Google, Facebook, Amazon And The Future Of Antitrust Laws - YouTube

Channel: CNBC

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In July 2019, the U.S.
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government targeted America's biggest tech companies.
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The Department of Justice and the FTC appear to be looking at whether the
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leading tech platforms have used improper means to acquire monopoly positions
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or to exclude promising rivals from contesting their position.
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Translation - Are these companies too big?
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And did they get that way illegally?
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These questions fall under a set of laws that until recently had faded from the
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public spotlight.
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Antitrust has gone from being this completely sleepy backwater discipline that
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was just a few people talked about to being very much in the public news.
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We've really started to see a lot of discussion about does there need to be more
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enforcement of antitrust?
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Are we really enforcing these laws and using these tools in the way that they
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were intended to be?
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And it's not just tech.
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Antitrust concerns have arisen around other industries that are also dominated
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by a few huge companies like domestic airlines, pharmaceuticals,
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telecommunications and beer.
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There's always this kind of balance between the desire for an efficient economy
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and this fear of what happens to to society, to democracy, to the interests of
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consumers, the interest of labor.
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So we asked these experts to explain what is antitrust anyway.
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The first federal antitrust law was passed in 1890 and two more followed in
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1914.
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The antitrust laws started out as being against power and making it easier for
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little firms to get into the market and survive, as well as to cater to
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consumers.
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They sought to prevent companies from getting too big or engaging in unfair
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practices like colluding to fix prices.
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They also created an agency to enforce those standards.
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So the antitrust laws were a reaction to the industrialization of the late 19th
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century because of the perception that there was too much economic power over
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specific industries being concentrated in a few hands.
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People like John D Rockefeller and J.P.
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Morgan.
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Rockefeller and Morgan were part of a movement that thought bigger businesses
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were better businesses and monopolies were the best.
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Its followers believed in consolidating whole industries into single firms or
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grouping firms into trusts. From
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just 1895 to 1984, thousands of manufacturing firms merged into just
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157 corporations.
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Morgan consolidated the steel, railroad, shipping and electricity industries and
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inspired copycats in tobacco, rubber, film production and more.
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But it was Rockefeller's Standard Oil Company that became the first blockbuster
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antitrust case.
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Rockefeller combined dozens of state-based companies like Standard Oil Company
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of Ohio, of Nebraska, etc.
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into one.
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By 1984, Standard Oil controlled 91 percent of oil production and 85 percent of
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sales. Following a searing expos茅 of Standard Oil's business practices by
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journalist Ida Tarbell, President Teddy Roosevelt's administration filed an
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antitrust suit against the company in 1986.
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After a five year court battle, the Supreme Court ordered the breakup of
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Standard Oil.
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Standard Oil was divested back into the local companies that had formed Standard
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Oil in the first place.
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Over time, of course, we get these companies beginning to compete with each
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other. We have new companies entering the market and we get a much more
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competitive oil industry.
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But that took a long time to happen.
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Innovation boomed and the overall value of the industry actually increased, as
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did Rockefeller stock in the new companies.
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A flurry of antitrust activity followed.
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By the end of the 1910s.
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Most of the major trusts had been broken up or regulated in some other way
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under antitrust law.
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But this aggressive approach ended when World War One began
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And after the U.S.
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entered into the war, the view was, boy, we just cannot afford to have
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antagonism between the federal government and big business.
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This shift highlights a key theme of U.S.
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antitrust law: How it's enforced or whether it's enforced at all depends
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heavily on the political will of the agencies, courts and president.
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The guidance in the laws is more than any other area of federal law, exceedingly
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broad and in many instances vague.
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There is a difference between having a law on the books and having a law
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actually be enforced.
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The regulatory agencies can do with the law what they want.
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President Franklin D.
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Roosevelt briefly revived aggressive antitrust enforcement to energize the
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struggling Depression era economy.
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But he, too, put it aside when World War 2 began.
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This time, though, the end of the war sparked the most aggressive period of
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antitrust enforcement to date.
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The stage had been set in Hitler's Germany.
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By 1933, when Hitler comes to power, the German economy is extremely
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concentrated. We have these big monopolies and chemicals and steel and
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electricity and coal and other important industries.
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Then Secretary of War Kenneth Royall put it bluntly in a report
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That "these monopolies soon got control of Germany, brought Hitler to power and
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forced virtually the whole world into war."
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The United States was very concerned that our country could tip towards
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fascism or communism if we didn't have and nurture a competitive,
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diverse society.
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Congress passed another act in 1950 to strengthen the mandate against mergers.
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This, combined with an extremely liberal Supreme Court, kicked off the era of
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peak antitrust, one where the FTC and the courts became extremely skeptical of
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any mergers that resulted in a larger market share for one company.
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Really, in the 50s and 60s, many, many cases were brought to stop mergers, even
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mergers that today we think of would not be problematic at all.
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The blockbuster case of this era was AT&T.
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AT&T had been the sole supplier of phone service in the US for decades.
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The Department of Justice filed an antitrust suit in 1974.
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And ultimately in 1982, that case was settled in the Reagan administration with
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a decree that broke up AT&T.
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And the idea was to create a more competitive telecommunications market by
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infusing competition into those markets.
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That sounds like a success for supporters of aggressive antitrust, right?
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Strictly speaking, it was.
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AT&T's decades long monopoly over phone service ended.
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But it also marked the end of the aggressive antitrust era and the beginning of
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the standard we have today.
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Let's back up a bit.
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A conservative backlash against extremely aggressive antitrust enforcement had
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been brewing as early as the 1950s, driven by scholars at the University of
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Chicago.
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They argued that big mergers could provide better efficiency and innovation.
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So there was a big movement to cut back the antitrust laws that would
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say firms need a lot of room to do what they want to do.
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Instead, these scholars proposed that antitrust suits only be brought against
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businesses if their actions had caused consumer harm.
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For example, if two businesses merged and caused products to get more expensive
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or worse, or if the new company somehow stifled innovation in the industry, the
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Supreme Court adopted this consumer welfare standard.
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In the 1979 case, Reiter vs.
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Sonotone.
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It fairly abruptly sort of announces that it's shifting its direction and
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accepting that this so-called consumer welfare standard is the goal of
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antitrust law.
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And when Americans voted conservative Ronald Reagan into office the following
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year, the fate of aggressive antitrust enforcement was sealed.
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Reagan campaign was based on the fact that government had become too intrusive
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into business.
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So this sentiment built up and Reagan ran on the ticket
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to get government off the back of business.
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And that won the day.
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That sentiment won the day.
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And the next few decades of antitrust enforcement.
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The Department of Justice did bring a size-based antitrust case against
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Microsoft in the late 1990s, which we'll explore in another video along with
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its effects on the current antitrust investigations of Big Tech.
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But for the most part, antitrust enforcement based on the size of companies has
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been essentially dormant for the last 40 years.
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And I think you saw antitrust be consumed with or be captured by a very
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fundamental free market ideology that caused regulators to put a heavy thumb on
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the scales, in favor of business, in favor of letting mergers go through, in
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favor of letting monopolies do whatever they wanted.
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This is obvious if we zoom out and look at some key data on the U.S.
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economy. Between 1982 and 2012, market concentration across all of these
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industries increased sometimes by triple digit percentages between 1996 and
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2016. The number of companies on the stock market fell by half also since
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1996. The FTC has challenged fewer and fewer proposed mergers that would leave
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only five or six major firms in an industry.
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Which is why there are now only four major domestic airlines, four major
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telecommunications carriers, three major drugstores and two major beer
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retailers.
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What we had at the turn of the 19th century and we have again now is companies
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that have a significant influence over the entire economy.
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This has experts wondering, is this another inflection point for antitrust law?
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Should these laws once again be skeptical of business size or should they leave
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these businesses alone?
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It feels like this is the first time in 40 years that antitrust has a real
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moment to decide what it's going to be for the next 40 years.
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At times, I think that antitrust is portrayed as this place and magic bullet, so
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to speak, of that if we just break up the companies, all these other problems
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that we're concerned about would go away.
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But there's no guarantee of that.
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Antitrust has intervened at different times to create possibilities for much
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greater innovation, much more robust competition.
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I think there is a broad sense, even in the US, that something has gone wrong in
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these markets that something needs to change.
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One way to think about it is between the ends. On
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one side that we have aggressive antitrust from the other side that don't have
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antitrust. There's a big spectrum and we probably want to find some point on
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the spectrum.
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You will never be the perfect point.
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But to be on the spectrum is better than being when one of the ends.