How Fracking Became America's Money Pit - YouTube

Channel: Bloomberg Quicktake: Originals

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If you wanna get around,
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if you wanna drive a car, you wanna get on a plane,
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you need oil.
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It has been the foundation of the 20th century economy.
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Once considered impossible,
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American energy independence has become a reality.
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And for better or for worse,
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it's all thanks to fracking.
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The spoils of which have spurred
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what's commonly called
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the Shale Revolution.
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It is almost impossible to overstate
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the transformational effect that fracking had
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on US oil and natural gas production.
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It became this rallying cry
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that the shale boom was really gonna transform
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the US into a dominant energy player.
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It changed everything really.
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The US went from producing about five million barrels
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of oil a day in 2008,
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up to 13 million barrels of oil just this last March.
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It was this, what we thought at the time,
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was gonna be this great American success story.
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Except for one problem.
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The numbers never added up.
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For every dollar they brought in,
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they'd be spending $1.10, or $1.20, or $1.50.
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This has always been the Achilles heel of the business.
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The oil sector always needs to be very careful
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about the level of investment it makes
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and the cash returns to investors.
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The investment community did not finance
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the shale revolution out of the goodness of their hearts,
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I think they liked the idea of US energy independence,
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but they wanted returns, and for the most part,
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they hadn't come.
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There has never been a better decade
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for growing US oil and gas production
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and yet what was the worst performing sector in the S&P500?
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Energy.
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That tells you a lot about this sector.
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26 US oil and gas producers
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have filed for bankruptcy this year.
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This is the story of how shale
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went from revolution to a bottomless money pit.
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In order to understand how much shale
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changed the energy game,
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you have to go back a half century or so.
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For about 50 years,
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America has been way short of oil and gas,
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having to import these vital fossil fuels
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that are essential to the running of the economy.
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And everyone believed that we would be importing
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almost all our oil requirements for the foreseeable future.
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And really that shaped American economics
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for a decade.
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You had the Arab oil embargo in the 70's,
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you've had wars, you've had recessions,
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all driven by shortages of oil and gas.
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From 1970 until 2000,
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the US imported most of its oil
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from Saudi Arabia and Russia.
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Companies like Exxon and Chevron
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were exploring drilling all over the world
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in places like the Arctic, and Africa.
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But fracking changed everything.
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When we talk about fracking,
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we basically talk about the combination
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of two technologies,
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horizontal drilling, and hydraulic fracturing,
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and when they come together,
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it allows oil producers to get oil and gas
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out of very, very dense shale rock,
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very deep beneath the earth.
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And they really unlocked huge, huge resources
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of oil and gas.
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It was briefly profitable
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as a gas game, but very quickly,
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the problem with any kind of commodity industry
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is supply and demand,
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so natural gas fracking unleashed such a plethora
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of supply, price plummeted
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and it's never recovered.
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After shooting itself in the foot
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by flooding the gas market, the fracking business
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managed to pivot to oil.
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And what we find is that all the lessons that were learned
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in natural gas could be applied just as easily
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to deposits of oil, because it's essentially
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the same process.
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A lot of people thought this was hocus pocus,
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it was never gonna work, but there were a few companies
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who decided to try it, just in case.
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Lo and behold, it worked.
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So, enormous amounts of money flooded into the sector
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and you had lots of companies took the money,
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and went out drilling.
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It was a perfect storm.
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Near zero interest rates prompted by the financial crisis,
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mixed with the seemingly endless demand for oil and gas
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at sky-high prices gave way to a veritable feeding frenzy
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of hungry investors on Wall Street.
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This made it very easy
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for small, independent shale companies to get started.
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You could really just lease up land
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and if you had partners, and you know,
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even just a small amount of investment,
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you could just try to figure out where the good rock was.
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And that meant that sometimes you lost
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and sometimes you won,
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but when you won, you won big.
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For years, the big majors didn't want anything
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to do with it, they stayed out of it.
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So it really was almost like modern day wildcatting,
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and people made fortunes.
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Throughout American history,
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oil has always attracted the rebellious type.
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And fracking was no different.
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Back then, and today, these guys were called wildcatters.
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In the movies, you see those pictures of
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the rugged Texas oil wildcatter standing in front of
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some spewing well.
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Wildcatter was basically someone who took
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what was considered like a small amount of money
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at the time,
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and went out and leased up a bunch of acreage
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and poked holes in the ground
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to try to figure out where the oil was.
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And no one personified the modern day
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shale wildcatter better than Aubrey McClendon.
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We might have brought a way for America and the world
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to be able to increasingly say no to OPEC.
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Aubrey McClendon was the founder and CEO
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of a company called Chesapeake Energy.
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He's a fascinating character, just larger than life.
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He was one of the first
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to appreciate the scale of American shale gas reserves.
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If there's an old maxim in the oil business,
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drill baby, drill!
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Drill baby, drill!
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Drill baby, drill! Drill baby, drill!
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That was Aubrey to a tee.
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If you gave him money,
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if he had access to money, any money,
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no matter how hard he had to scrounge to find it,
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he was gonna go drill a well.
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With McClendon as shale's mascot,
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companies like Chesapeake and a slew of other startups
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rode a wave of glory, and shale was hailed
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as the next great American success story.
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So 2010 to 2014 were really the glory days of shale.
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This is when you had everything going right.
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You had oil prices at $100 a barrel,
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you had Wall Street throwing money at these companies,
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you had exploration being very successful,
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finding all these new areas,
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all these new basins.
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The idea that you could take something
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that was in your own backyard
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and make your country this big global player
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is really a romantic one, and I think a lot of people
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believed in that.
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And so the oil flowed.
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Lots of it.
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So much that America's standing actually reversed
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from a net importer to a net exporter of oil.
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And for the wildcatters and consumers alike,
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it was a remarkable transformation.
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But what no one seemed to want to admit
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is that shale extraction is incredibly expensive.
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And a shale well is very different
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from a traditional oil well.
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With a conventional well,
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once you've drilled it, if you're lucky enough
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to hit natural gas, or oil,
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the well generally continues to produce
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for a long, long time.
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Shale wells by nature, explode in this like spew
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of production, and it's like if you take a champagne bottle
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and you shake it, you're gonna get bubbles flowing over.
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But the decline that happens
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after that initial burst of production,
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you can see a shale well lose 70 percent of production
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after its first year.
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I mean, it's pretty staggering.
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As a shale producer, you're constantly fighting
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this enormous decline rate.
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You need to constantly be drilling new wells, new wells,
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new wells, new wells, which is more money, more money,
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more money.
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If you think about the mindset of dot com companies
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back in the day, it was get market share,
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just grow, grow, grow, claim the market,
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then it's all yours, then you're gonna be able
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to produce profits.
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And Aubrey McClendon's mindset and the mindset of many
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in the shale industry was much the same way.
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And while investors kept pouring in new money,
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shale executives were raking in huge salaries,
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even as their companies were sinking.
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Executives were paid based on production growth,
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not on profits, and if you reward an executive
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to grow, then grow is what they're going to do.
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Tell an oil guy that not only does he have money
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to go drill, but you're gonna pay him
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if he can go and produce more oil,
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he's gonna go produce all the oil he possibly can.
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You can't slow down, or your company shrinks,
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but if you keep growing,
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you're just constantly putting cash in the ground
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to drill new wells
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and eventually investors are gonna say,
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"Wait a second, I need you to stop drilling wells
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"if you're not gonna be able to give me my money back."
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Over the last decade,
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an estimated $340 billion dollars
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has been spent on US fracking.
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It's what everyone refers to as the treadmill.
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The problem, of course, is when the treadmill stops,
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or when you are forced to get off the treadmill.
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How low could oil go?
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It's been referred to
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as the Thanksgiving Day massacre.
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There is going concern amongst some members of OPEC
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that shale was eating their lunch.
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Because you had this enormous growth in the sector.
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Saudi Arabia, that is taking the bigger picture,
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to protect the oil price, we have to not cut,
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because otherwise shale oil will get the advantage.
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The entire shale business model
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was predicated on high oil prices.
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Any serious drop and it all comes crashing down.
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Who's winning?
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Consumers.
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Who's losing?
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Well obviously producers, but maybe people who've lent
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to producers need to be a little bit more worried
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than perhaps they have been.
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US frackers who had been promising
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they could make money, suddenly it was clear
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they couldn't make money.
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And the capital going into the industry started to dry up.
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While over 100 companies ended up declaring bankruptcy.
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And people said the shale revolution is over.
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But since when has a slew of bankruptcies
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and a highly volatile market stopped any self-respecting
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entrepreneur?
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There was still a lot of people willing
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to invest billions of dollars in shale.
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A big reason why investors remained interested
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in shale was the rediscovery of a huge reserve in Texas
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called the Permian Basin.
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The hype around this region became known as Permania.
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And so even though there was this downturn,
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the music really didn't stop playing.
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Guys like Aubrey McClendon
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used permania to continually sell the shale story,
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even as the price per barrel made the model
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totally unsustainable.
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And fighting back the cloud over shale
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was gonna prove as futile as trying to change
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the direction of the wind.
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The reckoning came in 2016, with McClendon's death.
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The Oklahoma City Police Department responded
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to a fatality accident involving Mr. Aubrey McClendon.
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The government had been investigating him
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on price fixing charges,
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and they indicted him in the spring of 2016,
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and the day after he was indicted,
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he went out in his SUV and hit a bridge at top speed,
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and was killed.
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His death was almost like the punctuation mark
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underscoring what was supposedly the end
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of the shale revolution, but it came back!
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And the main reason it came back
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is because we were still in this super low interest rate
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environment.
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Investors didn't have anywhere else to put their money,
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and so it came roaring back.
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Oil prices continued to rise steadily,
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and shale execs drilled harder than ever,
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praying for increasing oil prices
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and promising returns to anxious investors.
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2020 was supposed to be the year
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where the top 20, 25 players in the independent US
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oil industry were supposed to, in aggregate,
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turn cash flow positive for the first time.
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But, of course, that didn't happen.
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In March of 2020, Russia triggered an oil war
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with Saudi Arabia, effectively killing
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an important OPEC deal, cratering global oil prices.
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And as if that wasn't enough.
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The coronavirus pandemic is triggering fears
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of a global recession.
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Crude oil drops below $30 a barrel.
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The impact on the oil is disproportionate.
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Oil prices crashed, and everything changed.
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Within weeks, you started seeing the impacts
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of the coronavirus and the subsequent lockdowns
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having effect on oil demand.
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And unlike the last downturn,
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this one was really triggered by a complete collapse
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in demand.
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Global demand for oil was already low,
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since governments imposed widespread lockdowns,
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and airlines grounded flights because of the disease.
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There were lots of passive investors,
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people who own oil futures, but have zero interest
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in taking delivery of a physical barrel of crude oil
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suddenly realizing that they were gonna be on the hook
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for taking delivery of crude oil.
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I think what everyone will remember for many years to come
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is the day oil prices fell to negative $37 a barrel.
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Since then, oil prices have bounced back,
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but the shale wildcatters have not.
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Some of the quickest to rise have already fallen,
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including McClendon's white knight, Chesapeake Energy,
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which filed for bankruptcy in June of 2020.
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Are we almost through this bankruptcy cycle
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in the distressed oil and gas patch?
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We are not.
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For a lot of these guys, it was going to happen anyway,
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and this really just accelerated it.
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The tally is still coming in,
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but the number of jobs lost
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due to the collapse in the shale business
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is going to be crushing.
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Fracking actually provided some four million jobs
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in the decade since the financial crisis.
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It's a sudden demise,
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perhaps a hint of things to come, for the beleaguered
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shale oil industry.
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Yet amidst this collapse,
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shale execs have been taking home huge bonuses.
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Oil and gas executives have typically made well over
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100 percent of their target bonuses,
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even as their returns or stock performance
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has been in the negatives.
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Ban fracking now!
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And now that the bubble has burst,
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many environmentalists have seized on these failures
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to make their case against shale.
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You actually have a coming together, almost,
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of environmentalist and investors to say
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just keep the oil in the ground,
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because there is too much of it.
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Environmentalists were delighted
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by any reports that fracking wasn't financially viable
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because it appeared to be support for their claim
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that this industry needed to go away.
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The lack of profits in the fracking industry
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means that it's all of us, it's taxpayers
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who are gonna be stuck with the cleanup cost
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with what it's done to our water supply,
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with what it's done to our environment.
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The lure of American dominance
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in the energy sector remains strong
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and despite the shale revolution's faulty business model,
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and unresolved environmental concerns,
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the powerful desire to extract oceans of oil
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that lay beneath our feet will likely never relent.
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Fracking has come back from the dead several times.
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I wouldn't count the industry out,
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I don't know that we'll ever see the heyday
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that we did in the last few years again,
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but I think it's too soon to say
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that fracking is going away.