Collateralized debt obligation overview | Finance & Capital Markets | Khan Academy - YouTube

Channel: Khan Academy

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We've seen that an investment bank can
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buy a bunch of mortgages, which essentially makes them
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the lender to the homeowners, and then it
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could stick those mortgages inside of a special purpose
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entity.
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And then it could sell the shares in that special purpose
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entity, and that these shares would
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be called mortgage-backed securities.
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And let's just say, just for the sake of argument,
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when it sells these shares it sells them at $10 a share,
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and it promises dividends at $10 a share,
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the equivalent of an 8% yield.
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So maybe the homeowners here are paying
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a higher than 8% interest, some of them
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default, once you average everything out,
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and the investment bank keeps a little bit for itself
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and to do all the operations and all the overhead,
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and so it can actually give the investors an 8% yield.
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This might be good for a whole class of investors.
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They might like the safety profile, the risk profile
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of the special purpose entity of this mortgage-backed security,
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and they might like the return, and they might go for it.
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But there might be a class of investors,
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may be very risk-averse investors like pensions,
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that says that this mortgage-backed security is
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too risky.
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They've looked at what we're holding,
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and they are like, hey, some of these are sub-prime mortgages,
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some of these are shady, some of these are to risky borrowers.
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I don't like where this is going.
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And even if they can't look under the hood
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to see what this is, the investment bank
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might have hired a ratings agency.
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So maybe a ratings agency to essentially look under the hood
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and tell investors what's there.
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So the ratings agency might look at this special purpose entity
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and look at these securities and say,
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look, I would say that these securities should be rated BB.
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So not super safe, but not super risky either,
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but for pensions that is not safe enough.
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Now on the other hand, you might have people who want more risk.
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So you might have, maybe there's some risky hedge funds,
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and not all hedge funds are risky,
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but let's say that there are some risky hedge funds,
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and then they say that this yield is too low.
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And the investment bankers, they're
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very creative people, they say, well, look,
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here's some people who want to buy securities,
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but these securities are too risky for them.
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And there's other people who want
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to buy securities who are able to take on more risk,
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but they say the yield is too low.
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So instead of losing out on these investors,
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why don't I just split up this special purpose
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entity in a different way?
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Why don't I split it up into tranches?
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So instead of all of the securities being the same,
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why don't I put them into classes?
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And they're often called the senior tranche,
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the mezzanine tranche, I'll just write "Mez"
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for short or the middle tranche, and then the equity tranche.
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And the way it works, in a mortgage-backed security
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everyone gets paid the same amount.
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In this situation, when you split it this way,
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the holders of the senior tranche securities
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are going to get paid first.
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Only when they are made whole are
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the owners of the mezzanine tranche security
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is going to get paid, and only when they are made whole will
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the owners of the equity tranche security will get paid.
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And this scenario right over here
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is called a collateralized debt obligation, CDO.
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And it's really a derivative security from the mortgages.
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We've sliced it and diced it in a slightly different way.
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Now you might be saying, how does this solve the problem?
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Well, now the ratings agency will say,
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well, look if the senior people are
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going to get paid before everyone else,
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then I'm going to give them a higher rating.
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And they can even get insurance on this and get a credit
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default swap, and then maybe they'll give it a AAA rating,
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and which means that the pensions can now buy the senior
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rated CDO's.
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But they'll pay them less interest.
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Maybe they'll pay them 5%.
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Maybe the mezzanine, they get paid next,
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they'll get maybe still a BB rating, and they'll get the 8%.
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And then the equity tranche, they'll get a higher interest.
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So they'll get say a 15% interest in exchange
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for being the last person to get paid.
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And maybe they don't get any ratings at all.
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So you could almost view this as a junk rating
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if you want to view it that way.
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But that makes both people happy.
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Pensions get something safe, lower yield.
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Hedge funds get something risky, but it has a higher yield.