Reasons to Avoid Index Funds - YouTube

Channel: Ben Felix

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- I generally assume that most
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of you watching these videos are already fully
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on board with the idea that index investing makes sense.
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While stock picking
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and actively managed funds should be avoided
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like the plague.
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Most Canadians are apparently not on board with that idea.
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As at the end of 2018, only 11.5%
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of Canadian investment fund assets that is mutual fund
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and ETF assets domiciled in Canada
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were invested in index funds.
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Clearly more people in Canada
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should subscribe to my channel.
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I'm Ben Felix Portfolio Manager at PWL Capital.
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In this episode of "Common Sense Investing"
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I'm going to tell you
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that there are no good reasons to avoid index funds.
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(upbeat music)
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Anecdotally, I can tell you that there are lots
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of financial advisors out there who genuinely believe
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that index funds are terrible investments.
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They have their reasons to believe this.
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And I'm willing to bet that it's this type of misinformation
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from supposedly financial professionals that is
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keeping so many Canadian dollars invested
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in actively managed funds.
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Let's start with the classic fallback line for any advocate
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of active money management.
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Index funds are risky.
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The premise of this argument is
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that when you own the whole entire market, you will get all
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of the ups and all of the downs that the market delivers.
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The alternative would of course be investing
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with an active manager that is able to feel out
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the market and use their analysis
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and intuition to protect you from a downturn.
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The active management story sounds way better
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than writing out, down markets with index funds.
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But the story does not hold up
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when we look at the data.
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Vanguard did a study in 2018
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to look at the performance of active managers
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in bull markets when stocks are doing well,
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and in bear markets, when stocks are doing poorly.
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Critics of index funds would suggest
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that active managers should outperform the index
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in a bear market.
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The data show that more than 50%
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of active managers outperform the index
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in some historical bear markets, but in other bear markets
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less than 50% manage to be the index.
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This should not instill confidence in anyone betting
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on active management to save them in a downmarket.
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If active funds do not offer any protection
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when stocks fall, then there is no basis to say
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that index funds are a relatively risky investment.
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Active management also introduces
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a whole other element of risk.
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We know that the market as a whole is risky.
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It goes up and down in value
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as investors expectations about the future change.
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For taking on the risk of the market,
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investors expect a positive return.
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In other words, the risk of the market is a priced risk.
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An active manager is still taking on market risk
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but they're also taking on active risk.
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The risk that their bets will end up paying off.
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Active risk is not a priced risk.
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I would argue that active management is far riskier
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than index investing because active management
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introduces an additional level of risk.
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And it is a type
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of risk that does not have a positive expected return.
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Another common reason to avoid index funds is
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that you get no control over your holdings.
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You end up buying all of the bad stocks
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along with the good ones.
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With the right active manager,
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you will only get the good stocks
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while avoiding the bad ones.
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This is another great story without any data to back it up.
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The problem with only picking the good stocks is
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that there is no way to tell what a good stock is.
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There is a massive difference between the quality
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of a company and the quality of its stock returns.
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For example, from 2010 through 2017
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a time when and Google, Apple, Amazon
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and a Netflix shares were on a massive growth path.
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Domino's pizza had stock returns that dominated all
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of the tech giants.
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It takes some serious predictive ability to successfully bet
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on a company like Domino's.
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This is not a small issue either.
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My example is descriptive of how stock returns work.
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Of the roughly 26,000 stocks that appeared
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in the CRSP database,
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a comprehensive database of U.S. stocks
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from 1926 through 2015, only 1000 of them were responsible
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for all of the market returns in excess of treasury bills
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over that time period.
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That was like finding a needle in a haystack.
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We can think about this issue another way.
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Global stocks as whole returned 8%
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per year on average from 1994 through 2017
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if you missed the top 10% of performers each year
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your average return drops to 3.6% per year.
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It is easy for an active manager to say
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that indexing results and owning all
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of the good and bad stocks.
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What they're not able to tell you is which stocks are good
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and which ones are bad.
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The reality is that it is a relatively small number
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of stocks that drive the market's returns.
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And it is next to impossible to consistently
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identify those stocks at least ahead of time.
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When proponents of active management give these reasons
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for avoiding index funds, it is always
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on the basis that active management is a superior.
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This is where the data comes in.
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The SPIVA Scorecard shows us the percentage
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of funds in each category that were able to
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beat their benchmark index over a given time period.
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The SPIVA Canada mid-year 2018 report shows
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that the vast majority of actively managed funds
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were unable to beat their benchmark index
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over one, three, five, and ten-year periods.
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Of course, the rebuttal to this data is that
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but he would invest with any old active manager.
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Smart investors only invest with skilled active managers.
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If you can find a skilled manager,
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index funds don't make sense.
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Let's dig into that for a moment.
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The idea that a successful active manager might be skilled
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needs to be considered alongside the fact
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that their success may have been due to luck.
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Even over long periods of time
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some active managers will beat the market
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due to luck rather than skill.
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This makes the process of finding
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a skilled manager exceptionally challenging.
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In a 1997 paper
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Mark Carhartt demonstrated that any persistence
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in mutual fund outperformance was not due to
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manager's skill, but due to exposure to the common factors
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in stock returns, including size value and momentum.
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The abstract to the paper concludes the results
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do not support the existence of skilled
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or informed mutual fund portfolio managers.
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In 2010 Eugene Fama and Kenneth French,
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again studied mutual funds
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in their paper luck versus skill in the cross section
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of mutual fund returns and found that before costs
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there are both skilled and unskilled managers
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but the skilled managers are not skilled enough
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to cover their own costs.
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Over the years, there have been many anecdotal examples
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of superstar fund managers who flamed
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out hard to finish their career, were they lucky or skilled?
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If they were skilled, why did their skill run out?
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Take David Baker who managed the 44 of Wall Street Fund to
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be the top performing us equity mutual fund in the 1970s.
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He even beat the famed Magellan Fund managed by Peter Lynch
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over that time period.
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For the following decade
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the 44 Wall Street Fund was the worst performing fund
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with investors losing a 73% for the full time period
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while the S&P 500 grew 17.6% per year on average.
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Or how about the Legg Mason Value Trust Fund managed
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by Bill Miller.
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He beat the S&P 500
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for 15 consecutive years ending in 2005.
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Starting in 2006,
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he led the fund to five years of mostly awful performance
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before handing the management over to a new manager.
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None of this should come as a surprise statistically
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it would take 36 years of 2% alpha.
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That is 2% of excess risk adjusted performance
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with a standard deviation of alpha
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of 6% for manager's skill to be statistically significant
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at a 95% level of confidence.
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10 or 15 years about performance
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it tells us almost nothing.
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With no way to identify skilled managers ahead of time,
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the argument that skilled managers make index
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funds obsolete does not make any sense.
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Before anyone says what about Warren Buffet,
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please check out my last video
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which covered the Oracle of Omaha in detail.
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Has anyone tried to convince you
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that index funds are bad investments?
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Tell me about it in the comments.
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Thanks for watching.
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My name is Ben Felix of PWL Capital
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and this is "Common Sense Investing".
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If you enjoyed this video, please share it with
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someone that you think would benefit from the information.
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Don't forget if you have run out of
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"Common Sense Investing" videos to watch,
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you can tune into the weekly episodes
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of the Rational Reminder Podcast
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wherever you get your podcasts.
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(upbeat music)