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Texas's power disaster is a warning sign for the US - YouTube
Channel: Vox
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In mid-February, cold arctic air,
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usually contained up north
in the Earthâs jet stream,
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dipped down into the US.
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Itâs called a polar vortex,
and itâs pretty common.
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Itâs what brings the coldest air to the
US during the winter.
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What was unusual, is for it to dip
as far south as it did.
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In Texas, where February is typically fairly
warm, temperatures dipped dangerously low.
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And it came with a storm.
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More than 4 million Texans lost power.
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Many wouldnât get it back
for nearly five days.
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By then, pipes had frozen. People were
melting snow for drinking water.
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And dozens had died from the cold in their
cars and in their homes.
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And it was almost even worse.
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The stateâs entire electrical grid
was within âseconds and minutesâ
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of a failure that wouldâve lasted months.
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But even though this storm
hit this huge area,
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it was really just Texas
that had major loss of power.
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Thereâs a reason for that.
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And it should be a warning sign
for the rest of the US.
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When you flip your lights on, youâre getting
your electricity from the power grid.
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And that grid is getting the electricity from
a bunch of different energy systems.
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Like nuclear power plants, or wind farms,
or natural gas facilities.
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In the US, these places are generally run
by private energy companies,
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that work with your local power utility,
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which directs the electricity around the grid
and into your home.
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That power utility is overseen
by a government commission,
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who sets things like prices
and safety standards.
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And the grids most Americans are on
arenât just big. Theyâre huge.
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The entire east coast, from Canada
to Florida, is on one grid.
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And the entire west coast
is connected in another.
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It's kind of a remarkable engineering feat.
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It's probably the biggest machine
humans have ever built.
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While most power tends to stay local,
this grid allows electricity to flow
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over huge areas, and between states.
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Like, in New York City, power comes
from energy plants in New York,
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but also from neighboring states,
and even Canada.
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This huge grid also means that,
in emergencies,
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power can be directed where itâs needed.
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Like in Oklahoma, which was also hit bad during
the February winter storm.
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They needed more power.
And instead of completely losing it,
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they were able to get electricity from
neighboring states through the grid.
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But itâs not so seamless to send it to Texas.
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Texas opted out of the big grids,
back when they were being built,
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nearly a hundred years ago.
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Since they covered several states, it meant
the federal government could regulate them.
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Texas was not into that.
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Texas decided to kind of go it alone.
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It's a very uniquely
Texas-type thing to do.
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So most of Texas is on its own grid.
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It means they donât have to follow the same
regulations as the rest of the country,
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like reliability and cost standards.
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But it also means when it
lost power in the storm,
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it couldnât easily get electricity
from other states.
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Its independence kept it in the dark.
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But it wasnât the reason it went dark
in the first place.
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Being on its own, Texas has to
make all their own power.
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They have a variety of sources.
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When the storm came,
it affected every one.
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Several coal plants stopped operating,
as coal piles froze.
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One of four Texan nuclear plants went offline.
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Some wind turbines stopped working
in the freezing cold.
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But the biggest failure, in terms
of its magnitude and its impact,
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was the natural gas system.
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Natural gas, which actually contains water
vapor, froze in storage wells and pipelines.
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Every one of these systems failed, in part.
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And it had nothing to do
with the type of energy,
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and everything to do with these companies
not being prepared for the cold.
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Clearly, you can run an energy system
in cold temperatures.
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There are wind turbines operating in Antarctica,
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and gas plants in Alaska and Alberta.
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So this is not a technology-specific issue.
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It was more a failure to anticipate
that this is something
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that could even occur in Texas
at this length and severity,
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and to prepare
for extreme cold temperatures.
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But it should have been anticipated.
Because this has happened in Texas before.
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In 1989, the same kind of arctic storm caused
natural gas plants to have the same problems,
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resulting in rolling blackouts.
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And the same thing again, in 2011.
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And both times, federal commissions
recommended that utilities
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"ensure reliability in
extreme weather conditions."
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And specifically, for the state government
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to create winterization standards
for these energy sources.
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The Texas utility commission did make those
standards -- but also made them voluntary.
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So most companies didnât winterize.
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Private companies like these donât have
an incentive to spend their money
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preparing for unpredictable and infrequent
events without being required to.
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But this problem is not limited to Texas.
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The particular vulnerability to the extreme cold
may be a uniquely Texas thing.
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But I think what it shows, is you need
to check your blind spots.
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And that applies everywhere.
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This is a chart of the last 40 years of severe
weather disasters in the US.
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Storms in particular are in orange.
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Here's the Texas winter storm in 1989,
and the one in 2011.
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These costly disasters
are becoming more frequent --
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not just in Texas,
but nationally, and globally.
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And the US is not prepared.
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Most of this grid
was built 60-70 years ago,
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but was only built to last 50 years.
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And some studies point to
nearly 100 facilities, like power plants,
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in immediate danger of flooding
and storm surges.
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Most of these private energy
companies, across the US,
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arenât going to change
unless theyâre required to.
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But these utility commissions
can require it.
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As can state governments.
And the federal government.
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All three can even help pay for it.
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Texas was warned for 30 years
to prepare its energy systems
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for severe weather and climate change.
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But they didnât.
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Now the rest of the US is facing
the same problem.
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It is a wakeup call,
for everywhere, to think about,
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how do we prepare our energy infrastructures,
and our other critical infrastructure,
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for extreme events
that may become more severe,
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and may become more likely?
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And that isn't about just
thinking about what's probable,
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but also, what can break the system
in a way that's catastrophic?
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