The Amazon monopoly and the problem with Jeff Bezos' business model - YouTube

Channel: The Hated One

[0]
This is Jeff Bezos.
[2]
No this is Jeff Bezos.
[5]
Sorry this is Jeff Bezos.
[9]
His net worth will soon surpass $150 billion.
[16]
And this is his home.
[25]
Amazon.
[26]
The second company in the world to pass the $1 trillion mark.
[31]
But did you know that during more than two decades of existence, Amazon has struggled
[35]
to make any profit?
[37]
In fact, the company has been regularly operating at a loss, especially on international markets.
[42]
This is despite its exponentially growing revenue stream peaking at $232 billion for
[49]
the last year.
[50]
In the final quarter of 2018, Amazon reported profits of $3 billion with the revenue 24
[57]
times bigger.
[58]
And it wasn’t until the late success of Amazon Web Services, the world’s leading
[63]
cloud computing service, that Amazon began reporting consistent profits.
[67]
So what is happening with all this revenue?
[70]
It has everything to do with the business model of Jeff Bezos.
[74]
In his own words, Bezos believes in shareholder supremacy, which means everything is justified
[79]
as long as the share value is growing.
[81]
The key metric for Bezos is the ability to lock customers in their Amazon ecosystem.
[87]
Bezos reassures his shareholders that Amazon “has invested and will continue to invest
[92]
aggressively to expand and leverage their customer base, brand, and infrastructure as
[97]
they move to establish an enduring franchise”.
[100]
The revenue growth is the manifest of this very expansion.
[104]
Amazon absolutely dominates e-commerce – controlling roughly half of all online sales, more than
[111]
all of their competition combined.
[113]
In five different categories, Amazon claims more than 90% market share.
[118]
Jeff Bezos pushed Amazon great lengths to claim this dominance.
[122]
From undercutting competitors with predatory pricing, through forcing itself into their
[126]
business, to vertically integrating into strategic markets across the business line, Amazon is
[132]
on track to gradually take over every aspect of e-commerce and to control and decide what
[137]
we shop and what is allowed to be sold.
[143]
One of the first key steps for Jeff Bezos was to lock Amazon’s grip on consumers.
[149]
To lure more customers to stay with Amazon, the company launched Prime membership subscription
[154]
for a flat annual fee of $79.
[158]
By offering free two-day delivery and e-book renting along with music and video streaming,
[164]
about half of Amazon customers have been converted to Prime membership.
[168]
On paper, this was an immediate success, because on average, Prime members spent more than
[173]
twice as much as non-Prime customers.
[176]
But by 2011, estimates showed that the average annual cost of each Prime membership ranked
[181]
up to $55 in shipping and $35 in streaming.
[186]
This left Amazon losing about $11 per Prime customer.
[190]
All in all, Amazon was losing about $1 to $2 billion a year on Prime alone.
[196]
Not to mention that the expansion of Prime was happening right in the middle of the deepest
[200]
recession since the Great Depression.
[203]
But Jeff Bezos managed to persuade shareholders to stick with Amazon and their stock prices
[208]
went up by almost 300% in two years, when everyone else in retail was failing.
[215]
So what made Amazon investors so loyal to the company that was losing profit during
[220]
a heavy recession?
[221]
It was Amazon’s ability to lock down their grip on customers and claim monopoly position
[226]
on the market.
[228]
In the words of a former member of Prime development team, “It was never about the $79.
[234]
It was really about changing people’s mentality so they wouldn’t shop anywhere else.”
[238]
And this strategy really succeeded in its mission.
[241]
When Amazon finally raised the fee to $99 in 2014, 95% of Prime members claimed to stay
[249]
loyal and renew their subscriptions.
[251]
Studies found that less than 1% of Amazon Prime customers would consider competitor
[256]
retail sites during the same shopping session, while non-Prime customers were 8 times more
[262]
likely to shop between different retailers.
[266]
Investors back Amazon when it’s losing profits, because sacrificing short-term profit for
[270]
aggressive long-term expansion pays off.
[273]
Amazon did this with e-books, when it began selling Kindle devices below its manufacturing
[278]
cost.
[279]
Like with Prime, the goal of Kindle was to lock book readers in the Amazon ecosystem.
[284]
Amazon did this with digital rights management, DRM, that locked its e-book formats to Kindle,
[290]
so they couldn’t be read outside of Kindle.
[293]
With this strategy, Amazon also succeeded in dominating the e-book market, claiming
[298]
around 83% of e-book sales in the US and the only real competitor left is Apple.
[304]
Undercutting competition with below-cost prices and locking users in its ecosystem is a classic
[310]
strategy of predatory monopolization.
[312]
It gives monopolies opportunities to unfairly raise prices and enjoy the cash flow in a
[318]
market with only that competition left which they can contain or control.
[323]
In ideal circumstances, antitrust regulators would have stepped in long before such dominant
[328]
positions could have been acquired through anti-competitive practices.
[332]
However, purposefully operating at a loss with the aim to price out competitors is not
[337]
viewed as an anti-competitive practice on its own under the new anti-monopoly regulatory
[343]
view in the US.
[344]
In order for the FTC or the courts to step in, there has to be an intent to raise prices
[349]
for consumers once the dominance is taken.
[353]
And this is what Amazon has been extraordinarily clever at hiding.
[357]
Every new service Amazon rolls out allows them to track user behavior and collect personal
[362]
and usage data of their customers.
[364]
Amazon then deploys algorithms to personalize pricing on individual scale, and even goes
[369]
as far so to use bots to monitor prices of their competition and match them with Amazon
[374]
prices in real time.
[376]
This mechanism obfuscates the baseline from which it could be possible to observe price
[381]
fluctuations and so if there is no body, there is no murder.
[390]
Obfuscating its true intentions allowed Amazon to vertically integrate into the markets on
[396]
which its competitors were dependent on.
[398]
It’s not a coincidence Jeff Bezos turned Amazon into a marketing platform, a network
[404]
for logistics and delivery, a book publisher, a hardware manufacturer, a fashion designer,
[409]
a film and TV producer, a payment service and a cloud service provider.
[414]
Every industry domination is a step in the Bezos’ plan.
[418]
Amazon expands to these different markets by either acquiring key businesses or undercutting
[423]
them with below-cost pricing if they refuse to sell.
[427]
A company called Quidsi used to be one of the fastest growing e-commerce businesses
[432]
in the world, overseeing Diapers.com, Soap.com and BeautyBar.com.
[438]
First, Amazon offered to buy the whole company in 2009.
[442]
When Quidsi refused, Amazon bots began tracking Diapers.com and cut their own prices for baby
[448]
products by up to 30%.
[451]
But unlike Amazon, Quidsi was a new venture and didn’t have investors backing their
[455]
losses while they competed with Amazon’s monopolistic ambitions.
[460]
Amazon then began rolling out subscription services for care takers and significant discounts
[465]
on diapers, which cost Amazon additional $100 million per quarter.
[470]
Quidsi was bleeding and had no option but to sell.
[473]
Both Walmart and Amazon made an offer.
[475]
When Bezos found out Walmart offered a higher bid, his deputies went to Quidsi founders
[481]
with threats that Amazon would cut their prices even further if Quidsi sells to Walmart.
[487]
The FTC investigation found no evidence of anti-competitive behavior, and in 2010 Quidsi
[493]
sold to Amazon.
[495]
What happened to the generous offers and discounts on baby products?
[498]
They were discontinued or significantly reduced.
[502]
Many users who converted to Amazon from Diapers.com because of those discounts, wanted to go back
[508]
after they were abruptly scraped.
[509]
But there was no Diapers.com anymore.
[517]
Amazon doesn’t just compete with their competitors.
[520]
It forces itself into their business.
[522]
As a dominant online retailer, Amazon had enough bargaining power to secure discounts
[528]
of up to 70% on deliveries from fulfillment companies like UPS and FedEx.
[533]
Amazon then used these discounted deliveries to pack them in its own delivery service called
[539]
Fulfillment by Amazon.
[541]
Because Amazon was almost bigger than the whole e-commerce industry combined, UPS and
[546]
FedEx didn’t have enough negotiating power over Amazon.
[550]
To make up for the excruciating discounts requested by Amazon, UPS and FedEx began hiking
[556]
their prices to other independent sellers.
[559]
This created a paradox – Amazon’s strategy effectively directed sellers to use Fulfillment
[564]
by Amazon as it was cheaper than to use UPS and FedEx directly.
[569]
And now Amazon is investing hundreds of billions of dollars to establish its own physical delivery
[575]
capacity to completely eliminate reliance on UPS and FedEx and it will succeed in doing
[581]
so.
[582]
Controlling e-commerce infrastructure enables Amazon to build a marketplace where it discriminately
[587]
favors its own products without getting punished for it.
[590]
As a marketing platform, Amazon opened its door to third party sellers to reach customers
[595]
in exchange for fees ranging from 6% to 50%.
[599]
What these third party vendors also unwittingly gave up was the valuable data of their businesses
[605]
and their customers.
[606]
Amazon is using this data to study purchasing patterns and trends to undercut third-party
[611]
merchants on price or give their own products a featured placement.
[615]
Another benefit none of Amazon’s retail competitors enjoy, is Amazon world leadership
[621]
in cloud computing.
[622]
Amazon Web Services is on track to control half of the cloud infrastructure market share
[628]
with Microsoft as the only strong competition currently standing.
[632]
Many new startups rely on Amazon cloud service to deliver their services without committing
[636]
to build expensive infrastructure on their own.
[639]
But this also serves as an ultimate tool of industrial espionage that Amazon can use to
[645]
learn about new emerging competition to acquire or undercut on price before it endangers its
[651]
business.
[652]
It gives Amazon a control over data none of its competitors have, and thus Amazon can
[657]
enter new markets much more quickly and effectively than any other retailer out there.
[663]
There is no real competition to Amazon left.
[666]
There is no company quite like it.
[668]
Amazon’s path to become a global monopoly across different markets isn’t just an anomaly.
[673]
It was Jeff Bezos’s intention from the very beginning.
[677]
Monopolies destroy free markets, and with them the freedom to choose not just as a consumer,
[683]
but as a small business owner, a worker, an Internet user, and a citizen.
[688]
The best solution users of the Internet can do right now is to support merchants, authors,
[693]
developers, entrepreneurs and vendors by purchasing their products directly from them, rather
[698]
than going through an intermediary like Amazon.
[701]
Sure, you might be getting a better bargain on Amazon, but the long-term cost of saving
[705]
few bucks now is unbearable.
[707]
Decentralizing our economy away from monopolies back to middle class and small businesses
[712]
is the only sustainable solution and is a responsibility of every individual participating
[717]
in this economy.
[719]
The story of Amazon domination isn’t unique but rather reflects the nature of the business
[724]
model that’s become a standard in Silicon Valley.
[727]
It leads towards market domination and monopolization within the hands of the most aggressive corporations.
[733]
The little convenience of economic centralization comes at the cost of small businesses, middle
[738]
class jobs, wealth distribution, privacy, free speech and free market as a whole.
[744]
Should we let Amazon monopolize one market after another?
[747]
Or should we step in with drastic measures to protect what allowed Amazon to exist in
[752]
the first place?
[753]
It’s time to have this conversation now.