Stock Market Forecasts - YouTube

Channel: Ben Felix

[0]
- Stock and bond market returns surprised everyone in 2019
[4]
despite what seemed like constant concerns
[7]
about a coming recession, the MSEI all country
[10]
world index finished the year up 20.19%
[13]
and the Bloomberg Barclays global aggregate bond
[15]
index hedged to Canadian dollars
[17]
finish the year up 7.4 3% both in Canadian dollar terms.
[22]
At the beginning of every year, including last year
[25]
and this year analysts make often gloomy forecasts
[28]
about short term expected returns and economic conditions.
[32]
There are two big problems with these forecasts.
[35]
They often make investors nervous and they're usually wrong.
[38]
I'm Ben Felix portfolio manager at PWL Capital.
[42]
In this episode of common sense investing.
[44]
I'm going to tell you what to expect
[45]
from the stock market in 2020.
[50]
There is no reliable approach
[52]
to predicting future stock market returns.
[54]
And the consistently poor accuracy
[56]
of stock market forecasts are enduring proof.
[59]
Every year, since 2010 Larry Swedroe
[62]
the chief research officer for the BAM Alliance
[64]
has compiled a list of sure thing predictions
[67]
made by the financial media and other investors.
[70]
He diligently tracks those predictions throughout the year
[72]
and reports on the results.
[74]
The predictions are things that most investors
[76]
will be familiar hearing.
[77]
Strengthening or weakening of currencies,
[79]
economic growth rates, market returns
[82]
and asset class returns to name a few.
[84]
Swedroe tallied up a total of 69 sure thing predictions
[87]
from 2010 through the end of 2018
[90]
only 32% of those predictions materialized as expected.
[94]
Of course, a sure thing should materialize 100% of the time,
[98]
not 32%.
[99]
The value of forecast was also studied
[101]
a bit more formerly in a 2018 paper
[103]
titled "Do Financial Gurus Produce Reliable Forecasts"
[106]
where the authors examined a 6,627 forecast
[110]
made by 68 forecasters.
[112]
They gave more weight in the analysis
[114]
to longer term and more specific forecasts.
[117]
They found that 48% of the forecast examined were correct
[120]
and 66% of the forecasters had accuracy scores
[123]
less than 50%.
[125]
Listening to humans making forecasts about the market
[127]
probably isn't useful
[129]
but there are some quantitative measures
[130]
that have historically been useful in forecasting
[133]
future returns and economic conditions.
[135]
These measures might even show up as evidence
[137]
to back up the usually incorrect market forecast
[140]
that people make.
[141]
The Shiller cyclically adjusted price earnings ratio
[144]
has been a particularly reliable indicator
[146]
where higher stock prices tend to be followed
[149]
by lower future stock returns.
[151]
As it stands right now US stock prices are high
[154]
based on the Shiller Cape.
[156]
This might lead to a lower return expectation for US stocks
[160]
but it's not information that can be used
[162]
to time Investment decisions.
[164]
A paper from AQR titled "Market Timing, Sin, A Little"
[167]
examined the Shiller Cape as a market timing tool.
[170]
They built a market timing strategy
[172]
that adjusted the weights in stocks based on valuations.
[175]
They tested the strategy on data from 1900 through 2015.
[179]
For the full sample the timing strategy
[181]
did add a bit of value to returns
[183]
but it underperformed from 1958 through 2015.
[187]
The paper suggest that this may be due to stocks
[189]
becoming more or less cheap for very long periods of time.
[192]
In other words, from 1900 through 1957
[195]
stocks were generally cheap relative to their past
[198]
resulting in the timing strategy being aggressively invested
[201]
in stocks for most of the time period.
[203]
From 1958 through 2015
[205]
stocks were generally expensive relative to the past
[208]
resulting in the strategy being under invested
[210]
for most of the time period.
[211]
The paper sums this up as follows.
[213]
Valuations can drift higher or lower
[215]
for years or decades making it difficult
[218]
to categorize the current market confidently
[220]
as cheap or expensive without hindsight calibration
[224]
and therefore difficult to profit from such categorizations.
[227]
The other thing to keep in mind
[228]
as a properly diversified investor
[230]
is that the us stock market is not the world.
[233]
Stocks in Canadian and international markets
[235]
are not currently as expensive as measured
[238]
by Shiller price earnings
[239]
and emerging market stocks are cheap by the same measure.
[243]
In either case it doesn't really matter
[244]
because we can't use the Shiller Cape to time the market.
[247]
But when you hear that the market is expensive
[249]
or overvalued an appropriate response might be which one.
[252]
The other measure that is often cited and making forecasts
[255]
is the US yield curve.
[257]
The chart of us treasury yields that plots
[259]
the yield on the y-axis and the maturity
[261]
is on the x-axis.
[262]
A normal yield curve is upward sloping
[265]
where longer maturity treasuries have higher yields
[267]
than shorter maturity treasuries.
[269]
An inverted yield curve when the shorter term treasuries
[271]
have higher yields than longer term treasuries
[273]
has been really good at predicting US recessions.
[276]
There have been nine a US yield curve inversions
[279]
including the one that occurred in late 2019
[281]
and seven US recessions since 1966.
[285]
An inverted yield curve has successfully forecasted
[287]
within six quarters, six of those recessions.
[290]
There was one false positive in 1966
[293]
when an inversion was not followed
[294]
by a recession within six quarters.
[297]
We are currently sitting within the six quarter window
[299]
that of recession has historically occurred
[301]
following an inversion, spooky stuff.
[303]
I'm not forecasting a recession, but even if I was
[307]
it wouldn't be a reason to change your investment strategy.
[310]
In a 2019 paper titled "Inverted Yield Curves
[312]
And Expected Stock Returns",
[314]
Eugene Fama and Ken French built a market timing model
[317]
that moves out of equities and into treasury bills
[319]
when the local yield curve is inverted.
[322]
They acknowledged that there is strong empirical evidence
[324]
suggesting that inverted yield curves
[326]
tend to forecast future recessions.
[328]
But they set out to answer how this relates
[330]
to stock returns.
[331]
They analyze three different portfolios
[333]
from the perspective of a US investor.
[335]
The US market the world ex US market and the world market.
[339]
The analysis was designed to test whether
[341]
or not an actively managed strategy
[343]
that shifts out of equities and into treasuries
[346]
based on yield curve inversions adds value
[348]
to portfolio returns.
[349]
Based on their analysis, Fama and French conclude
[352]
that the results should disappoint investors
[354]
hoping to use inverted yield curves
[356]
to improve their expected portfolio return.
[359]
We find no evidence that yield curve inversions
[361]
can help investors avoid poor stock returns.
[364]
They go on to explain their interpretation of this finding.
[367]
The simplest interpretation
[368]
of the negative active premiums we observe
[370]
is that yield curves do not forecast the equity premium.
[374]
This interpretation implies
[375]
that investors who try to increase their expected return
[378]
by shifting from stocks to bills after inversions
[381]
just sacrificed the reliably positive unconditional
[384]
expected equity premium.
[385]
In simple terms
[386]
while the yield curve may forecast economic activity
[390]
it does not forecast stock returns and trying
[392]
to time the market as usual results in a better chance
[396]
of losing out on good returns than missing bad ones.
[399]
All right, so the experts don't know what they're talking
[401]
about when they make specific market or economic forecasts
[405]
and the best quantitative forecasting tools that we have
[407]
for the stock market and the economy do not help
[410]
in making better investment decisions.
[412]
I need to qualify that statement a little bit.
[414]
The Shiller Cape may not be useful
[416]
for making portfolio timing decisions
[418]
but it has been a useful tool
[419]
for estimating future long-term stock returns.
[422]
In the 2019 version of an annually updated paper
[425]
on equity risk premiums asks what the motor
[428]
on demonstrated that the current implied equity risk premium
[431]
is the best predictor of the future equity risk premium.
[435]
It's still far from perfect
[436]
but it is the most reliable metric that we have
[438]
for forecasting future stock returns.
[441]
Well, this is not useful in making market timing decisions.
[444]
It is useful
[445]
in making long-term financial planning decisions.
[448]
After a year of great returns like 2019
[451]
it might make sense to reduce your expected returns
[454]
for financial planning purposes.
[455]
The way that the implied equity risk premium work
[458]
is by taking the earnings yield,
[459]
earnings divided by price, and then adding inflation
[462]
to estimate the nominal expected return.
[465]
For example, if the Shiller Cape
[467]
for US stocks is currently 31.31,
[470]
we take one divided by 31.31
[472]
to find the implied equity risk premium.
[475]
This gives us a result of a 3.2, 2%.
[478]
To estimate inflation we take the spread between
[480]
the Canadian nominal and real return long-term bond yields.
[483]
This difference in yield
[484]
is the market's current inflation expectation.
[487]
This figure is currently 1.37%.
[490]
We now have a nominal expected return for US stocks of 4.6%.
[495]
If you have been using historical market returns
[497]
as financial planning inputs
[498]
you might start to notice that what I'm saying is important.
[501]
The S&P 500 has returned over 11% per year
[504]
in Canadian dollar terms since 1926.
[507]
It should be obvious that there are dire implications
[509]
for basing a financial plan on an 11% return
[512]
when a more reasonable expectation might be 4.6%.
[516]
As low as that expected return for US stocks is
[518]
it's important to look around the rest
[520]
of your portfolio before getting discouraged.
[522]
Following the same methodology
[524]
Canadian stocks have an expected nominal return of 5.9%.
[528]
International developed stocks have
[529]
an expected nominal return of 6.4%.
[532]
And emerging markets are at 8.6%.
[535]
Unexpected return is not a short-term forecast.
[538]
It is the long-term return that you expect to earn
[540]
on an asset based on its riskiness.
[542]
Now, I know that some of you might be thinking
[544]
that it makes sense to move
[545]
out of the lower expected returning regions
[547]
and into the higher ones,
[548]
but the data are a little too messy
[550]
for that to work consistently.
[551]
In a 2012 paper by Cliff Asness titled
[554]
"An Old Friend The Stock Markets Shiller PE"
[556]
Asness confirmed that future returns fall consistently
[559]
as the Shiller price earnings
[561]
at the start of the period increases.
[563]
Higher Shiller price earnings,
[564]
lead to lower future returns on average.
[567]
The problem though is
[568]
that there is still a large distribution of future outcomes.
[572]
Higher prices shift the distribution as a whole
[574]
but they do not make future returns anymore certain.
[577]
Asness looked at the distribution of future returns
[580]
for the S&P 500 when the Shiller price earnings
[582]
was at various levels.
[584]
Remember it was 31.31 when this video was recorded.
[588]
When it was historically below 9.6
[590]
10 year real forward returns average 10.3% annualized
[594]
in US dollar terms.
[595]
For context, the average annual return for the S&P 500,
[599]
going back to 1926 has been 7.3% annualized
[603]
also in US dollar terms.
[605]
So when the Shiller price earnings has been low
[607]
market returns have been well above average.
[609]
The best 10-year real return while the Shiller PE
[612]
was below 9.6 was 17.5% annualized.
[616]
While the worst was 4.8%.
[618]
There was a difference of 12.7 percentage points
[621]
between the best and worst decade
[623]
when the Shiller PE was below 9.6.
[625]
At the other end of the spectrum
[627]
when the Shiller PE has been at historic highs above 25.1
[631]
the real returns in the following decade average 0.5%.
[635]
The best decade had a real return
[637]
of 6.3% annualized while the worst was negative 6.1%.
[641]
There was a difference of 12.4 percentage points
[643]
between the best and the worst decade
[645]
when the Shiller PE was above 25.1.
[648]
This should illustrate why making asset allocation
[650]
decisions based on the Shiller PE
[652]
would not be wise.
[653]
Shifting in and out of equity markets
[655]
based on the Shiller PE could easily lead
[657]
to a bad outcome.
[658]
Sticking to an asset allocation through time
[660]
allows you to maintain exposure
[662]
to the reliably positive equity risk premium.
[664]
I know I didn't give you any exciting forecast
[667]
in this video so I apologize
[668]
if that's what you were looking for.
[669]
The only forecast worth paying attention to
[671]
are those that have been proven as useful in the data
[674]
like the Shiller price earnings.
[675]
And even then forecast should only be used
[678]
to tweak your expectations for financial planning purposes
[681]
not to make short-term changes to your investment strategy.
[684]
Thanks for watching.
[685]
My name is Ben Felix of PWL capital
[686]
and this is common sense investing.
[688]
If you enjoyed this video,
[689]
please share it with someone who you think
[691]
could benefit from the information.
[693]
Don't forget if you've run out of common sense
[695]
investing videos to watch,
[696]
you can tune into weekly episodes
[697]
of the rational reminder podcast
[699]
wherever you get your podcasts.
[701]
(upbeat music)