The metric that could kill your startup - YouTube

Channel: Slidebean

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churn is cancer for a sas company
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overlooking it may have been the single
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biggest mistake
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our company made and the closest we've
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ever been from going out of business
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churn is a silent killer that slowly but
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surely will eat away your business
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you can cure it if you could catch it
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early on but if you let your churn
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problem go unchecked
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it will kill your starter and we learned
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this the hard way so let me give you
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some context
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into how we found ourselves here between
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2015 and 2016
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our company grew really fast we 5xed our
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subscriptions
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just in 12 months and everybody was
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really excited
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in 2016 we raised the second part of our
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seed round and it was
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the easiest money that i've ever raised
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it was obvious
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that we were on to something with
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slightly and the diligence process for
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what the investors had to do
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was actually pretty smooth there was
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inevitable fomo
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on sniper and i remember one investor
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coming and saying that they were going
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to pass because our churn was too high
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and at that point nobody was really
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paying much attention to churn
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let me show you why you'll see that
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we're adding six to seven thousand
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dollars in new subscriptions every month
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in the second half of 2016 that grew to
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10 to 12 000 subscriptions new mrr
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every month which again got everyone
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really excited at the time
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we were consistently adding 45 000 in
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net mrr and
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moving fast towards the 1 million dollar
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annual run rate
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by the way i'm fast tracking through
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some terms like month return revenue
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ar assuming that you've already seen
[83]
some of our videos
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if you haven't you want to hit pause and
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go watch this specific one sas metrics
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i promise you it'll help you make a
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whole lot more sense of
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everything that's coming in this video
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so the big number of new customers made
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us ignore
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the number of lost customers and we only
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focus on that pretty growing mrr chart
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and it's easy to miss
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what's happening under the hood so let
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me show you what we did
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to fix it the first part was
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understanding
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the why why do people turn
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in general people cancel because they're
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not getting enough
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value out of a subscription not enough
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to justify
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the price period that's really the only
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reason you can talk all you want about
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onboarding aha moments and cancellation
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flows it all comes down
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to the value obtained versus the price
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the more value
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you bring to your customers the more
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money you can get away
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with charging and i get this question a
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lot what should be the pricing of a sas
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product from the retail world we are
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maybe accustomed to thinking about
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margins we mark up the manufacturing
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price
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to generate profits from that in
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software
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it's it's really different because
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software is really cheap to operate so
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we could very much leave money on the
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table if we aren't aggressive
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enough about pricing my take on this
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here is that the pricing should be as
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much as we can get away with charging
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that's simple enough you can find that
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number by testing there's no way to
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guess it and
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user interviews and surveys are not
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going to give you the final answer on
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this they might guide you
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but you need to test and balancing these
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two variables
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the value obtained and the price is
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really some of the most
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complex challenges for sas product
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manager so let's talk about value first
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the value
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that a customer gets from a product can
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be affected
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by number one the onboarding so
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if you are not onboarding your customers
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correctly if you're not explaining
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what the tool does then the customers
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won't extract enough value out of it
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because maybe they just don't know how
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then you have the ux the user experience
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if customers can
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find what they're looking for or if they
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find the experience frustrating
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we are willing to forgive ux hiccups up
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to a certain point
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but after that we'll just cancel number
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three simply how the tool is used in
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their day-to-day are they using it daily
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weekly what's the alternative how much
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of a better experience
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are you giving them versus the
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alternative some examples from our own
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book we
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use intercom for our messaging for our
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onboarding for our emails for our
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support and for our newsletters
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it's over five thousand dollars a month
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for us it's one of our most expensive
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sas platforms but
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we couldn't really live without it the
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alternative doesn't have all the
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features so
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we just have to mix a bunch of different
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tools and it would still cost us
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somewhere in that range
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another service that hasn't logged for
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life is turn module it's the platform
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that you've been seeing in some of our
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youtube videos
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when we refer to sas metrics and the one
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we saw in this video
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we've been tracking our sask apis there
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for years and
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that set of features gives us what we
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need and we don't want to go through the
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process of
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migrating all of this data elsewhere
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it's just a lot of data
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another variable you might have noticed
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here is how hard it is
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to leave so for b2b software you want to
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find something
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that embeds deeply in the work pipeline
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of your customers so that they
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depend on your tool those are the
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companies that thrive look at slack or
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heck look even at microsoft office so
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your focus
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as a founder or as a product manager and
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you're probably going to be both for a
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little bit when you're starting a
[286]
company
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is creating a product that adds a clear
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value to your customers
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lives it can't be just a nice to have
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ideally it should be
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and i can't live without it type of
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relationship
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and there are a lot of ways that you can
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measure this first you want to ask them
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you want to get into conversations with
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your customers
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i do probably 20 or 30 user calls a
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month and that gives me
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this qualitative view as much as those
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calls are focused on helping them
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in whatever they can and whatever i can
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i'm
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taking notes i'm asking which features
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they found or haven't found useful
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and the ones that they've been using
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more frequently for more
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quantitative approach we have a little
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survey that you can use
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you've probably seen it before how
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disappointed would you be
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if you could no longer use slide p
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another
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standardized measure for this is the nps
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service the mps score
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net promoter score the question is how
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likely
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are you to recommend sniping or any
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product to a friend there's a 0 to 10
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meter so any answer below 6 is
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considered bad so that's minus 1 point
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answers between 7 and 8 are considered
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average so that's neutral
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or zero and then the answers that really
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speak passion about the product are
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nines and tenths
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so the sum of your nps score answers
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should be somewhere between 20 and 40.
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40 plus is considered great
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70 plus is considered world class now
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all of these indicators can be
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considered
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predictions for churn what we do is we
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pull
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this data into chart modules so we can
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look at the aggregated data
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based on the nps score and understand
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the likelihood of one of these customers
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churning or even our effectiveness in
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getting people
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from nine to ten to seven and eight
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month per month and how much revenue we
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get from each one of those groups
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last but not least you can also ask them
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why they're leaving you're i mean you've
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seen this
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quite a lot in cancellation flows and
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this is valuable information
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by any means but there's a big catch
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there which is that there's not a lot
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that you can do
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if a user has already cancelled your
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chances of re-engaging them
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at this point are pretty slim so what
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you can use
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is to plug those reasons into your data
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and then study why they're cancelled
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now in our case most of the
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cancellations we were seeing in 2016
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could be summarized as this story i like
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your product
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i just don't need it anymore and that
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was very
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painful to hear the story was consistent
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i can still
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see it in my 2016 nightmares nine or 10
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nps score
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great customer satisfaction i just don't
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need to make presentations anymore
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but that answer will be different of
[437]
course from company to company
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you might be getting complaints i don't
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know on missing features or bugs
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and those i would say maybe they're
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easier or generally easier to tackle
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easier to address because the customers
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are pretty much telling you what
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you want what's driving them away and
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again as long as you're taking the time
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to track it and to make good decisions
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you're good but our cancellation reason
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reflected a deeper a more fundamental
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problem with our product
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this was combined with the fact that our
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second most common reason for canceling
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was pricing people were saying the
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product was too expensive so we figured
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well maybe we're going to play around
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with pricing
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as a solution and boy were we wrong i
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like to call this stage of
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our process half measures because i love
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breaking bad
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and this is a breaking bad reference
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so path measures and pricing now
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remember two variables affect
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churn the value and the pricing we have
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experimented with pricing
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a lot we started with 4.99 then went to
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29 and then to 79
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a month now our biggest lesson from all
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of this is then when converting people
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people are less sensitive to pricing
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that you might think
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one of our biggest breakthroughs as a
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company when we were starting up was
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that we discovered that the amount of
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people that we could convert
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on a 499 a month plan versus a hundred
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and sixty dollars a year
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annual only plan was pretty similar
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conversion rate was only slightly
[517]
affected with the latter pricing and we
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of course
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made a lot of money a lot more money
[522]
with the year subscription now
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our first thesis to solve our turn was
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allowing customers to pay
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to unlock a single presentation rather
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than a subscription so
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we ramp up the price of the subscription
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so that only customers that
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are power users and there are really
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gonna present
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choose the subscription ramp and the
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others can just unlock the presentation
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so we settled for a single presentation
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unlocked at 29
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and then monthly plans starting at 49
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and then 79.
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and i think the thesis is not that bad i
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mean if we look back
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i think the thesis was kind of solid i
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think what would you say
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but boy did it fail at first we saw a
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nice spike of non-recurring revenue
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which
[561]
chet mongol reported separately so we
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could keep track and then while the
[564]
number of subscribers was
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reduced we still saw a decent amount of
[568]
people that were picking
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the subscription option but the real
[572]
problem
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churn would come by this a couple of
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months later
[576]
the new higher pricing spiked churn to
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25
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people were kind of accepting this new
[582]
pricing to convert
[584]
but they were really really sensitive
[586]
about it and they would cancel
[588]
in a month or two and of course the
[589]
value that this product was bringing was
[591]
not 79
[592]
worth again we thought only power
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presenters would pick the plan but
[595]
that really wasn't the case even worse
[598]
our nps score
[599]
dropped a lot people were suddenly much
[601]
more sensitive to bugs
[602]
and stuff that they couldn't solve in
[604]
the platform as expected
[606]
and they expected it more hands-on
[607]
support than a 79 plan
[609]
now one detail we did not foresee here
[612]
was how much revenue shifted from
[614]
recurring to non-recurring we had to
[616]
change those sales every month and a bad
[618]
month
[618]
would seriously endanger our runway so
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after a failure in that approach we
[623]
considered going with
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a lower pricing we came up with a plan
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called starter
[627]
which was priced at 12 a month and that
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kind of worked also kind of worked the
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churning in the 12 hour month plan was
[635]
better
[635]
under 10 for the first time in a while
[637]
but the next problem
[638]
was lifetime value and cash flow look at
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this math
[642]
on a 79 a month plan with 20 churn your
[644]
average lifetime value per customer is
[646]
395 dollars
[647]
that means the average customer stays on
[649]
the platform for about
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five months not a long time but for cash
[654]
flow you're collecting
[655]
395 dollars in five months now don't get
[658]
me wrong
[658]
that level of churn will kill any
[660]
business but at the time we were
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acquiring customers for about fifty
[663]
dollars
[664]
so we spent fifty dollars and we
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recovered them the first month
[668]
and then we make 345 dollars worth of
[670]
profit within the next
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five months on a 12 a month plan with a
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five percent turn rate your lifetime
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value is 240
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it's less and worse than that it takes
[680]
20 months to collect that money
[682]
it takes you four months to recover the
[683]
fifty dollars you spent bringing the
[685]
customer
[685]
so we had sort of solved the churn
[688]
problem but the pricing created
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other serious cash flow problems for us
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so
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the lesson with these pricing changes
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you yeah
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you want to experiment yes but you want
[698]
to always keep in mind
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how these experiments are going to
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affect your cash flow and your other
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metrics
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your job as a ceo is not running out of
[706]
money in this case
[707]
these metrics broke our profitability
[710]
but in a company
[710]
looking to raise funding they could
[712]
affect the story that you're telling
[714]
investors if suddenly your revenue drops
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the good thing is we learned a lot from
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the behavior of our customers and it
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allowed us eventually
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to solve the problem with full measures
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but before some other half-measure ideas
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pricing experiments weren't the only
[727]
effort that we were making to
[728]
improve retention we set up an
[730]
aggressive dunning campaign stunning
[732]
emails are used to recover customers who
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are
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who just canceled maybe voluntarily or
[737]
involuntarily
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voluntary churn comes from people that
[740]
took the time
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to go and cancel the product involuntary
[744]
churn comes from people
[745]
whose credit cards expired or failed to
[747]
update them it's churn either way but
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you tackle it very differently now we
[751]
also iterated a lot
[752]
on our onboarding process both visually
[755]
and with emails we became really really
[757]
good
[757]
at getting great open rates with which
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we achieved by
[760]
sending really personalized but still
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automated
[763]
emails that included details from the
[765]
customer's activity on the platform if
[767]
you include that information in the
[768]
email
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people are bound to read them because
[770]
they feel that it's very much directed
[772]
to them and those were good efforts that
[774]
we still
[774]
do and we could accurately measure how
[776]
much churn was
[777]
stopped thanks to those but it wasn't
[780]
enough
[781]
we needed full measures because what we
[784]
had failed
[784]
to see through all of these years
[786]
through all of these experiments was
[788]
that our problem was
[789]
a product market fit problem product
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market fit
[792]
is this elusive achievement for startups
[795]
it happens when you find
[797]
the ideal combination of product and
[799]
target audience
[800]
when you find this sweet spot suddenly
[803]
your marketing starts working better
[805]
your nps gets higher and your retention
[807]
goes up
[807]
it's a very cinderella kind of moment
[810]
and once again
[811]
the answer oftentimes you can find it in
[814]
the data
[814]
so when we set out to build slightly we
[817]
created this
[818]
alternative to powerpoint right this
[820]
alternative to designing presentations
[822]
content first automated design we
[825]
thought of it as a platform
[826]
for a lot of different types of
[827]
customers now a lot of customers could
[829]
use this
[830]
it worked for teachers and for
[831]
professors it worked for sales teams for
[833]
consultants
[834]
for marketers and for account executives
[836]
essentially anybody who needed
[838]
to present often and who cared about
[840]
those presentations who cared that they
[842]
looked good
[842]
while we didn't know what the customers
[844]
were doing in the platform because we
[845]
really don't have access to the slides
[847]
we could still see what templates they
[849]
were picking so we could classify these
[850]
customers as
[851]
startups or marketers or sales people or
[854]
academic use
[855]
and lo and behold our true numbers were
[858]
drastically different
[859]
for the startup group they were staying
[861]
longer they were using the platform more
[864]
they were rating us better on the nps
[866]
scores and this was
[867]
the beginning of a company-wide pivot
[870]
over the course of the next
[873]
in the next couple of years actually we
[875]
embraced how
[876]
the ideal use for sliding seems to be
[878]
pitch text
[879]
that required us to refocus our
[881]
marketing into something
[882]
like this videos and even to refocus our
[885]
product we want to we wanted to redo
[887]
and rename some features these customers
[889]
were already
[890]
clearly better customers for us than the
[893]
rest so now it's just a matter of
[894]
improving the experience
[896]
doubling down so aside from features and
[898]
marketing we made a key change in our
[899]
business model
[900]
after we understood who this audience
[902]
was
[903]
because if you're using sliding for
[904]
bitsticks why would you pay
[906]
for the product monthly pitching
[908]
investors is not a monthly thing you
[910]
don't make a pitch
[911]
and are done and finished raising money
[913]
in 30 days
[914]
or in 90 days raising money takes easily
[917]
six months
[918]
so what if instead of thinking of months
[920]
our pricing reflected
[922]
the length of the fundraising process
[924]
that would have made up for a
[927]
six month or a nine month plan but in
[929]
the end
[930]
that was a little bit confusing so we
[931]
ended up with a 12-month plan
[933]
an annual plan that would make sure
[935]
founders were covered for the whole
[937]
extent of this fundraising process so
[938]
when we switch to annual
[940]
only plans and you might think that
[941]
we're just cheating on churn right we're
[943]
forcing people
[944]
into a 12 month commitment with no
[946]
ability to cancel monthly
[948]
but if that were the case then the
[949]
retention at the 13th
[951]
month would be similar to the monthly
[954]
plans right
[955]
well no we improved that by about four x
[958]
the number of customers that were still
[960]
with us after their first
[961]
chance to leave was four times higher
[964]
than with the monthly plans and the
[965]
reasons behind that are
[966]
a complex combination of variables that
[968]
we probably haven't fully understood yet
[971]
it definitely has to do with us having
[973]
more time to make sure that we get
[974]
value that we show customers how to get
[976]
value out of the product and it
[978]
definitely has to do with customers
[979]
having more time
[980]
to use the product and more time to get
[982]
more and more presentations into the
[983]
platform
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thus making cancelling the products a
[987]
more difficult
[988]
choice and the change is not without its
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set of problems we know
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the conversion barrier is higher when
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when the pricing is very steep for
[996]
customers especially customers outside
[998]
the u.s
[998]
and trust me we're trying to figure that
[1000]
out as well so the lesson
[1002]
for all of this is don't be afraid to
[1005]
experiment
[1005]
but use your data to make better
[1007]
decisions which brings me to our sponsor
[1009]
for today's video we have been using
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we'll see you next week
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you