Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer Case Brief Summary | Law Case Explained - YouTube

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By the late 1940s, labor organizations had become a powerful force in America. The government
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worked with unions to prevent work stoppages, but widespread fear remained about the crippling
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effects of large-scale strikes. In response, Congress, over President Truman's veto, passed the Taft-Hartley Labor Act
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in 1947, which limited the negotiation tools unions had in collective bargaining disputes,
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This did nothing to soothe the contentious relationship between
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Congress and the President, who had been vocal in his criticism for the “Do-Nothing Congress”
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in his reelection campaign. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer involved
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a labor dispute in the early 1950s between steel mill owners and employees about their
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collective bargaining agreements. The two sides were unable to come to terms, even after
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federal mediators arrived to help. The workers prepared to strike.
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At the time, the United States was involved in the Korean War, and steel was needed for
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the military. President Truman believed the reduction in steel production from a strike
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would compromise national defense. He issued an executive order instructing the Secretary
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of Commerce (Sawyer) to take control of the nation’s steel mills and ensure uninterrupted
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production. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. (plaintiff) and
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other mill operators sued Sawyer in federal court. Youngstown alleged the President’s
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order was unconstitutional, because it amounted to legislation, which was Congress’s proprietary
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role. The government argued that because the President
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was acting in response to a national emergency, the order was authorized under “the aggregate
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of his constitutional powers as the Nation’s Chief Executive and the Commander-in-Chief.”
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The district court granted an injunction on the ground that the President had exceeded
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his constitutional authority, but the court of appeals, sitting en banc, temporarily stayed
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the injunction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the President
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had exceeded his executive powers when he issued the order.
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Writing for the majority, Justice Black held that the President could only act where he
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had been expressly or implicitly authorized to do so by the Constitution or Congress.
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The executive branch could not cite any express constitutional justification for the order,
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and the Court rejected as too attenuated the solicitor general’s argument that the President’s
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power should be implied. Justice Black found that the war powers granted to the executive
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by the Constitution did not apply because there had been no declaration of war, and
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no other constitutional provisions conveyed this authority. Justice Black noted that Congress
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expressly rejected the use of seizures to solve labor disputes during the drafting process
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of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. Thus, the executive order could not be justified by
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any statutory authorization, either. Given the concurring and dissenting opinions
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in this case, there has been some debate over the exact limits of the President’s authority.
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Justice Jackson’s famous concurrence outlines the authority of the President to act. Where
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Congress has expressly or impliedly granted power to the executive, the President may
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rely upon his own powers and those of Congress. Where Congress is silent, the President may
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rely only on his own authority (though there is a “zone of twilight” where the President
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and Congress may have concurrent powers). Lastly, where the President acts contrary
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to the will of Congress, “his power is at its lowest ebb.” Jackson found that Congress
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had explicitly refused to grant the executive the power to seize real property to avoid
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labor disputes and that Truman had acted unconstitutionally. Justice Douglas concurred to say that only
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Congress could appropriate money to compensate owners for a nationwide seizure of property;
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therefore, the power to seize private property rested squarely with Congress.
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Justice Frankfurter wrote a concurrence to point out that while the executive has been
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granted the authority to make large-scale seizures in the past, Congress had granted
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temporary powers during war or national emergency. Finding neither condition present, Frankfurter
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believed Truman’s order was unconstitutional. Justice Burton, in his concurrence, found
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the Truman acted outside his authority because he did not abide by the procedures authorized
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by Congress in the Taft Hartley Act and had no inherent power to act on his own.
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Justice Clark’s concurrence concluded that the executive’s independent power to act
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depends on the gravity of the situation, but he did not find the labor dispute to be severe
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enough to warrant the President’s executive order.
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Justice Vinson wrote the lone dissent, arguing that the President’s order was necessary
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to prevent a crisis of national defense that could result if work stoppage caused steel
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shortages. The Youngstown decision was a sharp and unexpected blow
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to President Truman’s policy ambitions, and Truman made his displeasure known. Justice
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Black extended an olive branch by inviting Truman to a party. Truman eventually made
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peace with the justices, telling Black, “Hugo, I don't much care for your law, but, by golly,
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this bourbon is good."