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Defensive, Offensive and Neoclassical Realism | International Relations Theory - YouTube
Channel: All About Defense
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In “Imperial by design” Mearsheimer
wrote about what kind of concepts guide
[4]
American decision-making in a
context of bipolarity, why the context of
[8]
bipolarity is particularly important,
what options exist within a setting
[12]
of unipolarity and what are the costs
of each of these choices we make.
[17]
Realism in the 1990s
needs to say something about
[19]
how the configuration
of power in the system,
[22]
marked by anarchy, is
translated into concrete
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action and strategies
on the part of States.
[27]
So, from this problem, we
have three strands of realism.
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The first category is defensive realism.
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Defensive realism is closer
to Waltz because he is a very
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conservative author in terms of
how he assumes states behave.
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Waltz is an author very
focused on the issue
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of survival as something
that becomes decisive
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for any form of political
organization within a
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context of anarchy,
marked by decentralization.
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Therefore, it is inevitable to think
that, given this degree of insecurity
[57]
generated by decentralization,
strategies reflect this need for survival.
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So, what informs the rationality
of the State's decision is,
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normally, a State supported by the
search to safeguard its expectation
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of survival, which makes the
State conservative from the point
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of view of its behavior,
since it won’t like to take risks.
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The tendency of the state is
to pursue the status quo, which
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is why the balance of power
becomes such an important concept.
[81]
When the State is facing
a context of change,
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it will give more
importance to the power
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he already has than
to take a risk that
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could make him gain
more or lose everything.
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War always creates
additional uncertainty and
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states tend to be averse
to these uncertainties.
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That's why they don't seek war.
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That's why they seek stability
and why the status quo is important.
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The priority of the rationality
of its strategy is more linked to
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maximizing its probability of survival
and maximizing its power projection.
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offensive realism
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In offensive realism, to
understand the international
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system it is necessary to
understand some things.
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It makes no sense to look at states'
strategies as if states were equal.
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To understand the dynamics of the
system, it is necessary to understand
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the behavior of the powers of the
system and not of all states in general.
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The rationality of the
powers are different.
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powers are less risk averse
and because they are dealing
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with such potentially aggressive
opponents, in a changing
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landscape, if there is an
opportunity to project power, you
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always grab that opportunity,
even if it causes instability.
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This is because the
power you failed to project
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today can be used
against you in the future.
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To understand the dynamics of the
system, it is necessary to understand the
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rationality of the
powers, which is different
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from the rationality
of other actors.
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And the rationality of stronger
states tends to be more
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aggressive, because they
play a more aggressive game.
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The possibility of power projection is
seen as something that if we don't use that
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opportunity, even if it involves a risk,
it can be used against you in the future.
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The rationality that guides the
behavior is not the probability
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of survival, but the maximization
of the projection of power.
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Any power you don't use can
be used against you in the future.
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neoclassical realism
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Neoclassical realism seeks
to argue that we have the
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structure that is the
starting point for reflection on
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the international, supported
by the idea of anarchy,
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decentralization and
distribution of capabilities.
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This structure is the independent
variable of the system.
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This means that it is the fundamental
cause of international phenomena.
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This structure causes
the behavior of States.
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The behavior of States
is the dependent variable.
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That's what you want to explain.
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You generate hypotheses
to explain how the structure
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generates certain
behaviors and not others.
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Between the system that is the independent
variable and the behavior of the State,
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which is the dependent variable, we have
the intervening variable in the middle.
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These are the processes
that translate the constraints
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of the structure into the
strategies of the States.
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These variables are, for
example, geography, culture,
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history, a particular set of
circumstances that will condition
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the way in which
decision-making in a given State is
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supported by the power
conditions present in the system.
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The materiality of the
distribution of power is
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not enough to explain why
we do A and fail to do B.
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For example, Americans do
not react to a North Korean atomic
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bomb in the same way they
react to a French-built atomic bomb.
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Even if the materiality, the components
used and potentially destructive
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power are the same, there is a
set of geographic, strategic and
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cultural circumstances that
condition how Americans translate that
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transformation in the balance of
power into effective political action.
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The bomb produced by North
Korea poses a more concrete
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threat to US security than
a French-built atomic bomb.
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We can only explain how
the same deviation in the
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configuration of power,
an independent variable,
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translates into different
behaviors, a dependent
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variable, if we understand
what is in the middle
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of the process, the
intervening variable, the
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cultural, geographic
processes that influence the
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construction of decision-making
processes of certain
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States and how they
react to certain changes.
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So these are the three main
streams of contemporary realism.
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We have one with a greater focus
on the status quo, and it looks at
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this property of the State to be very
aware of its survival, and assumes
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that this is crucial for understanding
the international system, and
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this logic of preserving stability
through construction of balance.
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We have authors who focus more on power
politics and the particular circumstances
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of that policy, and how it shapes the world
as a whole in a more aggressive trend.
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Power needs a different
behavior dynamic, it needs
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to project power whenever
it has an opportunity.
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So it doesn't maximize
the probability of
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survival, it maximizes
the power projection.
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Finally, we have the authors
who believe that in order
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to understand how the
system's constraints translate
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into decision-making, it is
not enough to generate a
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single hypothesis, as the
defensive and the offensive do.
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It is necessary to understand
which variables intervene
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in the way constraints
translate into decision making.
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Therefore, it is necessary
to understand what the
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intervening variables
are in a given situation.
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