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Video tutorial: Coordination game - YouTube
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4.13, social interactions and
conflict in the choice among Nash
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equilibria.
In this section I present to you another
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game: the players are the same, Bala and Anil,
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they're making a decision about
producing cassava
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and rice and they are making this
decision at the same time.
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They cannot communicate with each
other while making this decision.
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Now, as before, in order to find out if
this game has any Nash equilibrium we
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need to put ourselves in the shoes of
each player and analyze the game.
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I'm now inside Anil's head, I'm Anil now.
What am I going to do if Bala decides to
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produce rice?
If I produce cassava I'll get four, for rice
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I'll get zero, so producing cassava
is my best response if Bala produces rice.
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I put a dot here to mark my
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best response, Anil's best response in
this case.
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What if Bala decides to produce cassava?
If I produce rice I'll get two, if I
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produce cassava
I'll get one so my best response in this
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case is to produce rice
and I'll put a dot here to represent
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my decision and his best response in
that case.
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Now let's get out of Anil's head and go
inside Bala's head. I am now Bala.
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What am I going to do if Anil decides to
produce
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cassava? Now in this case if I produce
cassava I'll get zero, for rice
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I'll get four, therefore I decide to
produce
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rice and I put a circle
around that decision to mark my
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best response, Bala's best response.
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Now what if Anil decides to produce rice?
What would be my best strategy? If I
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produce cassava,
I'll get two, for rice I'll get one, so
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cassava is my best strategy,
and then I'll put a circle around
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that strategy to represent my best
response,
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Bala's response. Now let's take a step
back and look at the game from a
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perspective of an
outsider. We realize three things:
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first, that this game has two Nash
equilibria.
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The best response of both players
meet with each other
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in these two cells so that's the first
thing;
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the second thing is that if we focus
on these two Nash equilibria
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both of these are better than the other
two cells.
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What does this mean? It means that
both players
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are better off as long as they don't
compete with each other,
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as long as they don't produce the same
thing;
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and finally if you look at these two
equilibria we
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realize that one of them is inferior
to the other one,
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and in reality people might get
stuck in that equilibrium. That
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equilibrium can
persist, why? Because remember, these two
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players cannot coordinate their decision
with each other, they cannot communicate.
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Let's assume Bala is producing cassava,
then Anil has to produce rice,
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there is no point in Anil producing
cassava as long as
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Bala is not switching to rice.
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However in reality players can
end up in this better equilibrium on the
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basis of expectation.
Let's say Anil expects Bala
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to produce rice, why? Because you know
generation
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after generation people have been
producing
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rice in Bala's district so on the basis
of this expectation
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Anil produces cassava and both these
players
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end up in the better equilibrium without
talking with each other.
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Well you might say to yourself, what does
this all have to do with the real world?
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In real world you know Bala and Anil can
talk with each other
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and coordinate their decision and end up
here.
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Well that's not necessarily the case. If
we increase the number of players in the
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game
in the real world you know businesses
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and households,
a lot of them have to make a decision
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at the same time and it's not always
easy for them to get inside one room and
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coordinate their decisions,
and because of that sometimes the firms
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in one industry can get stuck
in an inferior equilibrium,
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and in order to get out of that
equilibrium they need an outside
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intervention by the government.
Let me give you an example: let's think
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about the barcode technology. That's one
of the most
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important innovations of 20th century
that dramatically increased the
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productivity of the supermarkets in the
retail sector.
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But it took many many years for the
supermarkets
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and the producers of the goods to adopt
this technology of barcode,
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why? Because of all these coordination
difficulties.
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Let's see this issue from the perspective of producers of goods.
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Let's say I'm a producer of cornflakes. I
would
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adopt the barcode technology only if
the supermarkets that I'm selling my
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cornflakes to move to this technology as well.
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Now let's see it from the perspective of
supermarkets. Supermarkets
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adopt the barcode technology only if
the producers of the goods move to that
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technology. So this is a classic coordination problem: many
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supermarkets
and the producers have to move from the
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old technology to the
new technology of barcodes at the same
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time, and because of these coordination issues
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new technologies take many years to take
off, and that has been the case not only with
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barcode technology, but with other technologies throughout
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economic history.
Thank you.
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