some intrinsic benefits to putting ideas
into mathematical models: they are their
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own justification. In a 1979 paper
Krugman outright stated that he was
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simply creating a model for ideas which
have been 'in the air' for some time. But
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how much work is the model doing when
it's telling us something we already
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knew? Whatever mechanisms and variables are most important for 'proving' these
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ideas mathematically are only relevant
if you assume the model itself is. Even
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worse, it's not clear economists are
really willing to follow models to their
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logical conclusions when they don't like
these conclusions. In a 1997 article
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Krugman proclaimed:
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He goes on to defend free trade
in spite of his own models.
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At one point he states:
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Now I have some sympathy for
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this statement - it's sensible. The problem is that it has nothing to do
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with trade models at the time, and once
you open up the possibility of using ad
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hoc, subjective reasons like this to
reject models, it's not clear where you
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draw the line. I could equally invoke reasons of
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unemployment and community to defend
protectionism, and they're not in the models
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either. Or I could invoke political
economy against free trade deals.
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Dean Baker has a lot of excellent work on how, through patent laws, trade deals are
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rigged to favor the wealthy. Dani Rodrik
has discussed how stronger protections
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against the downsides of trade can
actually increase political support for
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globalization over the long term. I would
prefer a discourse which wrestled with
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these different ideas in their own right,
instead of waylaying and misdirecting
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understanding for decades and even
centuries. As a final point I want to say
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that this is not a screed against models
altogether. My rule is that if you want
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to illustrate a principle, keep a model
simple if you want to make it more
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complex thing you need to show it's
worth it. This is why despite everything
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I actually prefer comparative advantage
to Krugman's more complex trade theories
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and that's why I spent some time
explaining it to you. It's a neat way to
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illustrate the gains from specialization
and trade, and it's so obviously unrealistic
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that, as long as it's taught properly, it
would never be taken too literally. And
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there is almost never a case for
disregarding historical or qualitative
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analysis over models of any kind.
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Thanks for watching this video. Please like and
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subscribe for more videos about
economics. If you have any thoughts on
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how to manage globalization or the uses
and abuses of economic theory I'd love
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to hear them
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