John Foster Dulles: Defender of Global Security or Hawkish Interventionist? - YouTube

Channel: The Cold War

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to most people john foster dulles is
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just an airport in Virginia but many of
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our viewers are not most people and
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surely are familiar with John Foster
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Dulles the influential character of the
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Cold War that an airport happens to be
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named after John Foster Dulles or JFD
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for short was US Secretary of State
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under President Eisenhower and as the
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head representative of US diplomacy he
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may actually seem like a terrible choice
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he was confrontational and black social
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skills Winston Churchill said that JFD
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was the only bull he ever met who
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carried his own china shop
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his brother Allen Dulles was the first
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director of the CIA and both had
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connections to a secret society the
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controversial skullenbones and both were
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behind interference or direct military
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intervention in the affairs of Iran
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Guatemala and Vietnam but who actually
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was this man and why does he loom so
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large in the story of the Cold War it's
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easy to see how jf Dee's image and
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legacy is that of a hawk more at ease
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with nuclear launch codes than with
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diplomatic protocol but today we're
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going to assess jf Dee's policies and
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determine if he was indeed a hawk
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through and through or a more astute
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indolence politician I'm your host David
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and today we are going to take a look at
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the life of one John Foster Dulles this
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is the Cold War
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john foster dulles was born in
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Washington DC on February 25th 1888 his
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father was a Presbyterian minister from
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a family with an enviable political
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pedigree his grandfather was former
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Secretary of State John Watson Foster
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and his uncle Robert Lansing would serve
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under Woodrow Wilson also at the helm of
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the State Department
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according to author Stephen Kinzer
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during his formative years
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JFD was exposed to three major
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influences that shaped his character and
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outlook first a belief in American
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exceptionalism the idea that the u.s.
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had a right to expand their influence
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via foreign intervention learned from
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both his grandfather and his uncle
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second a moral standpoint influenced by
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his father's missionary Calvinism which
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took him to view the world stage in
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absolute terms of black and white good
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versus evil and later epitomized by
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capitalism versus socialism finally the
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importance for the u.s. government and
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private corporations to align their
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goals for a mutually beneficial
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expansion beyond the nation's border the
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last influence came from JFK's
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employment with Sullivan and Cromwell a
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legal consultancy firm whose specialty
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was to lobby the US Congress and cabinet
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on behalf of large corporate groups but
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more on them later as a young man Dulles
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was at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference a
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member of the reparations Commission and
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economic council during this assignment
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Dulles was against issuing harsh
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sanctions against Germany warning of the
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dangers of holding berlin responsible
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for war reparations later on in his life
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during the Second World War
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Bellus served on the war trade board as
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a lawyer and after the war he entered
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private law practice by 1949 he had been
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elected to the Senate of the state of
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New York and this capacity Heath the
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chance to work behind the scenes as an
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advisor to the Department of State from
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May 1950 til the end of 1952 JFD is big
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break onto the international stage
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happened on the 21st of January 1953
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when
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newly elected president Dwight David
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Eisenhower appointed him as his
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Secretary of State he had developed a
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strong friendship with Ike giving him
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direct and unprecedented access to the
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president he also enjoyed the close
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cooperation of the CIA at the time
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headed by none other than his brother
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Allen Dulles jf Dee's term as SEC state
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was marked by a consensus in US policy
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that world peace could and would be
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maintained only through the containment
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of communism this consensus allowed
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Dulles and Eisenhower to sign security
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agreements with friendly nations while
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at the same time reducing both the
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number of troops in the US military as
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well as the production of weapons while
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conventional ones anyway
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this approach became known as the
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Eisenhower Doctrine during his tenure
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JFD faced and sometimes directly drove
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some of the major international crises
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of the 1950's the coup d'etat in
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Guatemala and in Iran the escalation of
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the conflict in Indochina the hungarian
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revolution and of course the suez crisis
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after the resolution of this last
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challenge JFD was diagnosed with
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advanced stage colon cancer despite his
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quickly declining health Dulles
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stated his post for a further three
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years until he resigned in April 1959
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John Foster Dulles died only a few weeks
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later on the 24th of May now we could
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fit that bio onto the back of a box of
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cereal what a great way to halt global
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communism but of course there is so much
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more to JFD than just that belief
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synopsis so let's get into that
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remember that law firm I just mentioned
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Sullivan and Cromwell well in the first
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half of the 20th century jf Dee's early
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employers represented 170 million
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dollars worth of American corporate
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activities in Cuba in February 1917 when
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a liberal military insurgency had
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opposed the government of Cuban
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conservative president men'll call these
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rebels took control of Oriente province
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directly threatening American own sugar
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plantations and it was feared that if
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they seized power in Havana they could
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have jeopardized even more American
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investment on the island US landowners
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called Sullivan and Cromwell for help
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and they handed the case to JFD the
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young lobbyists paid a visit to uncle
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Robert better known as Secretary of
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State Lansing pleading for a muscular
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intervention in support of Manukau
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Lansing complied dispatching a
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contingent of Marines to watch over the
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sugarcane plantations and provide
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support to the minica government this
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has become known as the sugar
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intervention of 1917 now let's skip
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forward to the years when jft was the
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Secretary of State our longtime
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subscribers already know about US and
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British backed coup against Iranian
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Prime Minister Mossadegh in August of
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1953 this was jf Dee's first major
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display of interventionism in the
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internal matters of a foreign power both
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him and President Eisenhower
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agreed that Mossad VEX plans to
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nationalize Iranian oil were a threat to
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US influence in the region and a
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possible first step for communist
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penetration author Stephen Kinzer argues
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that this was in fact a missed
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opportunity for Dulles to increase US
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influence in Iran Mossadegh ideology was
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essentially anti-colonialist and the US
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government could have easily positioned
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itself as a natural ally for enemies of
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colonialism but well that's not how it
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played out
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Dulles was also central to another coup
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when he orchestrated the overthrow of
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the legitimate Guatemalan government of
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Prime Minister Jacobo Arbenz our bands
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had been elected to office in March 1951
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on the back of a program centered on
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land reform which would benefit small
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local landowners to the disadvantage of
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the American owned United Fruit Company
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such policy led both Washington and
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private interests to fear that Guatemala
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was about to steer the wheel sharply to
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the left and in late 1953 President
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Eisenhower ordered head the CIA
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to Dulles look that's the other one to
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prepare for operation success a
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us-backed military insurrection against
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her Benz led by colonel Castillo armed
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us in the meanwhile Dulles jf this time
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made diplomatic preparations to lend
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legitimacy to the operation through his
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efforts in March of 1954 he got the
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Organization of American States to
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approve a new resolution one that
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recognized the threat of international
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communism in the Americas as grounds for
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intervention
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now all the Dulles brothers needed was a
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causes Ally and they got it when in
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April of 1954 our bends made a deal with
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Czechoslovakia to purchase Soviet made
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armaments clearly communism was
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infiltrating operation success was go
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now we've already covered the Guatemalan
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coup in another video so I'll only add a
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couple of fun facts this intervention
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was not a covert black ops intervention
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carried out in secret by the CIA this
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operation was fully sanctioned by the US
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Congress on the 29th of June 1954
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following a resolution driven by some
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guy called Lyndon Johnson interesting
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facts 2 & 3 Sullivan & Cromwell was the
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law firm that had helped United Fruit to
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draw up their contracts with previous
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Guatemalan president Biko in 1936 and
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Allen Dulles the CIA one had been a
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board member for yep that's right
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United Fruit this shows the tight
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personal and business connections
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between the Dulles brothers and
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Guatemala this was captured by Seminole
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Mexican mural artist Diego Rivera his
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work of art gloriosa victoria of
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november 1954 depicts the Dulles
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brothers front and center very obscene
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holding a nuclear bomb with the face of
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Eisenhower while they handle bundles of
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dollar bills to the rebel colonel
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Castillo our mas subtle Guatemala and
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Iran are not usually thought of as being
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front-line countries in the 1950s Cold
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War but JFD didn't believe in neutral
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participants when it came to the world
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conflict of East versus West to him the
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non line leaders were just Soviet allies
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in disguise
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America had a duty to intervene in these
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countries to actively contain the spread
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of communism and Soviet interference
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abroad jf DS key doctrine to contain the
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projection of Soviet power had been
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unveiled on the 12th of January 1954
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during a speech to the Council on
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Foreign Relations this was known as
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massive retaliation sounds got Norwegian
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black metal band but in the context of
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the Cold War
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this doctrine involved the deterrent of
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massive retaliatory power to protect the
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US and its allies from Soviet aggression
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this power that was implied of course
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was of the nuclear variety now massive
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retaliation was never actually
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implemented otherwise I'd be speaking to
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you from vault 69 but on at least one
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occasion jf d got very close to putting
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it in practice that was during the siege
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of Dien Bien Phu you'll recall from our
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earlier video that this was the last
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major battle of the second Indochina war
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fought in 1954 between the French
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garrison and the Viet Minh besiegers the
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US Joint Chiefs of Staff had planned for
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operation vulture a large-scale aerial
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attack in support of the French JFD
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strongly supported this plan however
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believing that the plan 298 bombers and
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450 jet fighters were not enough he
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floated the possibility of dropping
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atomic bombs on general Japs troops
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however the Chiefs of Staff and
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President Eisenhower opposed the idea of
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using even tactical nukes and eventually
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vetoed the whole operation okay so
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clearly a hawk right well we need to
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also consider examples which show jft as
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a more balanced and nuanced politician
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as well as a skilled diplomat
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despite Winston Churchill's cutting
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remarks during his tenure as advisor to
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the Department of State JFD strongly
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endorsed the Schumann plan the first
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step to the creation of the European
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Coal and Steel community the first
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incarnation of the European Union love
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it or
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this community was a guarantee for peace
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in Western Europe and JFD clearly saw
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that mr. Dulles was also put in charge
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of leading negotiations for the peace
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treaty with Japan signed in San
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Francisco on the 8th of September 1951
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he was recognized as skillfully
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completing a stalling process ending
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military occupation of Japan and
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restoring peaceful cooperation between
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Tokyo and the Western powers now when it
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comes to his time in office as Secretary
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of State
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let's focus on 1956 the year of the two
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crises Suez and Hungary you already know
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from our recent videos that the suez
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crisis was triggered when Egyptian
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President Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser
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nationalized the anglo-french Suez Canal
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Company on the 26th of July 1956 in
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September secretary Dulles and attempted
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a peaceful resolution of the mountain
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crisis wanting to prevent any possible
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Soviet involvement he proposed the
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creation of the Suez Canal users
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Association comprising 18 naval powers
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the Association would have given Britain
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France and Egypt an equal stake in the
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canal but his idea failed to win the
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full support of the contending powers in
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October the British government
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repeatedly hinted that it might resort
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to force in dealing with Nasser to which
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JFD refused to provide any support from
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the US military or otherwise when the
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British and French eventually did attack
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port sited Ellis's main concern was to
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dissociate the u.s. from their action on
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a broader scale he wanted to dissociate
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the u.s. from European colonialism this
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was a radical change of policy
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compared to JFK's precedents in similar
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scenarios think about the overthrow of
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Messiah back for example not only that
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jetty was also wary of Nikita
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Khrushchev's threat of entering the
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conflict a threat which would not
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discount the use of tactical nukes if
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not strategic ones jf DS final response
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was to pressure Britain and France into
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accepting a UN sanctions ceasefire on
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of November moreover Eisenhower's
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administration backed a UN resolution
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which publicly condemned the invasion
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now while handling the trouble in Egypt
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Dulles also had to contend with the
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events of the Hungarian Uprising for
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thirteen days from October 23rd to
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November 4th 1956 crowds of Hungarian
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demonstrators and forced the resignation
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of the Communist Party as well as the
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retreat from Budapest of Soviet
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occupation forces on November 1st the
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new democratic government under umbria
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Nagy announced Hungary's withdraw from
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the Warsaw Pact and the adoption of a
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position of neutrality nudg appealed to
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the UN and the Western powers for
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protection but Soviet armored columns
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rolled back into Hungary crushing the
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democratic experiment on November 4th an
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estimated 2,500 Hungarians died and
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200,000 more fled as refugees during the
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revolution both Eisenhower and Dulles
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delivered speeches on their Voice of
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America Radio expressing the sympathy
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for the rebels but nothing beyond that
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this lack of action was harshly
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criticized at the time and even since
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but a Department of Defense report
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Declassified in 2017 paints a more
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complex picture since the start of the
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uprising Eisenhower and Dulles did
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intend to bring the Hungarian crisis to
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the attention of the UN Security Council
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but hesitated to do so they feared this
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could be seen as an electoral move to
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gain votes from Eastern European
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immigrants eventually JFD made up his
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mind and instructed the US ambassador to
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the UN Henry Cabot Lodge jr. to discuss
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Hungary at the Security Council on the
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28th of October the issue was raised but
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the Soviet delegates stalled processes
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and the only decision was to convene a
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gain in five days time meanwhile
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Eisenhower met with both the Dulles
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brothers to discuss a possible
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intervention outside of a UN mandate Ike
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and John eventually decided
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instead unwilling to chance a military
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escalation in Eastern Europe jf DS plan
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for the next Security Council meeting
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was to introduce a resolution calling
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for Soviet withdrawal from Hungary
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supervised by UN observers JFD sought
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backing from the UK representative of
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the council Pierson Dixon who offered
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another idea to use the session on the
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1st of November to simply condemn the
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Soviets and postpone final deliberations
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for two more days while this was going
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on however events were escalating in
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Hungary nudge declared independence from
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Moscow while Khrushchev steel his
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resolve to intervene this was the week
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in which the French and the British had
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occupied the Suez Canal and the Soviet
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leader wanted at all costs to avoid the
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perception of weakness
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Ellis's approach to the Hungarian crisis
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was to avoid direct intervention but
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prevent a military escalation and while
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he sought to involve the Security
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Council procedural delays allowed events
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to overtake him and an American decision
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that was made for them in action which
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maintained the status quo but risked
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nothing for the United States now the
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final word is with you was JFD generally
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an aggressive interventionist driven by
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three forces of American exceptionalism
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manichaean worldview and corporate
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interest or was he the Stute statesman
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who did what was best for his country
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and adapted his approach based on risk
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and opportunities we hope you've enjoyed
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today's topic and to make sure you don't
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doesn't take too long before it becomes
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heated