The Principal-Agent Problem - YouTube

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Hey everyone. Noah Zerbe here. This is one of聽 a series of videos looking at key concepts in聽聽
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decision making. This video focuses in particular聽 on the principal agent problem. The principal聽聽
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agent problem can emerge anytime responsibility聽 for carrying out a specific task or course of聽聽
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action is delegated from one person to another.聽 The person delegating authority is the principal,聽聽
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and the person responsible for acting or making聽 decisions on behalf of the principal is the agent.聽聽
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But what happens if the interests and actions聽 of the principal and the agent are not aligned?聽聽
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This is the realm of the principal agent problem.聽 The concept itself emerges out of the business聽聽
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and economics literature to describe the tensions聽 between owners of a business and the managers of聽聽
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that business. In its simplest form, it describes聽 the tension between the principals--the owners聽聽
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of a company or the shareholders who wish to聽 maximize profits and increase stock dividends--and聽聽
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their agents--the managers of a company who may聽 be driven by a number of other motivations beyond,聽聽
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or at least in addition to, simple profitability.聽 The principal agent problem can be applied to聽聽
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a number of scenarios. Real estate agents聽 often have an interest in selling a house as聽聽
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quickly as possible, even if that means that they聽 might earn a little less money from the sale.聽聽
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This is because the costs they incur in selling聽 a house are greater than the extra profits they聽聽
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may earn from waiting a little longer. Thus the聽 interests of the real estate agent (the agent)聽聽
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and the homeowner (the principal) are not聽 aligned, and a principal agent problem can emerge.聽聽
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Or think about a student who pays someone else聽 to write their essay. The student (the principal)聽聽
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would like the highest quality paper. But the聽 anonymous author (the agent) is more interested聽聽
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in taking as little time as possible to complete聽 the essay, and may not even really care about聽聽
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getting caught by the professor. Again, their聽 interests are not aligned. And what about the聽聽
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competing interests between a landlord and a聽 tenant? The landlord would like to charge as聽聽
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much rent as possible while having a tenant who聽 takes good care of their property but doesn't聽聽
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demand too much from them in terms of property聽 maintenance and improvements. The tenant,聽聽
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by contrast, would like to pay as little as聽 possible and would like to see improvements and聽聽
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maintenance to the home performed by the landlord,聽 but doesn't necessarily care about the long-term聽聽
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quality of the home. Again, their interests are聽 not aligned. In the context of policy making,聽聽
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the principal agent problem emerges when the聽 interests and goals of the various layers聽聽
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of policy making are not clearly aligned.聽 Imagine a mid-level public official--say,聽聽
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a foreign service officer working in the State聽 Department. Such an individual is likely a career聽聽
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civil servant with years of experience聽 working in countries around the world.聽聽
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After a new president is elected, they generally聽 appoint new senior leadership to positions within聽聽
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the State Department and other governmental聽 departments and agencies. Such leadership聽聽
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encompasses the Secretary of State, the Under聽 Secretaries of State with specific portfolios,聽聽
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and dozens of Assistant Secretaries of State,聽 and so on. The President has their own goals,聽聽
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priorities, and interests, but must delegate聽 work and authority to the various Secretaries聽聽
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who operate relatively independently on behalf of聽 the President. That senior political leadership,聽聽
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in turn, is dependent on the bureaucracy--in聽 this case, the civil servants that comprise聽聽
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the State Department--to carry out their mandates.聽 At each level a potential misalignment between the聽聽
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interests and goals of the principal--the person聽 who wish whose wishes are to be carried out--and聽聽
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the agent--the person responsible for carrying out聽 the actions--can occur. Perhaps the Secretary of聽聽
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State has their own goals which are at odds with聽 those of the President. Or perhaps the Secretary聽聽
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is unintentionally miscommunicating them to the聽 various Under Secretaries. And the same situation聽聽
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can occur at lower levels, where the Under聽 Secretaries may be the principal whose interests聽聽
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do not clearly align with the agents-- the career聽 civil servants. The principal agent problem聽聽
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highlights several challenges for policy making.聽 First, it points to the fact that the interests聽聽
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and goals of the principal and agents--or between聽 elected government officials and career civil聽聽
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servants--may be misaligned or even divergent.聽 Slippage may occur when the agent sometimes聽聽
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comes to operate in pursuit of their own interests聽 rather than those of the principal. Or agents may聽聽
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engage in shrinkage, minimizing their own efforts聽 to pursue the principal's interests. Second,聽聽
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it also points to the problems of information聽 asymmetry between the principal and the agent. In聽聽
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this case, professional civil servants likely have聽 access to greater knowledge and information about聽聽
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the problems and processes used to address them聽 than the political leadership does. As a result,聽聽
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priorities established by the principle may be聽 based on incomplete or imperfect information,聽聽
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creating problems for those who are charged with聽 implementing policies. Relatedly, it can create聽聽
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problems of adverse selection, where the agent may聽 be actively trying to conceal information from the聽聽
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principal. All of these represent challenges聽 emerging from the principal agent problem.聽聽
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While the principal agent problem can represent聽 a real obstacle in implementing policy decisions,聽聽
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there are several ways to try to reduce or聽 overcome it. First, in the private sector,聽聽
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changing financial incentives is often used as a聽 mechanism to try to align interests. Thus managers聽聽
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might receive stock options as a part of their聽 compensation. In doing so, their interests in a聽聽
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variety of areas might come to more directly align聽 with those of the stock owners--the principals.聽聽
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But as we saw with the example of the real estate聽 agents who sells the house more quickly at a lower聽聽
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price, such incentives may not be entirely聽 effective. In the public sector, finding聽聽
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ways to align the interests between principals聽 and their agents might still occur, even if聽聽
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the vehicle to achieve these is not primarily聽 financial. Increased monitoring and oversight,聽聽
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for example, can reduce the principal agent聽 problem, albeit at an increased cost, primarily聽聽
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in terms of reduced efficiency in decision making聽 and implementation. After all, the main reason to聽聽
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employ agents to carry out decisions and operate聽 on behalf of the principal is to free time and聽聽
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energy for the principal to focus on other issues.聽 If they have to use some of that time monitoring聽聽
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implementation, then the utility of an agent is聽 reduced. So that concludes our brief introduction聽聽
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to the principal agent problem. I hope you found聽 it useful. Please feel free to leave any questions聽聽
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you have in the comments section below, and thanks聽 for watching. Have a good day everyone. Bye.