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Russell's Teapot and The Flying Spaghetti Monster | Two Failed Arguments Against God's Existence - YouTube
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Look, it might very well be that belief in god is
ridiculous. But I don't think that can be shown
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with silly examples like Russell's teapot...or
this guy right here. Stick around and I'll make my
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case. Then let me know in the comments whether you
agree. Imagine a teapot floating through space;
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a teapot so small it can't be detected by our most
powerful telescopes. It's a famous example from
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philosopher Bertrand Russell, and if you're
familiar with the Flying Spaghetti Monster,
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it's roughly a popular internet version of the
same idea. And what exactly is the idea? Well,
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we can't prove there's no teapot out there—outer
space is too big and the teapot too small.
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But that doesn't mean there *is* a teapot out
there. That's a confusion about how evidence
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works. And if you are asking me to believe
there's a Flying Spaghetti Monster, well,
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it's up to you to give persuasive
reasons, not my job to prove you wrong...
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that's just how argumentation works. Now all this
is good stuff, the sort of thing you might learn
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in a basic critical thinking course. But these
elementary points about evidence and argument
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are not what make Russell's teapot famous or made
the Flying Spaghetti Monster ubiquitous online.
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The reason they're popular is because they've
been used as arguments against belief in God.
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The idea seems to be that belief in god
is like believing in Russell's teapot...in
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other words, kind of ridiculous. The argument
often seems to go something like this:
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there is no evidence god exists, so you should
think the probability of god is laughably low.
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Now I don't want to challenge this premise. It
could be challenged but that would take us in a
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whole different direction. My question is this:
Even if it's true there's no evidence for God,
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how exactly would that show that God's probability
is laughably low? This is where the analogies
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usually come into play. For example, there is
no reason to think Russell's teapot exists,
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so you should think the probability of Russell's
Teapot is laughably low. Now you *should* think
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the probability of Russell's Teapot is laughably
low, but here's the crucial mistake: it's not
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exactly the lack of evidence that should make you
think the teapot is unlikely. That's a confusion
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about how probability works. For example, let's
say a minute ago I spun a coin on a table.
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Question: what do you think the odds are that
it came up heads? Now there's a lot of evidence
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that could help you with this; for instance, if
I *told* you it came up heads, or if you *saw* it
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land heads with your own eyes. In that case, you
should think the probability is very high indeed.
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But what if you had no evidence—zero
reason to think the coin landed heads?
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Would you think: There is no reason to think
the coin came up heads, so I should think
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the probability of heads is laughably low. Of
course not. You should think the odds are 50 50.
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Okay, now change the example. Let's say you're
dealt a single card from a full standard deck.
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You have not looked at your card yet, so
you have zero evidence that it's a red king.
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Think about it: would you say the odds of having
a red king are about as low as a teapot floating
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through space? Or would you say the odds are
closer to that of a coin coming up heads?
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Well, in fact, the probability of a red
king is 3.8 percent. But even if you're
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terrible at math and you weren't able to pin down
anything close to the exact odds, I bet it was
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still obvious to you that a red king is a *lot*
more probable than a teapot floating in space,
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and a *lot* more probable than the existence of a
Flying Spaghetti Monster. Here's something else I
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bet was obvious to you: getting a red king is a
lot *less* probable than a coin coming up heads.
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Do you see the point? When you have zero evidence
for something, you shouldn't just conclude that
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the probability is very low. That's a mistake.
Nor should you conclude that the odds are 50/50.
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That's a mistake, too. When there's no evidence in
play, the probability you should assign something
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just depends on what it is. This is called "prior
probability". In other words, the probability you
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give something prior to considering the evidence.
The prior probability you assign something
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just depends on that thing. If you have no
reason to believe the coin landed heads,
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then you should assign it 50/50 odds because
you have no evidence to go on except what you
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know about coins. But in the case of drawing a red
king, you should think there's a 3.8 chance. Not
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because you have any evidence about what you've
been dealt—you haven't looked yet!— but just
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because of what you know about decks of cards.
So back to Russell's Teapot. You should think
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the probability of a teapot floating in space
is laughably low, but now you can see it's not
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the lack of evidence that should make you think
that. Rather, it's the low prior probability.
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Our background knowledge contains all kinds of
facts about teapots; for instance, that they
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are typically made by humans and that humans are
not in the habit of shooting teapots into space.
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So, yeah, we should assign Russell's
Teapot a laughably low probability,
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but that's because of what we already
know about teapots and outer space.
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It's not the lack of evidence. Same goes for the
Flying Spaghetti Monster. You should think the
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probability of this Noodly Being is laughably low.
But it has nothing to do with lack of evidence.
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It's because of the low prior probability. When we
just think about what a Flying Spaghetti Monster
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is—in all its parmesan crusted glory—our
background knowledge tells us that such a Pasta
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Being would not have the aerodynamic properties
required for flight, or the chemical properties
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required for organic life. In other words, we
already know, even before considering the evidence
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for or against this Saucy Being, that we should
assign its existence a laughably low probability.
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So we've arrived at the crucial question: is
Russell's Teapot and God a good analogy? Or put
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it this way: Should we assign God's existence
a laughably low probability, in the absence of
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evidence, just like we do the Flying Spaghetti
Monster? I say no. And here's why. Just like in
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the case of the red king or the spinning coin, the
prior probability of God is a matter of thinking
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about the thing itself in the context of our
background knowledge. So let's think about God.
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God is said to be a non-physical personal being of
great power and goodness. Is there anything in our
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background knowledge to make us think the chances
of such a being would be laughably low? Well, no
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not in any obvious, straightforward way, at least.
Notice the difference: when it comes to Russell's
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Teapot and the Flying Spaghetti Monster it's
easy to see why we should start with a laughably
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low probability. But it's not easy to see why
we should do the same with God. At least, the
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people who put forward this kind of argument never
make clear why we should assign God a laughably
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low probability. It always just kind of seems
to be assumed, based on the lack of evidence.
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You might be thinking, "Oh come on now! Science
has given us all kinds of background knowledge
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that implies a laughably low probability for God.
But science is the study of physical reality and
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believers in God never said God is a physical
thing in space and time. On the contrary, the
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claim has always been that God is uniquely unique,
a non-physical thing, or maybe not a thing at all,
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and not bound by space and time. So it's hard
to see how our scientific background knowledge,
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on its own, should make us assign a laughably
low probability to God even before weighing up
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the evidence for and against. Or maybe you're
thinking, "Whoa, whoa, whoa! If there's one
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thing about my background knowledge I'm sure of,
it's that pain exists. Suffering exists. And that
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makes the existence of God highly unlikely. Look,
you'll get no complaint from me here. The argument
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from evil is a powerful argument. But notice it's
an argument. In other words, pointless evil seems
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to be evidence against God. If we're going
to explore the evidence for and against God,
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then let's go! I'm all in favor of people
entering into thoughtful, rational discussion,
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offering reasons for what they believe. That's
philosophy. And I never said the argument from
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evil is a lousy argument. I'm saying Russell's
Teapot is a lousy argument. And so is the Flying
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Spaghetti Monster. Why? Because they are burden
of proof arguments. They attempt to show that
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even before we get down to the hard philosophical
work of weighing the evidence, you should think
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God's probability is laughably low, supposedly
because the odds of Russell's Teapot and the
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Flying Spaghetti Monster are laughably low. And I
guess by analogy we're supposed to assume that God
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is the same. But what I've tried to show here is
it's a bad analogy. It rests on a confusion about
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prior probability. So here's my advice, for what
it's worth. If you are critical of belief in God,
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don't make shifty arguments about burden of
proof. Instead, just get down to the business of
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making your rational case against God —there's
plenty to work with! And if you're a theist,
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don't underestimate the problem of evil. It's
a hell of a problem that every believer in God
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should take seriously. Unlike floating teapots
and flying spaghetti monsters. So that's it
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everybody. Hope you enjoyed this one. Let me know
in the comments whether you think my criticisms
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were fair. Somebody asked me on a review of this
video, "So Timothy, you never came out and said
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what you think God's prior probability should
be." I would say that either it's inscrutable
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or that we should start with a prior probability
of 50/50 odds. I think that's what I would say,
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but what would you say? Again, let me know
in the comments and thanks for viewing.
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