Bitcoin Q&A: How to Avoid Re-creating Systems of Control - YouTube

Channel: aantonop

[0]
"Do we need to take a step back to go forward, letting the big banks store our cryptocurrency keys?"
[8]
"In previous videos, you [said] one of the most important next steps for the crypto world [is] to increase liquidity...
[15]
by increasing vendors of all kinds, thus making it easier to buy and sell crypto."
[20]
"How do you look at custodial banks in the future [having customers store] crypto...
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next to their fiat money in their bank [account]?"
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"Do you think taking this step back to the banks is necessary for increasing the liquidity?"
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[I would say] no to any step that re-adds an intermediary, a counterparty, a custodial owner into the system --
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no matter what benefit it gives you in the liquidity or price of cryptocurrencies.
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[Maybe] it creates a rally in the market and a few more people get lambos,
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but that is not something I would be interested in.
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It detracts from the most important principle of this technology, which is decentralization.
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If you are interested in decentralization as the most important principle, you are looking to...
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remove intermediaries, remove trusted third parties from the world of finance and commerce.
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Then you are willing to do so while not having a lambo. That's okay.
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When you [ask], "What do you think about custodial banks in the future [having customers store] crypto...
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next to their fiat money in their bank [account]?"
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I would argue that it is not their crypto and it is also not their fiat. It is the bank's crypto and the bank's fiat.
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Part of the problem we have in our modern world is, when you use a custodial third party like a bank,
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you have to trust that they [will] give you that money back; in many cases, they don't.
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It is not your crypto anymore and it is not your fiat either. It is the bank's crypto and the bank's fiat now.
[123]
You have just re-introduced a giant security risk, a concentration of power, an opportunity for corruption.
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If that is the way you increase the liquidity, I am not interested in more liquidity.
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That is not a trade-off that's worth doing. I am much more interested in maintaining decentralization.
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There are some trade-offs worth making and there are some trade-offs not worth making.
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This is not a step back. This is complete capitulation. You don't step forward by increasing liquidity of banks.
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You don't increase liquidity of the crypto [economy], because you no longer own any of it.
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No. Be very careful of people who try to persuade you that, in order to achieve your dreams,
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you [must] capitulate on your principles.
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[AUDIENCE] You were talking about financial institutions having caused many problems Bitcoin is combating.
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Curious [that], as the blockchain ecosystem matures, these same institutions are hopping on the bandwagon.
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They are re-creating the same financial instruments, or have ambitions to if they haven't done it yet.
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I'm curious what you think the implications are, when these guys hop on the bandwagon.
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They will probably [get in] a lot faster than the rest of us,
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even if we as individuals can create our own financial instruments on the blockchain.
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[ANDREAS] That's a great question. I get that question a lot too. I am not particularly worried.
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What most financial institutions are trying to do is...
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take the idea and use it to do business- as-usual without changing their practices.
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The main feature of this technology is the [systems architecture] we call decentralization, which says:
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no one is in charge, no one is in control, and everyone participates.
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It is a collaborative project.
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[What becomes] recorded in the blockchain is the result of hundreds of thousands of computers.
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It is not controlled by any single entity.
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They could adopt that, they could adopt decentralization as a principle and make the economy far more robust.
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They [will not] do that. They [will] try to pretend to do that, while creating something they control.
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The nature of corporations is centralization. The nature of financial corporations is even more centralization.
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As to the [question] of whether they will be able to move faster...
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There is a pervasive idea that because financial services companies have all the money --
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quite literally, because they made it themselves -- that they can simply buy their way into the future.
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Fortunately for us, unfortunately for them, there are a few things you can't buy: innovation and creativity.
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You can't buy innovation and creativity.
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Once these large organizations [grow] beyond a certain size, if innovation arises without their company,
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they will strangle it within 72 hours, probably by creating an innovation committee to study it first.
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When they see innovation outside their industry and it is not too disruptive, they [will] buy it,
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embrace it, ask it to have a haircut wear suits, and get into a 401k plan.
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At which point, all of the creative and innovative people will leave. They will be left with a husk of a product.
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Unless it is a very disruptive innovation, in which case they won't even try to buy it. They will try to snuff it out.
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This technique has worked for them really well in the past.
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Financial services could either buy the disruptive competitor, sue the disruptive competitor,
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or (their favorite technique) have governments turn their disruptive competitor off for them.
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Make sure there are enough regulations in the way that the smaller competitor can't compete [anymore].
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Then Bitcoin happens. You can't buy it, it is not [a company]; can't sue it, there's no one to sue.
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And the government can't regulate it out of existence because we forgot to ask their permission. [Laughter]
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For the first time in 75 years of traditional financial services, they can't do any of those [techniques].
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They haven't started panicking yet because hubris is a pretty big mountain to overcome.
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But at some point they will [panic]. Some of the smart bankers are already [understanding that].
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[Those smart bankers are] taking their Christmas bonus, jumping ship at the end of the year,
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and using their Christmas bonus to fund a blockchain startup in January.
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I have heard this story repeatedly from former Goldman Sachs bankers, JP Morgan Chase bankers...
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The rats are already abandoning the ship, so I am not worried about that.
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"Questions about blockchains for other industries."
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"Why would a company use a permissioned, centralized blockchain to track supply chain procedures?"
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What efficiencies are gained [compared to] using a traditional database or the cloud?
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That is a very astute question; if you ever find the answer to that, I would love to know it...
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Other than the fact that it allows you to stick every possible buzzword into your marketing brochure,
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perhaps raise a whole ton of money in an underground ICO from a non-extradition, tax haven country,
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and bamboozle a ton of investors...
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I'm not quite sure what the point of permissioned, centralized supply chain blockchains is.
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The very term "centralized blockchain" is an oxymoron. "Permissioned blockchain" almost equally an oxymoron.
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Blockchains are [data] structures that are useful in [enabling] decentralization and open-access.
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Making them centralized and permissioned completely removes the need for running a blockchain.
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In that case, it [would] simply [be] a very inefficient database.
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You can imagine certain scenarios where a blockchain system could be useful for supply chains,
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primarily for organizing supply chain interactions between partners who do not trust each other...
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who want a neutral, censorship-resistant, decentralized platform that serves needs in a predictable manner,
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where no one [party] is in control.
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That is what blockchains do. For that purpose, you can imagine a supply chain blockchain would be useful.
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However, that implies that you're using the supply chain across multiple participants in an industry.
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The problem is, they all have to agree to [a standard], rather than try to jockey for position and massage it...
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until they get relative advantage, as always happens when these things are designed by committee.
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[This is] exactly why successive efforts at...
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standardizing IT infrastructure and systems [through] industry committees fail, again and again.
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It is exactly why things like the internet and the web have [often] emerged from neutral, research-oriented,
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scientific, open-source endeavors have succeeded again and again.
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So let them try to create a supply chain [blockchain].
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What we [will] see: every company tries to make their own, none of them are interoperable,
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and all of them give too much power to the company that [created it].
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Therefore, none of the competitors will want to use it, and it is just an inefficient database.
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Millions of dollars will be wasted on this bullshit.
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Phil has some more astute questions for us,
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all of which [are about the pitfalls] of using blockchains for other industries.
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"Would someone who uploads the hash of a music file on the blockchain prove that he / she is the creator?"
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That is precisely the problem with trying to use blockchains in digital rights management,
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provenance, and all other stuff [that boils down to]: garbage in, garbage out.
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If you have a blockchain that guarantees information is recorded accurately forever,
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that doesn't mean the information is true.
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It is only true if you can validate it with consensus rules that remove centralized power.
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If anybody can simply put a hash out, that [proves very few things]. You can't prove identity,
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you can't prove provenance and you cannot prove ownership.
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If you have a third party proving the identity, provenance, or ownership, then it is not a decentralized blockchain.
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It is simply a database for registering the decisions of a committee or registry agency.
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Again, an inefficient database. Furthermore, using hashes to identify unique pieces of content,
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like music or video, has been proven again and again to be [pointless for the purposes they ascribe].
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[For example]. all you need to do is change one bit [of the content] and the hashes won't match anymore.
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You can't verify that a piece of content is [nearly the same with hashes].
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In all of this, I think I just demolished the ICO pitches and whitepapers for at least twenty different start-ups...
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[who] are playing around with these concepts.
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But the truth is, there really isn't much of a use case for provenance of music...
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or other things like that, by simply doing proof-of-existence [with a blockchain].
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Okay, let's destroy industry number three!
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"How would a patient holding his private key [simplify] healthcare record management?"
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"How could blockchain-based data be accessed if the patient holding the private keys is in a coma?"
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Well, unfortunately, most of these things have been designed by start-up people...
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who [were probably] in a coma when they were writing the white paper, because none of this makes sense.
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The idea that you would put healthcare data -- [some of] of the most private data [people have]
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-- on a public distributed ledger, is asinine at best.
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Healthcare probably [has some] of the most narrow applications for blockchain technology,
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despite the fact that millions [of dollars are] being raised by companies to do healthcare records management.
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Ask yourself this: which problem in healthcare records management do you solve [with]...
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a global, neutral, censorship-resistant, decentralized system? Because that is what a blockchain is.
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Is someone trying to do censorship on records management? Trying to introduce non-neutral data?
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Trying to artificially raise borders in healthcare records management?
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Is it a problem in healthcare records management that participants don't trust each other,
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and cannot vest power in anyone?
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None of these things are solved by a blockchain.
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The problems in healthcare records management are not problems that relate to blockchains.
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Be very skeptical about industry applications of blockchains.
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"Could a blockchain be implemented to distribute credits to the elderly to pay their rent or for social activities,
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supposing the credits are validated by certain authorities (priests, social service clerks, etc.)?"
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"Can you see a blockchain being created for that application, or could an existing one be used?"
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"To timestamp and validate the credits, [prohibit] buying and selling of these credits [for other purposes]."
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Steven, I'm sorry. While [this] is an admirable idea and I can see where you are coming from,
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what you are describing is money.
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Yes, you can create tokenized forms of money.
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But when you create tokenized forms of money and try to restrict the circulation and liquidity,
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restrict the places they can be spent, and restrict who owns them, that reduces the value of that money.
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In the end, you cannot prohibit people from buying and selling these credits;
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you cannot prevent secondary markets from existing in anything that is perceived as valuable.
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If something is valuable, it is traded. That is the natural rules of economics.
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You can't prohibit people from trading these tokens. They will trade them on secondary markets.
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They will trade them even if it's illegal to trade them.
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If you try to prevent people from trading, all you [will do] is discount the value of that token,
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so people will trade it at a discount.
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The less liquidity, circulation, and velocity it has, the more you erode the value of that token.
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Effectively what you created is simply bad money;
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[Gresham's Law says that] people will get rid of good money and replace it with good money.
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If people have two forms of money and one of them is considered bad, it is sold at a discount.
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They will use that bad money to do all of their spending until they run out of it,
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while they hoard the [good money].
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These basic rules of economics [won't] be violated. We see these scenarios play out again and again.
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We see them in places where you have hyperinflation, like Venezuela and Zimbabwe.
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You see it in places where you have demonetisation, as we saw in India.
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The demonetised notes flooded the market immediately at a heavy discount. Gresham's law played out in reality.
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We see the negative implications of using this kind of restricted [credit].
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These were very popular in company towns of the Old West; they are still [used] in certain places where...
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disadvantaged and disempowered workers live inside compounds.
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For example, [resource extraction companies like] mining and oil.
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The only credit they can spend is tokens that are issued by the company, spendable only at the company store,
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to buy food and basic amenities.
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These [credits] are used as a system of control. Not a good system, not a good outcome.
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They are used to control people, for the most part.
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So while I appreciate your approach to help people, the laws of economics will work against you in the end.
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[These credits would] become a poor substitute for money.