ABC Accounting for Long term Debt pt 7 - YouTube

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Welcome back to our intermediate financial accounting class. Over the last
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few segments, we've been talking about long-term debt, and the way it shows up
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on our income statement and our balance sheet. We've talked about the importance
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of debt finance, and we've talked about how we do journal entries for bonds and
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for mortgages, we've talked about retirements, and conversions, and done all
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sorts of examples to help solidify the concept of how we treat debt for
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financial accounting purposes. Now to wrap up this discussion, we need to
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talk about one last topic, and it's one we've alluded to already in our very
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first segment, but now I want to talk about it in a little bit more
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detail, and that's the fact that companies try to shift as much debt as possible
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off of their balance sheet. It's not because debt is bad, debt is actually a
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good thing. It gives extra financing, it keeps the owners from having to provide
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all those extra funds, it provides a financing source that you can pay back
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with just interest, you don't have to give back interest and part of your
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revenue stream, right? The profit that belongs to the investors. But it still
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has a negative connotation for a lot of investors, because of the risk associated
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with default. So companies have this tendency to try to slide it off. We call
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it "off-balance sheet financing." And companies actually have a lot of reasons
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why they think it's appropriate. We're going to talk about some of these
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reasons why companies think it's appropriate to do off-balance sheet
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financing. Now I'm not trying to convince you that's good or bad, I just want to
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make sure you understand the logic that companies are using to argue with FASB
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about whether or not different liabilities should show up on their
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financial statements. Keep in mind: this has become such a hot issue, and there's
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so much push back and forth between companies, and regulators, and auditors,
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and academics that it really has become a key concept in our discussion of debt.
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So here is the logic that companies use when arguing with FASB, and with others
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who are trying to push them to report more than they're currently reporting on
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their balance sheet, as a long-term debt balance. Their first
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argument is that it actually improves the quality of the balance sheet if we
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leave some of the debt off. And that allows us to get
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easier financing. Now when we talk about quality being improved, we're not talking
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about quality as in it provides more information, we're talking about quality
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as in it looks better, and if our balance sheet looks better, we can get easier
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financing. Easier financing is better on the bank, because they don't have to
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spend as much money trying to figure out if we're good investment or not. It's
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better on our investors because they don't have to pay as much to the banks
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so they get to keep a larger share of the profits. It's better for us as
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management, because we don't have to waste our time trying to get the
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financing that we need. So that's one argument, the second argument is it makes
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sure we don't violate our loan covenants. A lot of loan covenants have a
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restriction on the debt that you're allowed to show, so you can only have X amount
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of other long-term debt beyond this loan, or something along those lines. So
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companies that can shift some of this debt off their balance sheet, they keep
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from violating their debt covenants, which saves the bank a lot of time and effort
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to recall, they don't have to do as much analysis, and we don't have to try to
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renegotiate. It's always better for our owners if they don't have to pay the
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fees associated with a debt recall, or have our credit rating downgraded. The
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final argument is perhaps the most persuasive of the three, and that is the
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fact that the assets of the business are already understated. Some of them are
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recorded like the intangible assets that we talked about in an earlier lecture,
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many of them are recorded at historical cost, they appear to be much smaller on
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their balance sheet than they really are. So why should we have to show our debt
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at current value, if we're showing our assets at their old historical value, or
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not showing it at all? It makes our balance sheet lopsided, so
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if we can shift a little bit debt off the balance sheet, then it makes it more
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fair, and we get a better picture of what our company really looks like, because
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we've made both assets and liabilities look a little smaller. Whether you
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believe these arguments or not, companies have a lot of legal means, or financial
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accounting means to legitimately remove their debt. It might not be ethical, but
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it is legal, or legitimate from an accounting perspective, however you want
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to think about it. So one of the best ways that companies can still do this is
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with their leases. Leases, of course, are a long-term agreement to rent something
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from a different company, but if we structure it just right, we don't
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show that as a liability, we just debit a rent expense, and credit cash every
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period as we send our checks. So even if you're locked in to a 10 or 20 year
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lease, you can still not show that obligation on your balance sheet if you
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follow the rules just right. A lot of companies have been very careful to
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structure their leases so they follow these different roles, and slide off the
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balance sheet. One of the best examples of this is one, I believe we mentioned
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before, and that is FedEx. We've all seen the FedEx trucks, the planes, etc. None of
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those show up on FedEx's balance sheet as assets, and the liability that they have
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for leasing all of these items, don't show up as liabilities either. So leasing,
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again, is one of those common ways that companies eliminate debt from their
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balance sheet. Now in addition to the legitimate, or legal, ways that companies
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that can slide debt off their balance sheet, there's also some ways that are
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much closer to the border, and the best examples of these actually come from
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Enron. Now Enron was a great energy trader. It had a lot of things going for it,
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but slowly its culture shifted so that they started using accounting tricks,
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instead of legitimate business practices to make a profit, and to keep their
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balance sheet looking good. So there are many many examples of the ways that they
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would keep debt off their balance sheet. We're gonna look at just one simple
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example, and you'll see quickly just how complex some of the others had to be, if
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this is simple. So let's start off with Enron. Enron needed a lone, and they were
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worried about getting this loan, because they didn't want the extra debt on the
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balance sheet. They didn't want to violate a debt covenant, or drive up some of their
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ratios, so what they did instead is they created this special purpose entity. Now
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a special purpose entity is a special kind of company, basically what it boils
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down to is two different companies, or an individual and a company, getting
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together and saying, you know, we need extra widgets. Nobody out there is
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producing the widgets that we need, I don't have the money to do it, you don't
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have the money to do it, what if we each put up just half the money, and we'll
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create this special entity that only produces widgets? Now if we produce it
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and it loses money, that's okay we're only on the
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hook for half of the money that it loses, and if it makes money, at least we'll get
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half of a gain, this could be a really good thing for us. Well one of the
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negatives of a special-purpose entity is the fact that if you own half, and I own
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half, but neither of us controls it. And from an
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accounting perspective, since nobody has control, it just kind of disappears, and
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nobody really shows this entity, or its assets, and that's what Enron was trying
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to use. Not the special purpose, let's do something that's good for us
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portion of a special purpose entity, but instead, let's find a way to make this
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disappear, and then that's what they did with these entities, and they did quite a
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few of them, and by structuring them so that Enron owned half and one of their
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employees owned half, then they still essentially controlled this
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special-purpose entity. So in order to create the special purpose entity, in
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this example where they needed a loan, they took the asset they wanted use for
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collateral, and they used it to help found this special-purpose entity, and in
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exchange they received a bunch of stock from this special-purpose entity, which
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gave them their voting control, then what they did with that stock is they went to
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another special-purpose entity, that they didn't create, this one was already
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out there, but they took the stock, not the voting stock, but like preferred
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stock, where you were entitled to a dividend, but you don't didn't really
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have any voting rights, and they sold that stock to this other special-purpose
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entity. Well, the special purpose entity says oh yeah, we'd absolutely love to buy
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this stock from you, it's a great idea for us as an investment, but we don't
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have the cash right now, so let's go to the bank and we'll get
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the bank to loan us the cash, and we'll then give that cash to Enron. Well the
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bank looked at this loan, and they went, you know, this really is kind of risky, I
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mean, all you have is some stock in another small company, remember this is
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not Enron's stock, this is the special purpose entity one's stock, and the bank
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was a little worried about it, and they said, you know, that special-purpose entity one
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stock, I don't know if they're really going to produce enough value to repay
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this debt. So Enron stepped in with what we call a derivative, and a derivative,
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basically, is a way to offset risk, and essentially Enron guaranteed
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that they would cover any defaults in the interest that this special-purpose
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entity to had to pay to the bank, and the bank said, well, if we've got a derivative
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that ensures that the interest will be paid, alright we'll accept that. And they
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would loan the money to special purpose entity two, which would then give the money
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to Enron. Now if you look at what's happened here, Enron has really used an
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asset as collateral for a loan. That's what's really going on, but because of
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the way they structure that, they not only avoid showing the loan, but they get
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to show sales revenue from sailing off this stock to the subsidiary. Not only
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they rid of the debt, they get to show revenue for this, and they don't even
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have an interest expense to worry about later on, they just have to cover the
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interest payments if special purpose entity two can't quite make them. Ingenious,
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isn't it? You've got to wonder, as you think through this transaction and others that
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were much more complex, and how well Enron would have done as a business if
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they'd spent their time and intelligence and creativity providing business
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services, instead of accounting tricks. Now since Enron took such advantage of
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this special purpose entity opportunity, under the old GAAP rules, FASB
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has actually closed this loophole, and you can't just make these entities
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disappear anymore. So slowly but surely, we're finding ways to reduce company's
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opportunities to get the balance sheet free of some of this debt. One of the
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other ways we've done it, or are working on doing it, closing this loophole, is
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we're trying to restructure the lease accounting rules, so that everybody has
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to, what we call capitalize their lease, which would mean that you would show the
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asset, and you would show the lease liability. That one's still very much up
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in the air, there's a lot of pushback against what FASB's proposing, so
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we'll see what happens, but because of companies like Enron, we are trying to
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close some of these loopholes. Now despite company's attempts to shift
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financing off of their balance sheet, there are some good ways that we can use
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to analyze our debt, and how much debt a company's carrying, and perhaps the best of
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these is the debt to equity ratio. Now the debt to equity ratio is basically
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the total liabilities, divided by the total
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equity. What we're showing is: how many dollars of debt we have for every dollar
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of equity. That's the best way to interpret it, so if you have a million
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dollars in liabilities, and a million dollars in debt, you have a ratio of one
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one dollar of debt to every dollar of equity. Most investors want to see some
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long-term debt, they want to see some one term debt because they want to know that
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you're leveraging their money to make them more money. If I can take out a loan,
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I don't have to you the money from the investors, and if I can make more than
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the interest payment, then that profit rolls back to the investors, the owners,
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and that's what any owners want to see. But they don't want to see too much of
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it, so a smaller value is in this debt to equity ratio is usually considered less
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risky, but most of us don't want to see it as zero, they want to see it around
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one, perhaps maybe about 1.5, it depends on the industry how much debt
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they'll actually be able to take out. The higher the industry risk, say trying to
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invent new medicines, or other chemicals, there's a lot of risk there, so they
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can't get a lot of debt, if it's a low-risk investment like, say, utility,
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then you tend to see a lot higher debt to equity ratio, because there's really
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no risk. People aren't going to stop buying electricity or water, so you have
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a pretty good cash flow, and you can take out a lot of debt without a lot of risk,
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since your future cash flows will be pretty steady, and then you can leverage
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that and make investors more money. There's a lot going on with long-term
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debt, why? Because long-term debt is such a big piece of understanding our
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financial structure. Remember, these are our other investors. We have owners that
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are investors in the company, and we have these long-term debt holders there are
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other investors in our company, and we have to keep track of what we owe them,
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and how much we need to pay them interest, and when we have to pay them
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back, and how their investment matches up with what the owners have given us, it's
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cool stuff, and it all works together so well to provide a good picture, even when
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companies try to slide some of it off of their balance sheet. Now when we come
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back in our last lecture, we're going to talk about our last set of investors, and
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that is: our owners. The ones we typically think of as investors. That's what's coming up next.
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I'll see you then. Thanks