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How a terrible coincidence brought down this Aircraft | Tarom flight 371 - YouTube
Channel: Mentour Pilot
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it's the 31st of march 1995 and an
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airbus a310 from taron airlines is
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flying its standard instrument departure
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from the 08 right in bucharest
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initially everything looks okay but
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about a minute and a half into the
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flight it's obvious that something is
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not
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right the aircraft starts banking more
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and more towards the left
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the nose starts dropping and they find
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themselves in an almost vertical nose
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dive down towards the ground
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seconds later the worst aviation
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accident in romanian history is a fact
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how come that a pretty minor technical
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malfunction have led up to this and what
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has happened to the pilots
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well in order to understand this we once
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again have to turn our attention towards
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the final report
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so stay tuned
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the aircraft involved in this incident
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was an eight-year-old airbus a310
[67]
initially it had been bought by
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pan-american airlines and when they went
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bankrupt
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delta airlines had taken it over and
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then about a year prior to the accident
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the taram airlines had bought the
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aircraft
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this aircraft did have some technical
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issues specifically
[82]
with its outer truss systems the atf
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what had a tendency to happen was that
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as the aircraft was transitioning
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from its takeoff phase into its climb
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phase
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well then the trust should be reduced
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back to what we call
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climb thrusts but on this particular
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aircraft
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when that happened several times instead
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of just
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setting the trust the number one trust
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lover the one that's controlling the
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left-hand engine had started reducing
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back towards
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idol while the number two engine would
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have stayed at the take-off thrusts
[116]
now airbus was aware that there was some
[119]
issues with the autotron systems on the
[121]
early airbus a310s
[123]
and they have found out that it probably
[125]
had to do with some
[127]
excessive friction between the linkages
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of the
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couplings that you can engage with the
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truss levers and the truss levels
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themselves
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and because there was only one motor
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driving the truss levers
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if one of the truss levers got stuck
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well then
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the mechanism would feel that actually
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you know the trust that we have asked it
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to set is not set
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and it will continue to drive so the
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trust level that did not
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have an issue would drive backwards all
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the way to idle
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while the truss lever that got stuck
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would just sit where it was sitting
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this particular failure had occurred
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both when the aircraft was owned by
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delta airlines and also at least
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12 times when tarum had taken it over
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but the issue here was that any time
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that the pilots would report this the
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aircraft would come down on the ground
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maintenance would take over and they
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would start to try to replicate the
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failure to see where it was
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but they were unable to replicate the
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failure instead they would follow the
[187]
guidance
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that airbus had sent out something
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called service information letters which
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is
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basically um a step below a service
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bulletin
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okay a service information ledger is
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something that the manufacturer would
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send out
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when they are aware of what they think
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of causing this
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but they haven't found a permanent
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solution to it and in this case
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it was replacing the bearings but
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replacing some of the linkages
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and also just kind of lubricating the
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whole system
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and anytime that maintenance did this it
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would solve the problem
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right they wouldn't be able to replicate
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it and it would take several months
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before the same problem would come back
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again
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because of this therm airlines had
[227]
actually issued something called the
[228]
briefing card to its crews
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and that's a permanent entry into the
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tech log where
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all of the crews that are flying the
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aircraft when they're looking through
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the technical status of the aircraft
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they will see that okay there's a
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briefing card and they will see that
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time and time again this spurious
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failure would come in so make sure that
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you're guarding the trust levels during
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the
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departure phase um in case you'd come
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back and then obviously put it into the
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tech log
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and the last entry into the tech log
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that was referring to this particular
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failure
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was about 15 days earlier on the 16th of
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march
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however subsequent investigations would
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show
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that this failure had actually happened
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on the flight
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preceding the accident flight as well
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when the aircraft was flying from dubai
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to bucharest
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but the crew had not entered it into the
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tecla
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the reason behind that we will never
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really know but it is possible that the
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previous crew
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knowing that this was actually stated in
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the briefing card
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didn't think it was important enough to
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put it into the tech log again
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in the flight deck of terrorism flight
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371 was captain
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livio bartanio he is 48 years old
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had 14 312 hours of which
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1735 was on the airbus a310
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his previous experience prior to that
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was mainly on the back 111
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and on the boeing 707. together with him
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in the cockpit was first officer ian l
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stoy he had 8988 hours of which 650 was
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on the airbus a310
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and his previous experience prior to
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that was mainly on soviet-based aircraft
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like the illusion 1
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8 and the illusion 62. there was also
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nine cabin crew members and 49
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passengers onboard this flight
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terror flight 371 was scheduled to fly
[338]
from bucharest international airport
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over towards
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brussels international airport the
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weather on the day of the departure was
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not great it was
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cloudy with some low hanging clouds and
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also some snow showers in the area and
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because of the snow showers the crew
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decided that they needed to de-ice the
[355]
aircraft prior to departure
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they loaded the aircraft up with about
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20 tons of fuel to bring them towards
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brussels
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and because of the icing they got a
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little bit delayed
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when they were preparing for the um taxi
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out
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now during the pre-flight inspection and
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during the pre-flight briefing
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there was discussions regarding the
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briefing card so the crew clearly knew
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that this aircraft had had issues with
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its ats system before
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because of this the captain decided that
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the first officer was going to be the
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pilot flying for the leg and
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he the captain was going to be guarding
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the trust levels not only during
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the takeoff which is what we always do
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but also during the climb about to make
[398]
sure
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that the trust lovers wouldn't start
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going back and starting to get this
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trust level disagreement at times 05 54
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utc
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the crew was ready for departure and
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they called up the tower
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to ask for pushback and startup
[412]
clearance soon after that they started
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taxiing out for departure runway 08
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right in bucharest during the taxi out
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once again
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the captain restated who was going to do
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what during the departure
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that it was going to be a standard
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briefing for a right
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seat departure on the 08 right and when
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they had received their departure
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clearance
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they were expecting to climb straight
[435]
ahead for a couple of nautical miles
[437]
and then turn left towards a vor a pro
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trade called
[441]
sierra tango juliet and this left-hand
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turn is actually going to play a major
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part in what's about to happen
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at times zero six zero six and 44
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seconds utc
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the uh aircraft starts rolling down the
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runway and everything looks completely
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normal during the takeoff roll
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the only thing that's noted on the
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cockpit voice recorder is the captain
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telling first officer to remove his
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hands from the trust levels
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and put both of them on the control
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column
[470]
um this this is considered quite normal
[473]
normally during the takeoff role the
[474]
captain is the one that's guarding the
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trust levels in case a rejected takeoff
[478]
will be needed
[480]
the aircraft rotates normally gets
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airborne
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captain calls out positive rates to
[485]
which the first officer responds with
[486]
asking to get the gear up
[488]
the captain retracts the gear and also
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does a couple of associated
[493]
extra things like turning off the
[495]
landing lights and disarming the
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aerodynamic brakes the aircraft
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continues to climb
[501]
normally and at the time zero six zero
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seven twenty so that's about 30
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seconds after departure the captain
[508]
contacts the departure controller
[511]
the virtual controller comes in and
[512]
tells the aircraft that they can turn
[514]
left early towards sierra tango juliet
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now remember that they were expecting to
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fly straight ahead so the fact that
[521]
they're now getting a clearance to turn
[522]
to the left early means that they have
[524]
to go into the flight management
[525]
computer
[526]
and tell the aircraft that they have to
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make a turn
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so the first officer asks the captain to
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do this this is also standard procedure
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the
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pilot flying concentrates on flying and
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any updates to the navigation
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is done by the pilot monitoring but
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as the captain is now reaching down to
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the flight management computer to update
[547]
the new clearance
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they reach about 2000 feet which is
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about 1500 feet above
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ground level i remember this is
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where the outer truss system now couples
[559]
with the truss levels again to drive it
[561]
from take of trust
[562]
back towards climb trust so as the
[565]
captain is
[566]
working on the computer here
[569]
the trust levels start to move and the
[572]
failure
[573]
reappears so the number one trust lever
[576]
which is connected to
[577]
the left hand engine is now starting
[580]
to reduce backwards towards idle
[584]
slowly with about one degree of trust
[586]
level movement
[587]
per second number two anden is stuck
[591]
in take off trust but because the the
[594]
captain
[595]
has left the trust levels and is now
[597]
focusing on
[598]
the fmc it's likely that he does not
[601]
notice that this is starting to happen
[604]
and also on top of this remember that
[606]
they're expecting to make a left-hand
[608]
turn
[609]
well if this would happen
[612]
if you start to get asymmetric trust so
[614]
that the trust is reducing on your left
[617]
hand side but staying the same on the
[618]
right
[619]
if you're staying on a straight ahead
[621]
track you would notice this because the
[623]
aircraft would want to
[625]
yaw towards the engine with less thrust
[628]
but because this aircraft is now
[630]
initiating a left-hand turn
[632]
this is now likely masking the fact that
[635]
they're starting to get
[636]
asymmetric trust and because this is not
[638]
an engine failure or a failure of any
[640]
sort that is connected to any kind of
[642]
warning
[642]
there is no indication to the crew other
[644]
than the position
[646]
of the truss levers that this is
[647]
happening the aircraft continues to
[650]
climb
[650]
first officer is in a initially quite
[653]
soft
[654]
left banked turn with about 15 to 20
[657]
degrees of bang
[658]
but the bank angle is steadily
[660]
increasing and this
[661]
might be because of the asymmetric trust
[664]
that they're now facing
[667]
but none of the pilots are noticing this
[669]
issue
[670]
and as they climb through about 3 000
[672]
feet
[673]
the captain looks up at the primary
[675]
flight display and notices that the
[677]
speed is not accelerating as it should
[679]
then he calls out speed
[681]
first officer acknowledges that pitches
[683]
down a little bit in order
[684]
for the speed to continue to accelerate
[686]
and soon after that
[688]
at about 3 300 feet or so the first
[691]
officer says
[692]
250 knots inside flaps up
[696]
captain responds and selects the flaps
[698]
up
[700]
but here something else is going wrong
[704]
because as the aircraft continues to
[706]
climb now
[707]
the first officer asks for the slats to
[710]
be retracted which is a
[711]
separate thing to do on the airbus 310
[714]
but he doesn't get a response back from
[716]
the captain
[718]
so he calls it out again nothing happens
[721]
instead on the cockpit voice reporter
[724]
you could hear
[726]
something that can be interpreted as the
[728]
sound of human pain as
[729]
in someone groaning on the flight deck
[732]
first officer is asking what's what's
[734]
the matter with you what's up with you
[736]
but it doesn't get any reply so
[739]
the aircraft is now in a left-hand turn
[743]
the trust's asymmetry is starting to
[746]
increase more and more and at this point
[748]
it's at about 0.19 epr
[752]
the first officer would be very
[754]
concerned at this point remember they've
[756]
just taken off and there's obviously
[758]
something
[758]
wrong with his colleague so the
[762]
workload that the first officer is
[764]
feeling is going to start to
[766]
increase very rapidly here and you have
[768]
two things
[769]
that is happening at the same time both
[771]
the incapacitation of
[773]
his colleague potentially and also this
[776]
kind of subtle malfunction that's
[778]
happening in the background
[780]
the problem is though that this subtle
[782]
malfunction to the ats
[784]
system is going to have very real
[786]
consequences
[787]
on the flight controls of the aircraft
[789]
the bigger the asymmetric
[790]
trust becomes the more of a yaw is being
[794]
introduced and as this aircraft is
[796]
already in a turn
[797]
the bank angle just continues to
[800]
increase the bank angle of the aircraft
[802]
is now approaching 30 degrees which is
[805]
the
[805]
normal maximum when we are in normal
[808]
operations of the aircraft
[810]
the trust's symmetry is at about
[813]
0.36 epr still increasing
[816]
the aircraft is still climbing but the
[819]
first officer is now becoming more and
[820]
more concerned with his colleagues there
[822]
are indications that he tried to make a
[824]
quick
[825]
radio call at this point but there's
[826]
nothing indicated on the cockpit
[828]
voice recorder instead the aircraft just
[831]
continues to increase
[833]
its bank angle now for any one of you
[835]
who knows a little bit about
[837]
flying aircraft or maybe i've seen my
[838]
videos about how to make steep turns
[841]
you know that the more the aircraft is
[844]
banking
[844]
the more back pressure you need in order
[847]
to keep
[848]
the noise above the horizon if the bank
[851]
angle continues to increase and you
[853]
don't do anything about it
[855]
the nose is going to start to decrease
[858]
and drop
[858]
further and further down and the
[859]
aircraft is going to start descending
[862]
and this is what's starting to happen
[864]
now as the aircraft continues to climb
[866]
it reaches a maximum
[868]
altitude of 4620 feet
[871]
the bank angle is down about 43 degrees
[873]
and as the bank angle continues to
[875]
increase now the nose of the aircraft is
[878]
going to drop below the horizon and
[880]
a rapid descent follows
[883]
at about this time there is an
[885]
indication that the first officer is
[887]
calling
[888]
for the autopilot to be engaged and he
[890]
actually reaches
[891]
up and engages the autopilot as well
[894]
but because he is still inputting back
[898]
pressure on the control column
[900]
the autopilot only engages for about one
[902]
second before it disengages again
[906]
and when an autopilot disengages it will
[908]
come
[909]
with an alarm to you know basically tell
[911]
the pilots that
[912]
the autopilot hasn't engaged properly
[915]
this is called the cavalry alarm on the
[918]
on the airbus and it's a very loud alarm
[925]
this alarm goes off and it keeps
[927]
sounding for the remainder of this
[929]
flight
[931]
as the aircraft is now descending down
[933]
through 3600 feet
[934]
there is a call on the cockpit voice
[937]
recorder where the first officer says
[938]
this one has failed which indicates that
[940]
he is now trying to
[943]
understand what is going on with this
[944]
aircraft
[946]
but you have to understand that at this
[948]
point
[949]
when the first officer likely is looking
[951]
up and on to his instruments he's
[952]
finding himself
[953]
in a really really critical attitude the
[956]
nose has dropped
[957]
well below the horizon in fact at the
[960]
worst
[960]
point here it's pointing downward with
[962]
as much as 83 degrees which is basically
[965]
straight down towards the ground the
[968]
role is continuing and in fact the
[971]
aircraft rolls completely around
[973]
its roll axis and as the aircraft is now
[976]
heading straight down towards the ground
[978]
the speed is increasing very very
[981]
rapidly
[982]
here there's also an indication that the
[985]
trust levers are starting to be reduced
[987]
and the reason for that
[988]
is likely that the aircraft is
[990]
overspeeding and there is a protection
[991]
mode
[992]
in the ats in the autotrust system that
[995]
feels if the speed is getting too high
[997]
it will start moving the truss levers
[999]
back again and
[1001]
it's very possible that whatever was
[1002]
holding the number two truss level up
[1004]
before has now given way and the trust
[1007]
is starting to decrease
[1008]
this however has no real implication to
[1011]
what's about to happen to this aircraft
[1013]
what is a little bit interesting is that
[1015]
there was no overspeed
[1016]
warning the reason for that during the
[1019]
subsequent investigation
[1021]
was thought to be that the cavalry
[1024]
charge
[1025]
the autopilot disconnect alarm is
[1027]
actually set as a higher priority than
[1029]
the overspeed alarm
[1031]
so that if the autopilot disconnect
[1033]
alarm was going
[1034]
then the overspeed alarm would not be
[1037]
heard
[1038]
similarly it's also interesting to
[1040]
understand why
[1041]
they didn't get any gpws warning ground
[1044]
proximate warning system which was
[1046]
included in this aircraft the
[1049]
the thought behind that was that because
[1052]
the gpws is using the radio altimeter
[1056]
which is situated at the belly of the
[1059]
aircraft
[1060]
to measure closure rate towards the
[1061]
ground if the aircraft was actually
[1064]
rolled over almost completely well then
[1066]
there would be no
[1067]
readings from the radio altimeter either
[1071]
as they were now hurling towards the
[1073]
ground
[1075]
the highest speed recorded before the
[1077]
aircraft impacted with the ground was
[1079]
324 knots and a negative attitude of
[1082]
50 degrees so when the aircraft impacted
[1085]
the ground
[1085]
less than two minutes after departure it
[1089]
did so with an absolutely horrendous
[1091]
force it was a completely non-survivable
[1094]
event and all 49 passengers and 11 crew
[1096]
members
[1097]
perished immediately
[1114]
the crash site was only a couple of
[1115]
kilometers away from bucharest airport
[1118]
and fortunately it happened outside of
[1120]
any populated area
[1122]
the aircraft investigators came to the
[1125]
scene and started to
[1126]
to try to get a picture of what had
[1128]
happened and because
[1130]
of the very high angle that the aircraft
[1133]
impacted the ground with
[1134]
and the actual crash site was relatively
[1138]
small but part of the aircraft was found
[1141]
as deep into the ground
[1142]
as five meters it was not possible to
[1145]
make any post
[1146]
mortem on the first officer and the
[1148]
captain because of the
[1150]
severity of the damages so we will never
[1152]
really know
[1153]
what happened to the captain or to what
[1155]
extent that
[1157]
he was incapacitated but what we do know
[1160]
from both the cockpit voice recorder and
[1162]
from the flight data recorder which was
[1164]
recovered from the crash site
[1166]
is that after that initial groan that
[1168]
was hard on the cbr
[1170]
there was no more input neither voice or
[1172]
inputs on the controls
[1173]
from the captain so it's likely that the
[1175]
first officer was completely by himself
[1178]
during this event
[1181]
so now the issue for the investigation
[1184]
team
[1184]
is to try to figure out why this
[1186]
happened in the first place
[1188]
they very quickly honed in on the issues
[1191]
that have been previously recorded on
[1192]
this aircraft with the auto trust system
[1194]
and they understood
[1195]
that it's likely that this was a piece
[1196]
of the apostle but what they couldn't
[1198]
understand
[1199]
was why this would have caused this
[1201]
crash in the first place
[1203]
and it was only when they looked into
[1205]
the cvr and they realized the
[1207]
combination
[1208]
of when this issue
[1211]
started appearing at around 2000 feet
[1214]
the captain
[1215]
was heads in onto the computer
[1218]
trying to update the fmc and then the
[1220]
subsequent incapacitation
[1223]
by the captain first officer being
[1225]
potentially preoccupied with what was
[1227]
happening to his colleague
[1229]
as this was happening at the same time
[1231]
and this could potentially explain why
[1234]
the deteriorating attitude of the
[1235]
aircraft went undetected for so long
[1238]
but it doesn't explain why the first
[1240]
officer was unable to rectify the
[1242]
situation
[1242]
once he realized how bad it was but
[1245]
we're gonna get to that in a few minutes
[1248]
guys i hope that you are finding this
[1250]
air crash investigation series that i'm
[1252]
doing fascinating and if you do so i
[1254]
hope that i've earned a subscription
[1255]
from you there are many more videos in
[1257]
this series and you can check them all
[1258]
out
[1259]
up here and when i come back in just a
[1261]
short minute after this message
[1263]
i'll tell you how the training of
[1265]
commercial pilots have changed after
[1266]
this accident so stay tuned
[1269]
i also want to take a few seconds here
[1270]
to say a special thank you to the
[1272]
sponsor of this episode which is
[1274]
skillshare now i know that you are
[1276]
watching this because
[1278]
you are a curious person a lifelong
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learner someone who constantly wants to
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improve and understand the world around
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you better
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and in that case skillshare is
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definitely something that you should be
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checking out okay they have thousands of
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high quality video courses and pretty
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much anything
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that you can imagine a course that i'm
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using myself at the moment is
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five minutes creativity with jasmine
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cheyenne
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where she gives kind of hands-on tips on
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how to chisel out a few minutes to be
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creative every single
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day and it's something that i personally
[1305]
really need but there are also courses
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in
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you know storytelling creative
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photography or even how to use your own
[1312]
home simulator
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to improve and prepare before you start
[1316]
your private pilot license something
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that i've been doing together with my
[1319]
oldest son lucas
[1320]
and he really really enjoys in any case
[1323]
the 1000 first of you guys who uses the
[1325]
link in the video description here below
[1327]
you'll get a free trial with skillshare
[1329]
and if you find something
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that you like or if you want to try out
[1333]
different courses
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then signing up is really cheap it's
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less than ten dollars per month
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so you can support me by supporting them
[1340]
go down
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click the link and let me know what your
[1343]
favorite course on skillshare is so i
[1344]
can check it out myself
[1347]
the final report came to the conclusion
[1349]
that the following casual factors was
[1351]
the reason for the crash
[1353]
number one there was trust asymmetry
[1356]
number two a incapacitation of one of
[1359]
the pilots in this case
[1360]
the captain and number three the
[1362]
insufficient corrective actions
[1364]
from the co-pilot in order to rectify
[1366]
the situation that came
[1367]
from the first two points
[1371]
there were two safety recommendations
[1373]
that came out of the final report both
[1375]
of them were aimed at
[1376]
airbus industries the first one
[1378]
basically said that there needed to be
[1380]
some kind of service bulletin or air
[1382]
boardness directive issued in order to
[1384]
make sure that the underlying reasons
[1386]
for the trust asymmetry was dealt with
[1388]
airbus fairly promptly issued two
[1391]
service bulletins to deal with this on
[1392]
all of the aircraft affected
[1395]
by this potential increase in
[1398]
friction between the couplings and the
[1401]
trust levels
[1403]
the second one had to do with language
[1405]
used in the
[1407]
maintenance manual for example but
[1410]
none of these recommendations talked
[1413]
about the pilot
[1414]
and why the pilot would have lost
[1416]
control in the first place
[1417]
and this is something that really stuck
[1419]
with me um
[1420]
i i didn't feel that the final report
[1423]
gave me
[1424]
sufficient closure on this one because
[1427]
from all i could read when it came to
[1430]
the experience of the first officer and
[1431]
his training records and everything is
[1433]
that this was a very good
[1434]
pilot right he had really good training
[1437]
um
[1437]
history he had he was liked by his
[1440]
colleagues
[1440]
everything pointed towards a really
[1442]
experienced high-functioning
[1444]
pilot and the only thing really wrong
[1447]
here
[1447]
except for the fact that the captain was
[1449]
incapacitated
[1450]
was some trusty symmetry and actually
[1453]
when he found himself
[1455]
in that attitude the trusty symmetry
[1457]
likely wasn't even there because the
[1458]
trust lever on engine number two
[1460]
had already come back so why was it that
[1463]
he wasn't able to recover the aircraft
[1468]
so i brought this to detention of my
[1470]
patreon crew i love going to my patreon
[1473]
crew and kind of talk to them about
[1474]
things like this
[1475]
and one of my patreons who called
[1478]
dimitri
[1479]
brought my attention to a specific part
[1481]
of the first officer's
[1482]
experience and what he brought to my
[1484]
attention was
[1486]
the type of experience that the first
[1488]
officer had
[1490]
the first officer had close to 9 000
[1493]
hours in total
[1494]
but out of those 9 000 hours only 650
[1497]
was flown
[1498]
on western built aircraft the rest over
[1501]
8 000 hours
[1503]
was actually on illusion 1 8 and
[1505]
illusion 62.
[1507]
now there is a crucial difference
[1509]
between western
[1511]
and soviet-built aircraft when it comes
[1514]
to one of the most important
[1515]
instruments in the cockpit which is the
[1516]
artificial horizon that's the instrument
[1519]
that shows how the aircraft is actually
[1520]
flying
[1521]
in relation to the horizon because as
[1523]
we're flying inside of a cloud
[1525]
we cannot feel what is up and down okay
[1528]
it's impossible
[1528]
g-forces makes it impossible for our
[1530]
inner ear to understand that
[1531]
we have to have something to look at
[1533]
that tells us an accurate picture
[1536]
of what's going on and the primary
[1537]
instrument for that is the artificial
[1539]
horizon
[1540]
on western-built aircraft the horizon is
[1543]
moving
[1544]
there is an aircraft symbol and then the
[1546]
artificial horizon is moving depending
[1548]
on the attitude of the aircraft
[1550]
now on soviet-built aircraft the horizon
[1553]
stays fixed in the gyro and it's the
[1557]
little
[1557]
aircraft symbol that is moving instead
[1561]
so if you look at the attitude in a
[1563]
western built aircraft but your mental
[1565]
model
[1565]
is the russian built aircraft well then
[1568]
if you straighten out the horizon
[1570]
it will actually look like the aircraft
[1572]
is turning the opposite way
[1574]
if you as a pilot find yourself in a
[1576]
really high stress
[1578]
situation like the first officer in this
[1579]
case definitely found himself in
[1581]
you look up and your attitude is
[1584]
severely out of what you would consider
[1586]
to be normal
[1587]
well then the way that your brain
[1589]
interprets the information in front of
[1590]
you is going to be
[1591]
crucial for your actions following that
[1595]
and if you for just a split second
[1597]
misinterpret what you're seeing in front
[1599]
of you
[1600]
and put the wrong inputs into the
[1601]
controls or too little
[1603]
inputs into the controls or even no
[1606]
inputs as in you're struggling
[1608]
to to understand what it is that you're
[1609]
seeing in front of you
[1611]
this might be fatal especially at a low
[1613]
altitude like this
[1615]
but if this actually did play a part it
[1618]
wouldn't have been the first time
[1619]
in fact another crash crosshair flight
[1622]
49er 8 was
[1623]
also partially blamed to the pilots
[1626]
misinterpreting
[1627]
their artificial horizon
[1631]
this accident was like every other
[1633]
aviation accident a huge
[1635]
tragedy but like we've learned
[1637]
throughout this series of air crash
[1639]
investigations
[1640]
we as an industry always try to learn
[1643]
from anything like this and to make sure
[1646]
that the industry as a whole becomes
[1647]
better and safer afterwards
[1650]
and this is also true with rom flight
[1651]
371 after this accident and other
[1654]
incident that involved palliative
[1655]
capacitation
[1656]
the way that we train commercial pilots
[1659]
to deal with pallet incapacitation
[1661]
was upgraded so right now if you are
[1664]
going for
[1664]
your initial type rating on any
[1666]
commercial aircraft you are going to be
[1668]
practicing this
[1669]
in different phases of light and the
[1672]
emphasis
[1672]
and the priority whenever you find out
[1675]
pilot incapacitation
[1677]
is for the remaining pilot to focus on
[1680]
flying the aircraft
[1681]
right make sure that the aircraft is
[1683]
fully under control
[1684]
get it up to a safe altitude get the
[1687]
autopilot
[1687]
in and only after that then you can pay
[1690]
some attention to your colleague
[1692]
the first thing that you do is to verify
[1695]
that
[1696]
they haven't inadvertently touched any
[1698]
switches or any gauges or done anything
[1701]
to the flight deck so you verify that
[1702]
the flight deck is completely safe
[1704]
the automatics is in and then you call a
[1706]
mayday to air traffic control
[1707]
ask for as much help as you need from
[1709]
them and you also contact the cabin crew
[1711]
to come in and help you
[1713]
to potentially administer cpr
[1716]
or secure the pilots in its seat
[1719]
so that's what i wanted to tell you with
[1721]
this video guys as always i'd love to
[1723]
hear from you i'd love to hear what you
[1725]
want me to cover next if there is
[1726]
something that you want me to explain or
[1728]
whatever
[1729]
file it into the comments below or
[1731]
contact me either on my free mentor
[1733]
aviation
[1734]
app or inside of my discord server and
[1737]
today i really want to highlight the
[1739]
discord server guys because i'm really
[1740]
proud of it
[1742]
with more than 3500 people in there at
[1744]
the moment and it's a great community
[1747]
and last weekend for example we
[1749]
had a group flight where some guys got
[1752]
together in the discord server they
[1754]
they set a date and a time and they
[1757]
went island hopping in microsoft flight
[1759]
sim 2020 discussing talking amongst each
[1762]
other on the discord server
[1764]
most of them had my livery which by the
[1766]
way if you want it it's absolutely free
[1768]
and you can go to metropolitan.com and
[1769]
download it today
[1770]
it's there for all of the types on
[1772]
microsoft flight sim 2020
[1775]
but anyway it's just a really really
[1777]
nice community we do aviation quizzes
[1779]
most sundays we're discussing flight
[1782]
training and we're swapping pictures
[1784]
with each other anything really
[1786]
that has to do with any aviation in any
[1789]
form
[1789]
so if this sounds interesting to you go
[1792]
get the discord server it's
[1793]
metropilot.com
[1794]
discord or there's a link in the
[1795]
description below have an absolutely
[1797]
fantastic day and i'll see you next time
[1823]
you
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