Surfside Condo Collapse: What We Know So Far - YouTube

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On June 24, 2021, a portion of Champlain Towers South, a 12-story condominium in Surfside,
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Florida, near Miami Beach, collapsed around 1:30 am.
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It was one of the most deadly structural collapses in U.S. history, with nearly 100 fatalities.
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Forensic investigations of the event will likely take years to complete, but there’s
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a lot we already know about the collapse.
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In this video, I want to summarize the events of this unthinkable tragedy, talk about a
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few of the structural engineering issues that may have played a part, and finally explain
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the process of forensic structural investigations and what might result from learning the technical
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cause of this catastrophe.
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I’m Grady, and this is Practical Engineering.
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Today’s video is on the collapse of the Champlain Towers South building.
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Champlain Towers South was built in 1981 along with a nearly identical North structure just
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up the street.
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The 12-story oceanfront tower was constructed of steel-reinforced concrete in the small
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Miami suburb of Surfside.
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The building sat atop an underground parking garage that extended below the adjacent common
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area that residents called the pool deck.
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The building had 136 condominium units. Unlike an apartment property with a single owner,
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Champlain Towers South was collectively maintained by those 136 condo owners through an association
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with board members.
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In the early hours of June 24th, we know that there was a failure of the pool deck adjacent
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to the building.
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Tourists at a nearby hotel were swimming when they heard a crash.
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They walked over to the Champlain Towers to see that part of the pool deck had collapsed
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into the parking garage below.
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About 7 minutes later, the building began to fall.
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A security camera nearby caught the entire event on camera.
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The building collapsed in three sections: first a south portion of the building, immediately
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followed by a north portion, and finally, the east section.
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The entire western half of the building remained standing.
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The search and rescue operation started immediately to get residents out of the damaged building
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and the rubble of the demolished area.
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Crews worked 24/7 to sift through debris for survivors.
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The western part of the structure, which didn’t collapse, posed a hazard to the rescue and
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recovery crews, especially with the threat of Tropical Storm Elsa potentially bringing
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high winds to the area.
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Town officials made the difficult decision to demolish the remaining part of the building
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on July 4th to safeguard the crews and avoid the possibility of it falling onto the existing
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search and rescue zone.
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As of the recording of this video, 97 people have been confirmed deceased.
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There were 126 people who were in the building during the partial collapse and survived.
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Of course, the most critical question of the collapse is why it happened.
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Unfortunately it’s a difficult one to answer.
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The Town of Surfside put all of their records and correspondence about the building online
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in the interest of public transparency.
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It was in the process of being recertified, a requirement in Miami-Dade County for all
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buildings when they reach 40 years in age, and every 10 years afterwards.
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That process starts with a detailed inspection by a structural engineer.
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For Champlain Towers South, the inspection was performed in 2018.
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The findings of that structural inspection have been the focus of most of the early conjecture
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about the cause of the building’s collapse.
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Among the items of concern identified during the inspection, one of the most important
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was the pool deck.
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The large concrete slab adjacent to the building also served as a ceiling to the underground
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parking garage.
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The inspection report noted major structural damage to this concrete slab, mainly as a
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result of poor drainage and failed waterproofing.
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The issue was that rainwater on the pool deck could filter through the pavers above the
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concrete slab, and then it had nowhere to go.
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So, instead of flowing along a properly sloped slab to drains, it simply pooled above the
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slab like a bathtub.
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Unlike a bathtub, this system wasn’t watertight.
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Runoff was leaking into the concrete below through joints, cracks, and into the pores
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of the slab itself.
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This wasn’t a surprise.
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It was a well-known problem at the condominium, and there were even plastic gutters installed
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in various locations along the ceiling of the parking garage to divert these leaks away
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from cars and walkways.
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But the water wasn’t just a nuisance to residents.
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It was also slowly deteriorating the reinforced concrete structure itself.
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I’ve produced a series of videos about concrete and steel reinforcement, so I’ll link that
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playlist below if you want more details.
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Reinforced concrete is an extraordinarily versatile building material because it is
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strong, durable, relatively inexpensive, and can be cast into just about any shape.
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For better or worse, it is one of the most ubiquitous building materials of the modern
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world.
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But like all building materials, it has its weaknesses and is subject to deterioration
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over time.
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One of the most prevalent of those weaknesses is the corrosion of steel reinforcement.
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Embedded steel is usually safeguarded against corrosion by the impermeable covering of concrete
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and its alkalinity, which creates a protective oxide layer around the steel.
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However, over time, water flowing through concrete can leach certain constituents out,
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making the concrete more porous and less alkaline.
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That makes the steel more subject to corrosion.
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This is especially true in coastal areas where salt laden air from the sea can carry chloride
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ions toward inland structures.
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When these chloride ions saturate the concrete, they accelerate the degradation of the protective
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oxide coating around the steel.
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Corrosion doesn’t just weaken steel, it also causes it to expand in volume, creating
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pressure within a reinforced concrete structure.
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Eventually the corrosion can reach a point where the pressure is too much.
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The surrounding concrete breaks away, leading to cracks, spalls (which are small areas of
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flaked off concrete), or delamination, where parts of the concrete along mats of reinforcing
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steel are completely separated.
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Once the steel is no longer surrounded and protected by concrete, the corrosion can progress
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much more quickly and may eventually lead to a structural failure.
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The engineering and construction industries have made huge improvements in design and
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construction of concrete structures in the past 30 years thanks in large part to the
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Federal Highway Administration and the International Concrete Repair Institute.
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However, Champlain Towers South was designed and built before modern building codes included
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best practices for concrete structures in harsh coastal environments.
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The engineer who inspected the tower pointed out the problem with the pool deck in strong
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language, stating that “failure to replace the waterproofing in the near future will
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cause the extent of the concrete deterioration to expand exponentially.”
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Keeping water, especially salty water, away from reinforced concrete is vital.
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If inadequate waterproofing turns out to be the cause of the failure, it won’t have
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been the first time.
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In 2012, the roof of the Algo Center Mall in Elliot Lake, Ontario collapsed, killing
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two people.
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The cause of the collapse was corrosion of the building's steel framework instigated
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by leaks through the improperly waterproofed rooftop parking deck.
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The prevailing theories about the Champlain Tower collapse from most of the current investigative
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journalism centers around the pool deck as a trigger or at least a major factor in the
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building’s demise, especially because the pool deck failure preceded the collapse.
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However, there is less certainty about what role in the collapse the failure of the deck
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slab had, since it does not provide any support to the building itself.
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What we see in the surveillance video would have required failure of one or more columns
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below the structure.
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One possibility is that the deck slab punched through intermediate columns such that it
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was hanging like a sheet from the columns below the building, sometimes called catenary
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action.
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The forces from the hanging slab could have loaded the columns below the building in a
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way they weren’t designed to withstand, causing them to buckle.
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Thanks to Mike Bell for sharing his animation of how that might have happened.
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However, the exact mechanism in which those columns failed is still unknown.
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Tragedies like this are usually the result of many separate factors coinciding, and there
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are several circumstances that may have contributed to the collapse.
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A research team studying changes in land and sea levels in the area in 2020 measured some
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unusual settlement of a few millimeters per year in the area of this building.
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Although many areas experience significant long-term and large-scale settlement, also
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called subsidence, it’s possible that if different parts of the site were settling
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at different rates, the tower’s foundation could experience additional structural stresses.
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Also, some photos of the rubble appeared to show less reinforcing steel than was called
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for in the original design drawings, particularly at the column-to-slab connections.
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There were also regular intrusions of groundwater into the parking garage, the recent construction
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of an adjacent high-rise building, and ongoing construction to the building’s roof to consider.
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All of these factors and many more will be reviewed by the forensics teams who are already
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investigating the cause of the failure.
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Many of these investigators have been on site during the recovery and cleanup operation
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to make sure rubble and debris that may offer clues into the cause of the collapse are documented
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and preserved.
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Major parts of the building are being preserved as evidence, so rubble was sorted on site
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and taken to a nearby warehouse for cataloguing.
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It’s important to keep in mind that each one of these forensic teams is trying to answer
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a slightly different question.
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The Town of Surfside hired its own investigator, Allyn Kilsheimer, to begin looking into the
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collapse.
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Surfside has a number of high-rise condos under their purview, so presumably they felt
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the need to conduct their own investigation for the safety of their citizens.
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Another critical service that Mr. Kilsheimer is providing is to satisfy the public’s
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need for information, which is why you see him doing interviews and talking on news shows
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on behalf of the Town of Surfside.
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At the federal level, the National Institute of Standards and Technology announced that
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they would launch a full investigation into the collapse.
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Formerly called the Bureau of Standards, NIST does a lot of research and science around
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measurements, materials, manufacturing, and engineering.
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Since 2002, they also have a federal mandate to investigate the cause of failure when a
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building collapse results in substantial loss of life.
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Their investigation will likely be the most thorough, including laboratory testing of
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steel, concrete, soil specimens, and structural modeling.
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During the recovery operation, they were on site with sophisticated equipment to take
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detailed records as rubble was hauled away and performing non-destructive testing to
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locate reinforcing steel and determine properties of the concrete members.
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They will also review all the reports and photographs from professionals, survivors,
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and witnesses of the event.
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Their final report will probably take a year or two to complete.
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The primary purpose of that investigation will not be to find fault, but rather to make
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recommendations for improvements to the building code and industry practices in the fields
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of structural engineering and construction.
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Insurance companies, victims, owners, and designers will also be involved in lawsuits
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to try and establish who is at fault in this tragedy and potentially award damages as a
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result.
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Those legal teams will hire their own experts who will be investigating the details of the
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collapse.
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However, their focus will be toward establishing professional and organizational culpability
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more than the technical causes of the failure.
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Finally, the county called a grand jury to examine the building’s collapse.
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A grand jury is essentially a group of citizens used to administer justice in various forms.
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Most commonly, grand juries are used as a step between accusing a person of a crime
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and trying them in court.
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However, they can also conduct their own investigations as representatives of their community.
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If the grand jury finds serious negligence or wrongdoing, there may even be criminal
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investigations that result from the collapse.
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Was it a poor design, a mistake made during construction, lack of proper maintenance,
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or a combination of all three?
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That’s the question the forensic teams will be trying to answer.
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And just to temper expectations a little, they may not find a final and clearcut cause
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of the collapse.
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The difficulty of forensic engineering is that you’re trying to piece together a sequence
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of events from small and disparate puzzle pieces.
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Unfortunately, in this case where the failure likely began at the bottom of the structure,
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most of those puzzle pieces were buried in a pile of rubble.
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I want to emphasize that this type of event is extremely rare.
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The damage to the Champlain Tower South pool deck shown in the 2018 inspection report is
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severe, but it was not an indication of an imminent collapse of the adjacent building
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by itself.
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Although we don’t know exactly how much things worsened between then and the collapse,
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I think you’d be hard-pressed to find a structural engineer who would evacuate a building
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based only on the level of deterioration shown in that report.
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Nearly all buildings, even with moderate maintenance, will last much longer than 40 years without
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fear of something catastrophic.
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Modern building codes are designed to ensure that our structures are engineered with redundancies
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and factors of safety for exactly this reason.
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My heart goes out to the victims of this unspeakable tragedy.
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I hope that investigators can get to the bottom of the collapse and its cause so that something
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like this never happens again.