Bitcoin Q&A: Key Storage Best Practices - YouTube

Channel: aantonop

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"Why do paper wallets behave differently from hardware wallets?"
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"If you send a portion to another wallet, the remaining balance [in the paper wallet] is not correct or is lost."
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"The remaining balance must also be sent to another address."
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That is a great question. Paper wallets are different from hardware wallets because...
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the [latter uses] hierarchical deterministic (HD) wallets, whereas paper wallets have one public and private key.
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A hierarchical deterministic (HD) wallet is built upon a [mnemonic] seed, a set of 12 to 24 English words.
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This seed is used to generate an enormous number of keys [and addresses]. In fact, it can generate,
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at each account level, more than two billion private keys in sequence.
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These can all be generated from the same seed, not only for receiving but also for change addresses.
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Any HD wallet, whether software, mobile, or hardware, where you are backing up 12 to 24 English words,
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will generate a new [change] address for every transaction you do.
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It can generate billions of these addresses, all from a single seed, without any problems whatsoever.
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That is the fundamental difference. A paper wallet only has one key, with one address.
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That means when you spend from a paper wallet, some strange things can happen.
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The other big difference is, a paper wallet only exists on paper. A hardware wallet [allows you to]...
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back it up as a mnemonic phrase, and has a process for importing that mnemonic phrase.
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That process is defined in BIP-39, the Bitcoin Improvement Proposal [for mnemonic codes].
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The hardware wallet can import the seed in such a way that it can re-generate all of the keys and addresses.
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On the other hand, if a paper wallet is made "hot" (online) and you decide to make a transaction,
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you can import it into a software wallet.
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Some wallets will allow you to import private keys, which means your software wallet will spend...
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directly from the private key on the paper wallet.
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You must consider what happens to change.
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Theoretically, wallets should be smart enough to notice that when you have imported a private key...
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from an external source, the change should go back to that private key, to ensure there are no problems.
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However, most wallets don't do this. In fact, if you import a private key from an external source,
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most wallets assume that you will no longer using that private key.
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They will spend from it and return the change to a different address managed by the software wallet,
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not the address that is on the paper wallet.
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In practice, many people don't understand that this is happening.
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They don't understand that change is being [accounted for] in a transaction.
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They will download a software wallet on their phone, import their paper wallet, spend a small amount,
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and put the paper wallet back in a safe when they are finished.
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They assume that the rest of the money is still on there, and then delete the software wallet,
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assuming it is no longer needed.
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However, there is no longer any money on the paper wallet. The rest went into a change address.
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That change address was generated by the software wallet; it is not the same as the paper wallet address.
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As a result the paper wallet is now empty. The software wallet has been deleted.
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The money has been lost. This has happened numerous times.
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The problem with paper wallets is that the user experience is counter-intuitive.
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If you know exactly what you are doing with the paper wallet, then you can make a paper wallet work for you.
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But for 99% of people who do not have the technical expertise to understand how the UTXO set works,
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how change addresses are generated, how paper wallets work, how wallet import works,
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and how transactions work, paper wallets end up being very dangerous [for most users].
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They are a cheap way to [handle] cold storage, but they have a lot of associated risks.
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They require you to set up a secure computer in order to generate them,
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and a secure printer in order to print them out, which are [tasks] that most users cannot handle.
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By comparison, a hardware wallet has an intuitive user experience, which 99% of users can handle securely.
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A paper backup of the mnemonic seed is sufficient for cold storage.
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There is no chance of losing money due to [a misunderstanding of] change addresses.
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As a result, for 99% of users, hardware wallets are a far superior solution [compared] to paper wallets.
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Yes, people keep insisting on paper wallets. If you try to do this, please be very careful.
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Make sure you understand, in every transaction, where the change went.
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If possible, try to follow the advice that is given: load a paper wallet once,
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and when you spend it, spend it all.
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Move it [deliberately] to a different address or wallet, and destroy the paper wallet.
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Assume that there won't be any money on it.
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"Among the various Bitcoin clients and wallets, which is top-notch for storage and transacting?"
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I have been changing Bitcoin wallets, on average, once every six months.
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While there is a lot of development [in Bitcoin], these wallets are often not maintained long-term.
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Many of the companies that make wallets fail to develop sufficiently robust business models.
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[Eventually], they either go out of business, or they stop maintaining the wallet and become distracted...
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by other features [or products], like ICOs. Maintaining a crypto wallet is very difficult.
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The space is constantly changing. Wallet developers need to keep moving along...
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with the standards, and that requires funding.
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So far, I have found that many wallets are not keeping up.
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I use a number of mobile and desktop wallets; for the most part, I use a combination of...
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hardware wallets, desktop software wallets, and mobile wallets that work with the hardware wallets.
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What I use to store my keys and sign transactions is almost always a hardware wallet.
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I do have a mobile wallet with a tiny amount of petty cash, about $100 [worth].
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I use it for transactions when I am out and about. Most of my cryptocurrency is on hardware wallets...
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that I keep separately.
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I access these hardware wallets through a variety of desktop and mobile wallets.
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Think about where you store keys and sign transactions (hardware wallets)...
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as separate from the software you use to construct transactions and sync with the blockchain.
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This could either be full node software like Bitcoin Core, or any capable software wallet.
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I quite like Electrum as a desktop wallet, but your mileage may vary.
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"What about the new Bluetooth enabled wallets," mentioning one of the hardware wallet manufacturers.
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There are a number of hardware wallets with various forms of connectivity, other than plugging through USB.
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I haven't studied the security of such wallets. However, I would personally be concerned...
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about storing my funds on a device that has wireless connectivity.
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Wireless protocols are very rich in features, and in the past have been found to contain many bugs.
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They can be accessed by more than the device you just plugged it into.
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That increases the exposure and attack surface of the hardware wallet.
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That doesn't mean it is not secure; it just means I would not trust that type of hardware wallet,
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one that has WiFi or Bluetooth connectivity in addition to USB, for cold storage.
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I might trust it as a warm wallet, for my spending money, but I wouldn't trust it for cold storage...
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where I might have my savings.
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"Regarding desktop wallets and storing funds, what [should you do] if your hard drive fails?"
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This is a great question. As I mentioned in the previous answer, I make a very big distinction between...
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the wallet software I use to construct transactions and sync with the blockchain,
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and the device I use to store keys and sign transactions.
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That may be a bit confusing. I use hardware wallets to store my keys and sign transactions.
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That gives me the highest degree of security.
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It also allows me to create paper backups of the mnemonic phrases,
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to achieve resilience and continuity in case something happens to me.
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I don't trust the software running on my desktop. In fact, I don't trust my desktop at all, to be secure.
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I assume that my mobile smartphone and laptop [could be] compromised. I don't trust these devices.
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I assume that any information stored on them could have been accessed, including keys for bitcoin wallets.
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I use hardware devices for second-factor authentication and signing bitcoin transactions...
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so that I don't rely on the security of my laptop, desktop, and mobile devices to protect me from losses.
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Basically, I don't put keys [for a lot of bitcoin] in online devices, ever.
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All of my keys are on offline devices, with the exception of a mobile wallet that has $100 in spending money.
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What if your computer hard drive fails? It shouldn't matter if there are no keys on it.
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[Everything] of importance that is stored on my laptop, has encrypted backups elsewhere, in multiple locations.
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[I can] recover if I lose or damage my mobile device and laptop.
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In the case of my cryptocurrency keys, I have multiple copies of mnemonic phrases...
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that I can recover onto other devices, including the petty cash on my smartphone,
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even though it is not a lot of money, because it wasn't hard to do.
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Therefore, if I lose these devices, I can recover from the seeds.
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When I upgrade my mobile phone or my laptop every two to three years, I don't copy the information over.
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I use the opportunity to run a recovery exercise and re-build from data backups, to ensure they are working.
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I would still have the old phone and laptop, so if the backups are not working, now is a good time to find out.
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That way, I can test my backup system.
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One thing I would like to point out: a few people will [say] that you can store backups of keys...
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in encrypted drives, password managers, or [cloud storage systems]. This is not a good idea.
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There is a reason it is not a good idea. First of all, if you make backups on encrypted drives,
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Google Drive, Truecrypt, a password manager, or something like that, you are creating an online copy.
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It is encrypted, but that encryption and its security depends on a lot of factors.
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When you run that software and decrypt it, if that laptop has been compromised,
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then you have exposed your keys and could lose your money.
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The process of encrypting and decrypting these files happens on a laptop.
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Finally, you still have the problem of backing up the password so you don't lose the encryption key.
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Essentially, you have just [shifted] the problem of backups one step further.
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Instead of backing up your crypto keys, you are backing up the encryption keys for your encrypted backups.
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You [still] need to back those up. What form do those take?
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The best form of backup for keys is a 12 to 24-word mnemonic phrase.
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If you have more concerns, you can add a passphrase and back that up separately.
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It is much easier to remember and record 24 English words, on paper, in your own handwriting.
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Put them in a secure location.
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[It is easier] than backing up an alphanumeric password...
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of arbitrary length, that you may or may not have generated with sufficient entropy.
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There are so many pitfalls in rolling your own security, in a way that is not compliant with the standards.
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There are many risks you may not be aware of. Be careful when you hear about suggestions like this.
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Do not backup your keys online. Do not use encryption [as an excuse] to back up your keys online.
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Use the recommended mechanisms. In the case of HD wallets, write down the 24 words.
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Do not cut them up and store them as separate pieces. Do not try to hide them in fancy ways.
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Do not obfuscate them, like hiding each [word] in the page of a book or something like that.
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Write the 24 words down, in sequence, and store them [together] in one place.
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Then make another copy and store it in a different place.
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If you are concerned about the physical security of your environment, that someone could access them,
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then use a passphrase and write that down too.
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Store it in another location, separately from where you store your mnemonic seed.
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But that may be excessive. In 99% of scenarios that most of us face,
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the greatest risk is [accidental] loss due to computer failure, natural disaster such as flood or fire,
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or damage to your backups.
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Therefore, the best balance for your security, risk against theft versus accidental loss,
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is to follow the standard instructions and make a paper backup of the 24 words in your own home.
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That is sufficient for 99% of cryptocurrency users.