The Auction Problem - YouTube

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Vsauce!
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Kevin here, and I’m auctioning off the ultra-rare PlayStation 5: Jake Roper ā€œPrepare to Cryā€
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edition, which evokes the frustration and heartbreak of Jake’s fruitless attempts
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at securing his very own PS5.
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With this edition, you’re buying countless hours of entertainment -- and a monument to
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one man’s pain.
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I’m auctioning it using a system of sealed bids -- the bidders submit their price and
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we determine a winner.
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I’ve got 4 bids…
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Ready?
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Okay bid number one...
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Hideo Kojima?
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MY GREAT FRIEND HIDEO KOJIMA WHO I MET FOR 9 SECONDS IN 2013?
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Even HE can’t get a PS5?
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Alright well, $400, that’s pretty undervalued -- he must be a very patient and frugal man.
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The PS5 retails for $499, so if this bid wins, Kojima is getting a serious deal.
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Alright, bid #2: BALLOON KEVIN!?
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You are not Real Kevin!
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How many times?
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I am Real Kevin.
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How did you even get in here?
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Well, Whatever.
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And what is your bid? $3?
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$3.
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Okay.
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Balloon Kevin is a scammer.
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What a stupid bid.
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But I guess maybe he thought lowballing was worth a shot.
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Whatever.
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Ugh.
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Moving on...
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Bid #3: Oh, this bid is actually from Jake himself, still desperately trying to get a
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PS5. $550?
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That, that’s fair.
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It’s a 10% premium on top of the going price, which makes sense for something in such high
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demand.
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Smart bid -- good luck!
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Hopefully we can dry those Roper tears.
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And now to reveal the fourth and final bid.
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Drumroll please...
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$8,000!? WOW!
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That is..
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THAT is a serious bid.
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Michael must really want this thing.
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Well, SOLD!
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For $8,000.
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THAT is absolutely what you would call a..
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Pro.
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Gamer.
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Move.
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Dramatically outbidding everyone to secure the win, and here’s something that you don’t
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realize is so genius about it.
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This isn’t a normal auction.
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No.
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This is a Vickrey auction!
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Which means the winner doesn’t pay the highest bid.
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They pay the second highest bidder’s bid.
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In this case, that’d be Jake’s $550.
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Sorry Jake.
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You’re really gonna wanna stay hydrated because those tears will continue to flow
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as Michael is playing his brand new PS5 after only paying YOUR $550 bid.
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So, that’s that!
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And as always thanks for watching… w….wait…
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A really aggressive bid worked out this time, yeah.
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But overbidding on a Vickrey auction is actually a really, really bad idea -- and virtually
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no one realizes that the most popular auction house in human history works this way.
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Here’s a question: WHAT ARE AUCTIONS?
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The discipline of auction theory within economics is built on a handful of basic auction formats.
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You’re probably used to auctions that start low and people bid back and forth until there’s
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only one bidder left.
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The highest bid wins -- that’s an English auction, or an ā€œopen-bid ascending auctionā€
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if you wanna get TECHNICAL.
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You can also do auctions the other way, as well.
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A Dutch auction starts at a price nobody would pay and descends until the first person bids
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and thereby wins instantly.
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And there are two types of sealed bid auctions.
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In a normal sealed bid auction, everyone submits their secret bid and the highest one wins
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-- the end.
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Then there’s the Vickrey Auction, a sealed bid auction in which the highest bidder actually
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pays the second-highest bid.
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But why would you do it that way?!
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Why not just keep it simple?
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And how can such a tiny change in the rules even make a difference?
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First, it’s important to note that we’re dealing with an item with known value.
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There’s an established retail price for the PS5, so we’ve got a pretty good sense
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of what it’s worth -- millions of people have paid that price.
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Compare that to, say… a painting.
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I might think it’s a $100 painting.
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Painting Collector McGee, a person I just made up, might think it’s a $25,000 painting.
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I don’t know.
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But..
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What about if the item is like an oil field somewhere and no one knows what’s really
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under the ground.
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That makes it tough to establish a value yourself, but it makes it really hard to know what other
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people might be bidding.
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With a PS5, we’ve got a pretty good idea of what other people might be thinking.
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So let’s say Jake figured he’d be up against someone who might bid at least as much as
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the $550 he was willing to pay… but maybe they’ll try to get a deal and hope that
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everyone else can’t afford it.
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He thinks they’ve got a bidding range of $450 to $650, with an equal probability of
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submitting any bid within that range.
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So should he bid $550, so half the time he wins, half the time he doesn’t, and when
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he loses he’s not really out anything?
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In a standard sealed bid auction format…
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No.
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If he bids over $550 and wins, he’s losing value by paying more than he wanted to, so
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that’s out.
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But if he bids under $550 -- say, $530 -- he’ll still win 40% of the time against the mystery
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bidder, and each time he wins he’s saving $20.
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If the highest bid was over $550, he would have lost anyway.
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The extra value he gains out of saving $20 4 times out of ten outweighs that one time
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he’d bid $530 and lose to a bid of $550.
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That’s called ā€˜bid shading,’ and it’s what Nobel prize-winner William Vickrey solved
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in 1961 in ā€œCounterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders.ā€
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Vickrey’s work on auctions included the development of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem,
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which showed that if an auction satisfies a handful of conditions, the revenue for the
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seller will be the same no matter what the format -- and for all this, he found out he
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won the 1996 Nobel Prize in Economics just 3 days before he died.
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So what’s so great about Vickrey Auctions?
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By making the winner pay the second-highest bid instead, that incentive to manipulate
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the bidding evaporated -- and it actually started to pay to be as honest as possible.
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Vickrey ushered in an era of honest bidding being the dominant strategy in an auction
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-- let’s go back to Jake.
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He wants to pay $550 for the PS5 because that’s what it’s worth to him.
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If he commits to the pro gamer move of bidding $8,000 just to guarantee that he’ll win
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the auction, the second highest bidder could be any number lower than that.
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He could get stuck paying $600, $800, $4,000, or more, especially if someone else is trying
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to use the same strategy.
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Inflating his bid not only doesn’t help, but could put him in a really bad position.
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If Jake wants to try to save a little money, he can still bid $550 -- because if he wins,
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he’s paying less than that anyway based on whatever the next-highest bid is.
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He doesn’t have to engage in bid shading… and if he does try to game the system, he’s
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susceptible to being outbid and losing.
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In a second-price auction, potential buyers also have a much harder time colluding with
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each other to manipulate the price in their favor, and sellers just don’t have enough
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information to successfully ā€˜plant’ bids to drive up a price.
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In a Vickrey auction, Jake’s incentive to go higher or lower than his true value is
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just… gone.
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$550 is his best bid.
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But it’s not just best for him: everyone he’s bidding against has the same incentive
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to bid honestly, too.
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The same forces are at work for them, and they know it, so why not just be honest?
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The seller knows no one’s trying to game the system, either, and they’re gonna get
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the best price for their item.
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And guess what?
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This is pretty much how eBay works.
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Everyone submits their bid and the winner pays just a tiny bit more than the second-highest
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bid.
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Vickrey had no way to know that almost 60 years after his paper, one single website
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on the internet would house nearly a billion and a half auctions for everyday items worldwide
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-- and virtually everyone would be able to use his bidding system from a device in their
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pockets.
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The 2020 Nobel prize in Economics went to Robert B. Wilson and Paul Milgrom for their
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work advancing auction theory -- and we’ve been thinking about a system where I have
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something, you want it, and we need to figure out how to exchange it in a way that’s best
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for both of us for a long time.
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The Greek historian Herodotus wrote about Babylonian auctions in 2,500 BC, and that's
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the most surprising thing here.
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In 4,500 years of thinking about auctions, the mathematical development optimizing the
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activity of billions of people is really close to just… being honest.
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And in the spirit of honesty...
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I’m actually not auctioning my PS5 because I have Demon’s Souls to play!
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And as always -- thanks for watching.