🔍
India needs to make its own Aircraft Carriers and Subs to be a true 'Blue Water Navy' - YouTube
Channel: unknown
[8]
Welcome to WARN, Today News is.
[11]
India needs to make its own Aircraft Carriers
and Subs to be a true 'Blue Water Navy'
[18]
One does not require the wisdom of the great
American naval historian Alfred Mahan or British
[23]
admiral Julian Corbett to state the obvious:
no nation can aspire to be a sea power without
[28]
producing its fighting ships indigenously.
[32]
Being the smallest of the three arms of India�s
defence forces (taking personnel strength
[37]
as the parameter), attaining expertise in
the manufacture of quality (surface) fighting
[42]
ships of up to 8,000 tonnes is the best to
have happened to the Indian Navy.
[47]
However, in the sub-surface and aircraft-carrier
category, India is a late bloomer due to the
[53]
lack of any sustained, long-term initiative.
[57]
Hence, it is obvious that one cannot manufacture
sophisticated, technologically-complex submarines
[64]
and aircraft-carriers without having long
experience in the sea.
[69]
And that is exactly the case with the Indian
Navy.
[72]
It was the second Asian Navy, after Japan,
to induct a used 20,000-tonne aircraft-carrier
[80]
of British origin, INS Vikrant, on March 4,
1961.
[85]
(It was eventually scrapped in 2014-15.)
[90]
A long �active sea-time� gave the right
exposure to the Indian Navy men before India
[95]
launched the first phase of building its own
aircraft-carrier (also named INS Vikrant)
[100]
on February 28, 2009 at Kochi.
[105]
Although French DCNS and Italian Fincantieri
were reportedly involved in its initial �conceptualisation
[111]
and design� work, the completion of the
40,000-tonne-plus first indigenous aircraft-carrier
[118]
will be a feather in the cap for the Indian
Navy, thereby fulfilling a long cherished
[123]
dream.
[125]
China has recently announced that its first
indigenous aircraft-carrier Liaoning is combat-ready.
[131]
Unlike India, China has been a case of �first
produce, then use�.
[137]
It would be interesting to see how the carriers
of Delhi and Beijing sail in the future, though
[141]
prima facie the Chinese aircraft-carrier is
bigger at 60,000 tonnes (full load).
[148]
They have emphasised on speed as one of the
key elements.
[153]
Being a late entrant in submarine warfare
perhaps helped India to be bold, brave and
[158]
wise.
[159]
Without producing a single indigenously-conceived
and designed conventional underwater vessel,
[164]
Delhi leapfrogged into the nuclear strategic
missile submarine (SSBN/SSGN) club in 2004
[172]
at Visakhapatnam.
[174]
No doubt Russian cooperation was �acknowledged�
at the time of launching the 600-tonne submarine
[180]
INS Arihant on July 28, 2009; nevertheless,
it speaks volumes about India�s naval achievement
[187]
and fulfilment of its �Make in India�
vision.
[191]
Here, one has to concede that China has been
the Asian pioneer in nuclear submarine building,
[196]
beginning its voyage before India way back
in 1980 with three 5,700-tonne Han class nuclear
[203]
subs.
[206]
As is well known, if a submarine succeeds
in diving deeper than the standard 300 metres
[212]
(985 feet) under the sea, things become that
much more difficult for the anti-submarine
[218]
assets to detect, identify and take position,
defensive or offensive.
[224]
Hence a recent report on India�s nuclear
submarine INS Arihant�s �diving depth
[228]
of 450 metres approximately� is promising.
[232]
Another reported feature of the �dived speed�
of 24 knots gives it an edge over other South
[237]
Asian or West Asian submarines operating in
the combat radius of the Indian Navy.
[244]
The positive story of India�s naval buildup,
however, is overshadowed by chronic time and
[249]
cost overruns.
[252]
The Navy continues to struggle to maintain
the �minimum deployable and to-be-deployed�
[256]
fleet as often the speed of decommissioned
ships outpaced the speed of commissioned ships.
[261]
The classic example is reflected in the depleted
strength of India�s submarine squadrons.
[268]
Indeed, things became acute at the beginning
of the 21st century owing to the spill-over
[273]
effect of former Soviet-origin ships on the
Indian Navy.
[277]
Precious time was lost on production, delivery
schedule and maintenance programme of the
[282]
ships, owing to breakup of the USSR in 1991
and the resultant disarray of Moscow�s shipbuilding
[289]
industry.
[290]
This setback was reflected in the 2011 CAG
report: �Between 2011 and 2013, the Indian
[297]
Navy would have only 61 per cent of its envisioned
frigate fleet, 44 per cent of its envisioned
[304]
destroyer fleet, and 20 per cent of its envisioned
missile corvette fleet.� It must be remembered
[310]
that the frequency, duration and out-of-area
operational deployment of the Indian Navy
[315]
is no longer what it used to be 25 years ago.
[319]
The fleet�s �sea-time� has increased
manifold, thereby putting pressure on its
[323]
wear and tear as well as logistics and material
management.
[330]
Admiral Gorshkov, an USSR-made, Russia-refurbished,
India-used, carrier is another classic case
[337]
of a monumental disaster due to cost overruns.
[340]
A ship is neither produced overnight nor an
FMCG product.
[346]
Aircraft-carriers had been built by only seven
(US, UK, France, Russia, China, Italy and
[353]
Spain) countries; thus India became the eighth
producer.
[357]
Indeed, a blessing in disguise if India successfully
commissions the carrier in 2019.
[365]
Good things apart, there still exist matters
requiring urgent action, as can be gleaned
[371]
from the CAG report tabled in Parliament on
February 18, 2014: �Between 2005 and 2010,
[379]
113 of 152 Indian Navy refits were completed
after an accumulated delay of 8,629 days,
[388]
or 23.6 years�.
[391]
It attributed the delay to �growth attributable
to the ageing ships, and the inability to
[396]
ensure timely induction of new ships�.
[400]
Very serious stuff surfaced subsequently as
Navy stated �that delays of five to 67 months
[406]
in commencing mid-life upgrade (MLU) of naval
platforms had prompted cascading delays in
[412]
refitting other ships which resulted in operational
unavailability�.
[417]
Another angle to India�s indigenous shipbuilding
enterprise is the uncooperative bureaucracy.
[422]
Indian Navy officials have long claimed that
although it had received new platforms in
[427]
the past decade, the defence and finance ministries
had declined to provide additional funds to
[432]
pay for the consequent increase in staffing
levels, leading to meagre resources being
[437]
stretched and to officers with limited experience
assuming charge of technically-advanced vessels,
[442]
many of which experienced mishaps.
[445]
Indeed, a serious matter pertaining to safety
and security of the State even if half of
[450]
these claims are found to be correct.
[453]
The bottomline, therefore, comes down to administering
and interfacing man and machine.
[459]
India traditionally has never had an acute
shortage of trained and qualified manpower.
[464]
However, what is required now is time management.
[469]
That itself will give boost to the indigenisation
enterprise of the Indian Navy.
Most Recent Videos:
You can go back to the homepage right here: Homepage