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The Amazon monopoly and the problem with Jeff Bezos' business model - YouTube
Channel: The Hated One
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This is Jeff Bezos.
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No this is Jeff Bezos.
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Sorry this is Jeff Bezos.
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His net worth will soon surpass $150 billion.
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And
this is his home.
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Amazon.
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The second company in the world to pass the
$1 trillion mark.
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But did you know that during more than two
decades of existence, Amazon has struggled
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to make any profit?
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In fact, the company has been regularly operating
at a loss, especially on international markets.
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This is despite its exponentially growing
revenue stream peaking at $232 billion for
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the last year.
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In the final quarter of 2018, Amazon reported
profits of $3 billion with the revenue 24
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times bigger.
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And it wasnât until the late success of
Amazon Web Services, the worldâs leading
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cloud computing service, that Amazon began
reporting consistent profits.
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So what is happening with all this revenue?
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It has everything to do with the business
model of Jeff Bezos.
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In his own words, Bezos believes in shareholder
supremacy, which means everything is justified
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as long as the share value is growing.
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The key metric for Bezos is the ability to
lock customers in their Amazon ecosystem.
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Bezos reassures his shareholders that Amazon
âhas invested and will continue to invest
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aggressively to expand and leverage their
customer base, brand, and infrastructure as
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they move to establish an enduring franchiseâ.
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The revenue growth is the manifest of this
very expansion.
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Amazon absolutely dominates e-commerce â controlling
roughly half of all online sales, more than
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all of their competition combined.
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In five different categories, Amazon claims
more than 90% market share.
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Jeff Bezos pushed Amazon great lengths to
claim this dominance.
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From undercutting competitors with predatory
pricing, through forcing itself into their
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business, to vertically integrating into strategic
markets across the business line, Amazon is
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on track to gradually take over every aspect
of e-commerce and to control and decide what
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we shop and what is allowed to be sold.
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One of the first key steps for Jeff Bezos
was to lock Amazonâs grip on consumers.
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To lure more customers to stay with Amazon,
the company launched Prime membership subscription
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for a flat annual fee of $79.
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By offering free two-day delivery and e-book
renting along with music and video streaming,
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about half of Amazon customers have been converted
to Prime membership.
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On paper, this was an immediate success, because
on average, Prime members spent more than
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twice as much as non-Prime customers.
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But by 2011, estimates showed that the average
annual cost of each Prime membership ranked
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up to $55 in shipping and $35 in streaming.
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This left Amazon losing about $11 per Prime
customer.
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All in all, Amazon was losing about $1 to
$2 billion a year on Prime alone.
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Not to mention that the expansion of Prime
was happening right in the middle of the deepest
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recession since the Great Depression.
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But Jeff Bezos managed to persuade shareholders
to stick with Amazon and their stock prices
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went up by almost 300% in two years, when
everyone else in retail was failing.
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So what made Amazon investors so loyal to
the company that was losing profit during
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a heavy recession?
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It was Amazonâs ability to lock down their
grip on customers and claim monopoly position
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on the market.
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In the words of a former member of Prime development
team, âIt was never about the $79.
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It was really about changing peopleâs mentality
so they wouldnât shop anywhere else.â
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And this strategy really succeeded in its
mission.
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When Amazon finally raised the fee to $99
in 2014, 95% of Prime members claimed to stay
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loyal and renew their subscriptions.
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Studies found that less than 1% of Amazon
Prime customers would consider competitor
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retail sites during the same shopping session,
while non-Prime customers were 8 times more
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likely to shop between different retailers.
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Investors back Amazon when itâs losing profits,
because sacrificing short-term profit for
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aggressive long-term expansion pays off.
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Amazon did this with e-books, when it began
selling Kindle devices below its manufacturing
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cost.
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Like with Prime, the goal of Kindle was to
lock book readers in the Amazon ecosystem.
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Amazon did this with digital rights management,
DRM, that locked its e-book formats to Kindle,
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so they couldnât be read outside of Kindle.
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With this strategy, Amazon also succeeded
in dominating the e-book market, claiming
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around 83% of e-book sales in the US and the
only real competitor left is Apple.
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Undercutting competition with below-cost prices
and locking users in its ecosystem is a classic
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strategy of predatory monopolization.
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It gives monopolies opportunities to unfairly
raise prices and enjoy the cash flow in a
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market with only that competition left which
they can contain or control.
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In ideal circumstances, antitrust regulators
would have stepped in long before such dominant
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positions could have been acquired through
anti-competitive practices.
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However, purposefully operating at a loss
with the aim to price out competitors is not
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viewed as an anti-competitive practice on
its own under the new anti-monopoly regulatory
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view in the US.
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In order for the FTC or the courts to step
in, there has to be an intent to raise prices
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for consumers once the dominance is taken.
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And this is what Amazon has been extraordinarily
clever at hiding.
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Every new service Amazon rolls out allows
them to track user behavior and collect personal
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and usage data of their customers.
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Amazon then deploys algorithms to personalize
pricing on individual scale, and even goes
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as far so to use bots to monitor prices of
their competition and match them with Amazon
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prices in real time.
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This mechanism obfuscates the baseline from
which it could be possible to observe price
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fluctuations and so if there is no body, there
is no murder.
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Obfuscating its true intentions allowed Amazon
to vertically integrate into the markets on
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which its competitors were dependent on.
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Itâs not a coincidence Jeff Bezos turned
Amazon into a marketing platform, a network
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for logistics and delivery, a book publisher,
a hardware manufacturer, a fashion designer,
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a film and TV producer, a payment service
and a cloud service provider.
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Every industry domination is a step in the
Bezosâ plan.
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Amazon expands to these different markets
by either acquiring key businesses or undercutting
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them with below-cost pricing if they refuse
to sell.
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A company called Quidsi used to be one of
the fastest growing e-commerce businesses
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in the world, overseeing Diapers.com, Soap.com
and BeautyBar.com.
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First, Amazon offered to buy the whole company
in 2009.
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When Quidsi refused, Amazon bots began tracking
Diapers.com and cut their own prices for baby
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products by up to 30%.
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But unlike Amazon, Quidsi was a new venture
and didnât have investors backing their
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losses while they competed with Amazonâs
monopolistic ambitions.
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Amazon then began rolling out subscription
services for care takers and significant discounts
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on diapers, which cost Amazon additional $100
million per quarter.
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Quidsi was bleeding and had no option but
to sell.
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Both Walmart and Amazon made an offer.
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When Bezos found out Walmart offered a higher
bid, his deputies went to Quidsi founders
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with threats that Amazon would cut their prices
even further if Quidsi sells to Walmart.
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The FTC investigation found no evidence of
anti-competitive behavior, and in 2010 Quidsi
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sold to Amazon.
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What happened to the generous offers and discounts
on baby products?
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They were discontinued or significantly reduced.
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Many users who converted to Amazon from Diapers.com
because of those discounts, wanted to go back
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after they were abruptly scraped.
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But there was no Diapers.com anymore.
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Amazon doesnât just compete with their competitors.
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It forces itself into their business.
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As a dominant online retailer, Amazon had
enough bargaining power to secure discounts
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of up to 70% on deliveries from fulfillment
companies like UPS and FedEx.
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Amazon then used these discounted deliveries
to pack them in its own delivery service called
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Fulfillment by Amazon.
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Because Amazon was almost bigger than the
whole e-commerce industry combined, UPS and
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FedEx didnât have enough negotiating power
over Amazon.
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To make up for the excruciating discounts
requested by Amazon, UPS and FedEx began hiking
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their prices to other independent sellers.
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This created a paradox â Amazonâs strategy
effectively directed sellers to use Fulfillment
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by Amazon as it was cheaper than to use UPS
and FedEx directly.
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And now Amazon is investing hundreds of billions
of dollars to establish its own physical delivery
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capacity to completely eliminate reliance
on UPS and FedEx and it will succeed in doing
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so.
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Controlling e-commerce infrastructure enables
Amazon to build a marketplace where it discriminately
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favors its own products without getting punished
for it.
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As a marketing platform, Amazon opened its
door to third party sellers to reach customers
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in exchange for fees ranging from 6% to 50%.
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What these third party vendors also unwittingly
gave up was the valuable data of their businesses
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and their customers.
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Amazon is using this data to study purchasing
patterns and trends to undercut third-party
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merchants on price or give their own products
a featured placement.
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Another benefit none of Amazonâs retail
competitors enjoy, is Amazon world leadership
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in cloud computing.
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Amazon Web Services is on track to control
half of the cloud infrastructure market share
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with Microsoft as the only strong competition
currently standing.
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Many new startups rely on Amazon cloud service
to deliver their services without committing
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to build expensive infrastructure on their
own.
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But this also serves as an ultimate tool of
industrial espionage that Amazon can use to
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learn about new emerging competition to acquire
or undercut on price before it endangers its
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business.
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It gives Amazon a control over data none of
its competitors have, and thus Amazon can
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enter new markets much more quickly and effectively
than any other retailer out there.
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There is no real competition to Amazon left.
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There is no company quite like it.
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Amazonâs path to become a global monopoly
across different markets isnât just an anomaly.
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It was Jeff Bezosâs intention from the very
beginning.
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Monopolies destroy free markets, and with
them the freedom to choose not just as a consumer,
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but as a small business owner, a worker, an
Internet user, and a citizen.
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The best solution users of the Internet can
do right now is to support merchants, authors,
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developers, entrepreneurs and vendors by purchasing
their products directly from them, rather
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than going through an intermediary like Amazon.
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Sure, you might be getting a better bargain
on Amazon, but the long-term cost of saving
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few bucks now is unbearable.
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Decentralizing our economy away from monopolies
back to middle class and small businesses
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is the only sustainable solution and is a
responsibility of every individual participating
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in this economy.
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The story of Amazon domination isnât unique
but rather reflects the nature of the business
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model thatâs become a standard in Silicon
Valley.
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It leads towards market domination and monopolization
within the hands of the most aggressive corporations.
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The little convenience of economic centralization
comes at the cost of small businesses, middle
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class jobs, wealth distribution, privacy,
free speech and free market as a whole.
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Should we let Amazon monopolize one market
after another?
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Or should we step in with drastic measures
to protect what allowed Amazon to exist in
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the first place?
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Itâs time to have this conversation now.
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