Weighted Voting: The Shapley-Shubik Power Index - YouTube

Channel: Mathispower4u

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- WELCOME TO A LESSON ON THE SHAPLEY-SHUBIK POWER INDEX.
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THE SHAPLEY-SHUBIK POWER INDEX WAS INTRODUCED IN 1954
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BY ECONOMISTS LLOYD SHAPLEY AND MARTIN SHUBIK.
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IT PROVIDES A DIFFERENT APPROACH FOR CALCULATING POWER
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IN A WEIGHTED VOTING SYSTEM THAT IS DIFFERENT
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THEN THE BANZHAF POWER INDEX.
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IN SITUATIONS LIKE POLITICAL ALLIANCES,
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THE ORDER IN WHICH PLAYERS JOIN AN ALLIANCE COULD BE CONSIDERED
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THE MOST IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION.
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IN PARTICULAR, IF A PROPOSAL IS INTRODUCED,
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THE PLAYER THAT JOINS THE COALITION
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AND ALLOWS IT TO REACH QUOTA
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MIGHT BE CONSIDERED THE MOST ESSENTIAL.
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THE SHAPLEY-SHUBIK POWER INDEX COUNTS
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HOW LIKELY A PLAYER IS TO BE PIVOTAL,
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BUT WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR A PLAYER TO BE PIVOTAL?
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FIRST, WE NEED TO CHANGE OUR APPROACH TO COALITIONS.
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PREVIOUSLY, THE COALITIONS CONTAINING PLAYERS ONE AND TWO
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AND PLAYERS TWO AND ONE WOULD BE CONSIDERED EQUIVALENT
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SINCE THEY CONTAIN THE SAME PLAYERS.
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WE NOW NEED TO CONSIDER THE ORDER IN WHICH PLAYERS
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JOIN THE COALITION.
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FOR THAT WE WILL CONSIDER WHAT'S CALLED SEQUENTIAL COALITIONS,
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WHERE SEQUENTIAL COALITIONS THAT ARE COALITIONS
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THAT CONTAIN ALL PLAYERS IN WHICH THE ORDER OF PLAYERS
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ARE LISTED TO REFLECT THE ORDER THEY JOINED THE COALITION.
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FOR EXAMPLE, THE SEQUENTIAL COALITION HERE
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CONTAINING PLAYER TWO,
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PLAYER ONE AND PLAYER THREE WOULD MEAN PLAYER TWO
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JOINED THE COALITION FIRST, PLAYER ONE JOINED SECOND,
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AND FINALLY, PLAYER THREE JOINED THIRD.
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THE ANGLE BRACKETS ARE USED INSTEAD OF CURLY BRACKETS
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TO DISTINGUISH SEQUENTIAL COALITIONS.
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AND NOW LET'S DEFINE A PIVOTAL PLAYER.
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A PIVOTAL PLAYER IS A PLAYER IN A SEQUENTIAL COALITION
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THAT CHANGES THE COALITION FROM A LOSING COALITION
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TO A WINNING ONE.
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NOTICE THERE CAN ONLY BE ONE PIVOTAL PLAYER
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IN ANY SEQUENTIAL COALITION.
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LET'S DETERMINE THE PIVOTAL PLAYER
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IN THE WEIGHTED VOTING SYSTEM FOR EACH SEQUENTIAL COALITION.
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SO WE'LL ADD THE WEIGHT OF EACH PLAYER
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IN EACH PARTICULAR ORDER TO SEE WHICH PLAYER
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ALLOWS THE COALITION TO REACH THE QUOTA, IN THIS CASE, OF 16.
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SO PLAYER THREE HAS A WEIGHT OF SEVEN
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SO WE HAVE SEVEN + THE WEIGHT OF PLAYER TWO.
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THAT WOULD BE 8.
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7 + 8 = 15, WE STILL DON'T HAVE QUOTA.
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AND THEN PLAYER FOUR HAS A WEIGHT OF THREE SO + 3.
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NOTICE THAT PLAYER FOUR BRINGS THE TOTAL WEIGHT TO 18
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AND NOW THE COALITION REACHES QUOTA.
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AND THEREFORE, PLAYER FOUR IS THE PIVOTAL PLAYER.
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LOOKING AT THE NEXT SEQUENTIAL COALITION,
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WE FIRST HAVE PLAYER ONE
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THAT HAS A WEIGHT OF 12 + NEXT PLAYER TWO JOINS A COALITION
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WITH A WEIGHT OF 8.
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AND SINCE 12 + 8 = 20,
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NOTICE AFTER PLAYER TWO JOINS
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THE COALITION THE COALITION REACHES QUOTA.
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AND THEREFORE, WE SAY PLAYER TWO IS PIVOTAL.
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NOW LETS GO OVER THE STEPS ON HOW TO CALCULATE
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THE SHAPLEY-SHUBIK POWER INDEX.
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NUMBER ONE, WE LIST ALL SEQUENTIAL COALITIONS.
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REMEMBER THESE COALITIONS CONTAIN ALL THE PLAYERS.
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TWO, IN EACH SEQUENTIAL COALITION
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WE'LL DETERMINE THE PIVOTAL PLAYER.
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THREE, WE'LL COUNT HOW MANY TIMES EACH PLAYER IS PIVOTAL.
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AND THEN FOUR, WE'LL CONVERT THESE COUNTS TO FRACTIONS,
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DECIMALS, OR PERCENTAGES
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BY DIVIDING BY THE TOTAL NUMBER OF SEQUENTIAL COALITIONS.
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BUT BEFORE WE DO THIS, WE NEED TO MENTION ONE MORE THING.
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IF A WEIGHTED VOTING SYSTEM HAS N PLAYERS,
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THEN THERE ARE N FACTORIAL SEQUENTIAL COALITIONS.
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SO FOR EXAMPLE, IF A VOTING SYSTEM HAS FIVE PLAYERS,
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THERE WOULD BE FIVE FACTORIAL SEQUENTIAL COALITIONS,
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WHERE FIVE FACTORIAL IS 5 x 4 x 3 x 2 x 1 = 120.
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SO NOW LET'S TAKE A LOOK AT OUR EXAMPLE.
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WE WANT TO FIND THE SHAPLEY-SHUBIK POWER INDEX
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FOR THE GIVEN WEIGHTED VOTING SYSTEM.
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NOTICE HOW THERE ARE THREE PLAYERS AND THEREFORE,
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THERE ARE THREE FACTORIAL OR SIX SEQUENTIAL COALITIONS
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GIVEN HERE.
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REMEMBER, FOR A SEQUENTIAL COALITION THE ORDER MATTERS.
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SO WE HAVE THE COALITION IN THE ORDER OF PLAYERS
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ONE, TWO, AND THREE.
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THEN THE COALITION OF PLAYERS ONE, THREE, AND TWO,
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THEN THE COALITION WITH PLAYERS TWO, ONE, AND THREE,
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THEN THE COALITION OF PLAYERS TWO, THREE, AND ONE,
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AND THEN FINALLY, WE HAVE THE TWO SEQUENTIAL COALITIONS
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WHERE WE HAVE PLAYERS THREE, ONE AND TWO
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AND THEN PLAYERS THREE, TWO, AND ONE.
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SO WE'VE DONE STEP ONE.
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WE'VE LISTED ALL THE SEQUENTIAL COALITIONS
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AND NOW FOR EACH SEQUENTIAL COALITION
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WE'LL DETERMINE THE PIVOTAL PLAYER OR THE PLAYER
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THAT CHANGES THE COALITION
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FROM NOT MEETING QUOTA TO MEETING QUOTA.
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SO FOR THIS FIRST COALITION WE HAVE PLAYER ONE FIRST,
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WHICH HAS A WEIGHT OF 17 + THE WEIGHT OF PLAYER TWO,
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WHICH IS 13.
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NOTICE HOW ONCE PLAYER TWO JOINS THE COALITION
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THE COALITION HAS A WEIGHT OF 30, WHICH MEETS QUOTA.
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AND THEREFORE, PLAYER TWO IS PIVOTAL.
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NEXT ORDER IS PLAYER ONE, PLAYER THREE, AND THEN PLAYER TWO.
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SO PLAYER ONE HAS A WEIGHT OF 17
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+ THE WEIGHT OF PLAYER THREE IS 10.
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WELL, 17 + 10 = 27.
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SO PLAYER THREE TURNS THE COALITION
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FROM NOT MAKING QUOTA TO MAKING QUOTA SINCE THE QUOTA'S 25.
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SO PLAYER THREE IS PIVOTAL.
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FOR THE NEXT COALITION WE HAVE PLAYER TWO FIRST,
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WHICH HAS A WEIGHT OF 13 + PLAYER ONE SO WEIGHT OF 17.
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NOTICE PLAYER ONE MAKES THE SEQUENTIAL COALITION
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MEET THE QUOTA AND THEREFORE, PLAYER ONE IS PIVOTAL.
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NEXT, WE HAVE THE ORDER PLAYER TWO, PLAYER THREE,
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AND PLAYER ONE.
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PLAYER TWO IS 13 + PLAYER THREE IS 10.
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NOTICE HOW HERE THE WEIGHT IS 23,
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WE STILL HAVE NOT MET QUOTA.
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IT TAKES PLAYER ONE TO JOIN WITH A WEIGHT OF 17
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FOR THE COALITION TO MAKE QUOTA.
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THIS WOULD BE 40, WHICH ONCE AGAIN, MAKES QUOTA.
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SO PLAYER ONE IS PIVOTAL FOR THIS ORDER.
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NEXT, PLAYER THREE HAS A WEIGHT OF 10
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+ PLAYER ONE HAS A WEIGHT OF 17.
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NOTICE HOW WHEN PLAYER ONE JOINS,
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THE COALITION MEETS QUOTA AT 27.
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SO PLAYER ONE IS PIVOTAL.
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AND THEN FINALLY, WE HAVE THE ORDER OF PLAYER
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THREE, TWO, AND THEN ONE.
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PLAYER THREE HAS A WEIGHT OF 10.
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PLAYER TWO HAS A WEIGHT OF 13, STILL HAVE NOT MADE QUOTA.
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IT TAKES PLAYER ONE TO JOIN WITH A WEIGHT OF 17 TO MAKE QUOTA.
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SO PLAYER ONE IS PIVOTAL.
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NOW WE'LL COUNT HOW MANY TIMES EACH PLAYER IS PIVOTAL.
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SO PLAYER ONE IS PIVOTAL HERE, HERE, HERE, AND HERE,
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SO FOUR TIMES.
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PLAYER TWO IS PIVOTAL HERE ONLY ONCE.
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AND PLAYER THREE IS ALSO ONLY PIVOTAL ONLY ONCE.
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NOTICE HOW THE SUM OF THE NUMBER OF PIVOTS IS SIX,
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SO THE SHAPLEY-SHUBIK POWER INDEX FOR PLAYER ONE
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WOULD BE 4 DIVIDED BY 6, OR 2/3,
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WHICH AS A PERCENTAGE WOULD BE APPROXIMATELY 66.7%.
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THE POWER INDEX FOR PLAYER TWO WOULD BE 1 DIVIDED BY 6, OR 1/6,
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WHICH AS A PERCENTAGE WOULD BE APPROXIMATELY 16.7%
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AND THE SAME THING FOR PLAYER THREE.
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REMEMBER, THE POWER OF INDEX CAN BE EXPRESSED AS A FRACTION,
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DECIMAL, OR PERCENTAGE.
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I DO WANT TO TAKE A MOMENT AND MENTION
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THAT THE BANZHAF POWER INDEX AND THE SHAPLEY-SHUBIK POWER INDEX
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ARE USUALLY SIMILAR.
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HOWEVER, SINCE THE TWO APPROACHES ARE DIFFERENT,
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THE VALUES ARE OFTEN SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT.
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FOR EXAMPLE, IF WE WERE TO CALCULATE
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THE BANZHAF POWER INDEX FOR THE PREVIOUS EXAMPLE,
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NOTICE HOW THE POWER INDEX VALUES ARE SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT
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USING THIS METHOD.
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WE WON'T TAKE THE TIME TO CALCULATE
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THE BANZHAF POWER INDEX IN THIS LESSON
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SINCE WE ALREADY LEARNED THIS IN THE LAST LESSON,
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BUT NOTICE HOW THESE VALUES ARE SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT
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THEN THE VALUES THAT WE FOUND
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USING THE SHAPLEY-SHUBIK POWER INDEX.
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HERE ARE THE VALUES FOR THE BANZHAF POWER INDEX
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AND HERE ARE THE VALUES THAT WE FOUND
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USING THE SHAPLEY-SHUBIK POWER INDEX.
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I HOPE YOU FOUND THIS LESSON HELPFUL.