Collateralized debt obligation (CDO) | Finance & Capital Markets | Khan Academy - YouTube

Channel: Khan Academy

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Welcome back.
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Well, in the last presentation, we described a
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situation where you had a bunch of borrowers.
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They needed $1 billion collectively, because there's
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1000 of them and they each needed $1 million
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to buy their house.
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And they borrowed the money essentially from a special
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purpose entity.
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They borrowed it from their local mortgage broker, who
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then sold it to a bank, or to an investment bank, who
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created the special purpose entity, and then they IPO the
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special purpose entity and raise the money from people
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who bought the mortgage-backed securities.
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But essentially what happened is the investors in the
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mortgage-backed securities provided the money to the
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special purpose entity to
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essentially loan to the borrowers.
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And then the reason why we call it a security is because,
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not only are these people getting this 10% a year, but
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if they want to -- let's say that you had one of these
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mortgage-backed securities and you paid $1000 for it.
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And you're getting this 10% a year, but then all of a
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sudden, you think that the whole mortgage industry is
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about to collapse, a bunch of people are going to default,
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and you want out.
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If you just gave someone a loan, there'd be
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no way to get out.
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You'd have to sell that loan to someone else.
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But if you have a mortgage-backed security, you
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can actually trade the security with someone else.
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And they might pay you, who knows, they might pay more
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than $1000.
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They might pay you less.
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But there will be at least some type of a market in the
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security, so you could have what you could call liquidity.
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Liquidity just means that I have the security
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and I can sell it.
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I could trade it just like I could trade a share of IBM or
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I could trade a share of Microsoft.
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But like we said before, this security, in order to place a
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value on it, you have to do some type of analysis of what
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you think it's worth.
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Or what you think the real interest will be after you
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take into account people pre-paying their mortgage,
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people defaulting on their mortgage, and other things
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like short-term interest rates, et cetera, et cetera.
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And there is only maybe a small group of people who are
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sophisticated enough to be able to figure that out to
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make some type of models and who knows if even they're
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sophisticated enough.
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There might be a whole other class of investors
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here, say this guy.
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He would love to kind of invest in insecurities, but he
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thinks this is too risky.
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He'd be willing to take a lower return as long as he was
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allowed to invest in less risky investments.
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Maybe by law, maybe he's a pension fund or he's some type
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of a mutual fund, that's forced to invest in something
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of a certain grade.
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And say that there's another investor here, and he thinks
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that this is boring.
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You know, 9%, 10%.
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Who cares about that?
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He wants to see bigger and bigger returns.
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So there's no way for him to invest in this security and to
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get better returns.
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So now we're going to take this mortgage-backed security
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and introduce one step further kind of permutation or
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derivative of what this is.
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That's all derivatives are.
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You've probably heard the term derivatives and people do a
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lot of hand-waving saying, oh, it's a more complicated form
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of security.
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All derivative means is you take one type of asset and you
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slice and dice it in a way to spread the risk, or whatever.
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And so you create a derivative asset.
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It's derived from the original asset.
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So let's see how we could use this same asset pool, the same
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pool of loans, and satisfy all of these people.
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Satisfy this guy, who wants maybe a lower return but lower
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risk, and this guy, who's willing to take a little bit
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higher risk in exchange for higher return.
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So now in this situation, we have the same borrowers.
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They borrowed $1 billion collectively, right, because
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there's 1000 of them, et cetera, et cetera.
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And they're still a special purpose entity, but now,
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instead of just slicing up the special purpose entity a
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million ways, what we're going to do is we're going to split
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it up first into three, what we could call, tranches.
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A tranche is just a bucket, if you will, of the asset.
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And we're going to call the three tranches: equity,
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mezzanine, and senior.
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These are the words that are commonly
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used in this industry.
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A senior just means, if this entity were to lose money,
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these people get their money back first. So it's the least
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risk out of all of the tranches.
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Mezzanine, that just means the next level or middle.
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And these guys are some place in between.
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They have a little bit more risk, and they still get a
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little bit more reward than senior, but they have less
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risk than this equity tranche.
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Equity tranche.
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These are the people who first lose money.
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Let's say some of these borrowers start defaulting.
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It all comes out of the equity tranche.
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So that's what protects the senior tranche and the
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mezzanine tranche from defaults.
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So in this situation what we did is we raised -- out of the
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$1 billion we needed -- $400 million from the senior
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tranche, $300 million from the mezzanine tranche, and then
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$300 million from the equity tranche.
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The $400 million senior tranche we raised from soon.
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1000 senior securities, collateralized debt
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obligations.
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These are these, right here.
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Say there were 400,000 of these and these each cost
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$1000, right?
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Let's say these cost $1000.
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And we issued 400,000 of these.
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So we raised $400 million.
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Let's say we give these guys a 6% return.
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And you might say, 6%, that's not much.
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But these guys, it is pretty low risk, because in order for
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them to not get their 6%, the value of this $1 billion asset
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or these $1 billion loans, would have to go down below
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$400 million.
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Maybe I'll do a little bit more math in another example.
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But I think it'll start making sense to you.
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For example, every year we said there's going to be $100
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million in payments, right?
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Because it's 10%.
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$100 million in payments.
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Of that $100 million in payments, 6% on the $400
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million, that's $24 million in payments.
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Right?
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So $24 million in payments will go to the senior tranche.
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Similarly we issued 300,000 shares at $1000 per share on
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the mezzanine tranche.
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This is also 1000.
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This is the mezzanine tranche.
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And let's say they get 7%, a slightly higher return.
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And these percentages are usually determined by some
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type of market or what people are willing to get.
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But let's just say it's fixed for now.
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Let's say it's 7%.
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So 300,000 shares, seven 7%.
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These guys are going to get $21 million.
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Right?
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So out of the $100 million every year, $24 million is
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going to go to these guys, $21 million is going to go to
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these guys, and then whatever's left over is going
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to go to the equity tranche.
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So the $300 million from equity, they're going to get
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$55 million assuming that there are no defaults or
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pre-payments or anything shady happens with the securities.
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But these guys are going to get $55 million.
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Or on $300 million, that's a 16.5% return.
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And I know what you're thinking.
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Boy, Sal, that sounds amazing.
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Why wouldn't everyone want to be an equity investor?
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I don't know.
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My pen has stopped working.
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But anyway, I'll try to move on without my pen.
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So you're saying, why wouldn't everyone want to
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be an equity investor?
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Well, let me ask you a question.
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What happens if -- let's go to that scenario where we talked
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before -- 20% of the borrowers just say, you know what?
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I can't pay this mortgage anymore.
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I'm going to hand you back the keys to these houses.
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And of that 20%, you only get a 50% return.
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So for each of those $1 million houses, you're only
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able to sell it for $500,000.
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So then instead of getting $100 million per year, you're
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only going to get $90 million per year.
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I wish I could use my pen.
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Something about my computer has frozen.
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So instead of $100 million a year, you're now only going to
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get $90 million a year.
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Right?
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And all of a sudden, these guys are not
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going to be cut off.
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This guy is still going to get $24 million, this guy is still
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going to get $21 million, but now this guy is going to get
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$45 million.
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But he's still getting above average yield.
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Now let's say it gets even worse.
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Let's say a bunch of borrowers start
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defaulting on their loans.
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And instead of getting $90 million per year, you start
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only getting $50 million in per year.
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Now you pay this guy $24 million.
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You pay this guy $21 million -- or this group of guys or
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gals -- $21 million.
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And then all you have left is $5 million for this guy.
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And $5 million on $300 million, now he's getting less
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than a 2% return.
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So this guy took on higher risk for higher reward.
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If everyone pays, sure, he gets 16.5%.
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But then if you start having a lot of defaults, if, let's
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say, the return on what you get every month goes in half,
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this guy takes the entire hit.
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So his return goes to 0%.
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So he had higher risk, higher reward, while
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these guys get untouched.
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Of course, if enough people start defaulting, even these
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people start to get hurt.
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So this is a form of a collateralized debt
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obligation.
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This is actually a mortgage-backed collateralized
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debt obligation.
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You can actually do this type of a structure with any type
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of debt obligation that's backed by assets.
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So we did the situation with mortgages, but you could do it
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with a bunch of assets.
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You could do it with corporate debt.
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You could do it with receivables from a company.
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But what you read about the most right now in the
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newspapers is mortgage-backed collateralized debt
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obligations.
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And to some degree, that's what's been getting a lot of
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these hedge funds in trouble.
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And I think I'll do another presentation on exactly how
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and why they have gotten in trouble.
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Look forward to talking to you