The Infinite Money Paradox - YouTube

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Vsauce! Kevin here, and I  have a simple coin-flipping 
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game, that requires no skill, has no catch
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or trick, and can lead to infinite wealth. The thing is… nobody really wants to play
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it.
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Why?
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How is it possible that an incredibly easy game with infinite upside causes virtually
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everyone to react with a massive yawn?
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To play this game, we’ll turn to the most rational, calculating man in history: long-time
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friend of Vsauce2, Dwight Schrute. You walk up to the table to flip a coin. Your prize
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starts at $2. If the coin flip results in FALSE, the game is over and you win $2. If
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it lands on FACT, you play another round and your prize doubles. Every time you get a FACT,
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you keep playing and the prize keeps doubling -- from $2 to $4 to $8 $16 $32 $64. $128,
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so on and so on… forever.
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But as soon as you get a FALSE, you are done and you collect your winnings. So if you hit
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a FALSE in the third round, then your prize is $8. If your first FALSE comes in Round
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14, you’d walk away with $16,384. No matter how unlucky you are, you’ll never win less
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than $2. If things go really well… then things could go really well.
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Now that you know the potential payoffs, how much would you be willing to pay to play this
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game? $3? What about $20, $100? The winnings could be infinite so the question is: how
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much is a chance at infinite wealth worth to you?
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We can determine the precise answer, but first we need to know the game’s expected value,
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which is the sum of all its possible outcomes relative to their probability. That determines
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the point at which we choose to play a game -- or, in the real world, the point at which
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we decide to take out insurance on our house or a life insurance policy. If our risk is
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less than our likely reward, we should play. If we’re paying too much relative to what
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we’re likely to get out of playing, then we should not play.
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Here’s the expected value of Schrute.
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You’ve got a 50/50 chance of losing on your first flip and heading back to the beet farm
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with $2. With a probability of ½ and a payoff of $2, your expected value in the first round
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is $1. The probability of winning two rounds is ½ * ½, or ¼, and your prize there would
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be $4. That’s another $1 in expected value. For three successful flips, it’s ½ ^3 -- or
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⅛ -- times $8. Another dollar. 1/16 * 16… 1/32 * 32… 1/64 * 64…
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For n rounds, the expected  value is the probability 
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(½)^n * the payoff of 2^n -- so no matter
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the value of n, the result will be 1. The expected value of the game is 1 + 1 + 1 +
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1 + 1… forever. Because each round adds $1 of value no matter how rare the occurrence
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might be. The expected value is infinite.
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And there’s our paradox. Because, you’d think a rational person would pay all the
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money they have to play this game. Mathematically, it makes sense to pay any amount of money
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less than infinity to play. No matter what amount of money you risk, you’re theoretically
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getting the deal of a lifetime: the reward justifies the risk. But nobody wants to do
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that. Who would empty their bank account to play a game where they know there’s a 75%
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chance they walk away with $4 or less?
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It’s confusing because expected value is, mathematically, how you determine whether
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you’ll play a game. Look, if I offered you a coin-flipping game where you won $5 on heads
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and lost $1 on tails, your expected value of each round would be the sum of those possible
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outcomes: (50% chance * +$5) + (50% chance * -$1). Half the time you’ll win $5, half
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the time you’ll lose $1. In the long run, you’ll average +$2 for every round you play.
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So paying anything under $2 to play that game would be a great deal. When the price to play
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is less than your expected value, it’s a no-brainer.
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And since the expected value of the Schrute game is infinite, paying anything less than
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infinite money to play it should also be a no-brainer. But it’s not. Why?
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The thing that’s so interesting about this game is how the math conflicts with.... actual
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humans. Enter: Prospect Theory. An element of cognitive psychology in which people make
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choices based on the value of wins and losses instead of just theoretical outcomes.
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The reason people don’t want to empty their pockets to play this game despite its infinite
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gains is that the expected marginal utility -- its actual value to them -- goes down as
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those mathematical gains increase forever. This solution was discovered a few years ago.
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A few hundred years ago.
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In 1738, Daniel Bernoulli  published his "Exposition 
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of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk"
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in the Commentaries of the Imperial Academy of Science of Saint Petersburg -- and what
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we now call the St. Petersburg Paradox was born. Bernoulli didn’t dispute the expected
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value of the St. Petersburg game; those are cold, hard numbers. He just realized there
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was a lot more to it. Bernoulli introduced the concept of the expected utility of a game
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-- what was, until the 20th century, called moral expectation to differentiate it from
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mathematical expectation.
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The main point of Bernoulli’s resolution was that utility, or how much a thing matters
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to you, is relative to an individual’s wealth and that each unit tends to be worth a little
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less to you as you accumulate it.
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So, as an example, not only would winning $1,000 mean a lot more to someone who’s
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broke than it would to, say, Tony Stark, but even winning $1 million wouldn’t affect
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the research and development at Stark Industries.
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And there’s also a limit on a player’s comfort with risk, with John Maynard Keynes
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arguing that a high relative risk is enough to keep a player from engaging in a game even
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with infinite expected value. Iron Man can afford to lose a few billion. You probably
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can’t.
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And value itself is subjective. If I won 1,000 peanut butter and jelly sandwiches, I would
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be THRILLED. If someone allergic to peanuts won them, they’d be… less thrilled.
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So. Okay, okay. Given all this, how much can YOU afford to lose in the St. Petersburg game?
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How badly do you want to play? Bernoulli used the logarithmic function to come up with price
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points that factored in not only the expected value of the game, but also the wealth of
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the player and its expected utility. A millionaire should be comfortable paying as much as $20.88
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to flip Schrutes, while someone with only $1,000 would top out at $10.95. Someone with
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a total of $2 of wealth should, according to the logarithmic function, borrow $1.35
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from a friend to pay $3.35.
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Ultimately, everyone has their own price that factors in their wealth, their desires, their
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comfort with risk, their preferences, how they want to spend their time, what else they
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could be doing with their money, their own happiness...
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And the thing is… this game can’t even exist. Economist Paul Samuelson points out
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that a game of potentially infinite gain requires the other party to be comfortable with potentially
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infinite loss. And no one is cool with that.
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So if the important elements are variable and the game can’t exist, what’s the point?
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The St. Petersburg Paradox reminds us that we’re all more than math. The raw numbers
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might convince a robot that it’s a good idea to wager its robohouse on a series of
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coin flips, but you know deep down that’s a really bad idea.
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Because you aren't an expected value calculation. You aren't a logarithmic function. The numbers
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are a part of you and help you live your life. But in the end, you are… you.
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Fact.
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And as always, thanks for watching.