The Double Life of Wirecard鈥檚 Fugitive Executive - YouTube

Channel: Bloomberg Quicktake: Originals

[11]
The former chief executive of Wirecard, Marcus Braun,
[14]
has been arrested.
[16]
Auditors revealed that nearly $2 billion
[19]
has gone missing.
[21]
This has been a wild ride for Wirecard.
[23]
You only need to look at the share price
[24]
over the past five days.
[27]
Wirecard is a payment processing company.
[29]
At their height they were worth 22 billion euros.
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Wirecard was supposed to be Germany's ticket
[38]
into the high-tech world.
[40]
They were supposed to be the pride of German fintech.
[44]
Wirecard spectacularly imploded.
[46]
Its stock went to penny stock level and now it's worthless.
[50]
That is quite remarkable.
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Never before has a company on Germany's DAX just gone bust.
[56]
Is there a corporate fraud going on here
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or is it something more mundane?
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The business model was fraudulent right
[63]
from the beginning.
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It was bank robbery and investors and creditors
[67]
they're seeking more than 12 billion euros in repayments.
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The two key players are two Austrians.
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The chief executive, Markus Braun
[75]
and his deputy, Jan Marsalek.
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Right now, Marcus Braun is in jail
[80]
and he's facing charges.
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It's far more difficult to know anything about Jan Marsalek
[84]
because he's missing.
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There is reason to believe that he had close ties
[87]
to secret services around the world,
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so he had the means and obviously the money
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to just vanish without a trace.
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Might he be in Russia? Might he be in Asia?
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Might he be on some deserted island? Nobody really knows.
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He's on the most wanted list of Interpol,
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but so far, nobody's been able to track him down.
[116]
The German economy mostly builds on car-makers
[119]
and engineering companies, which is sort of the past.
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Wirecard was that bright new future-oriented company
[126]
and Wirecard promised that they would deliver
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electronic payments and in the future
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they would become a super big company.
[133]
They started as a startup, essentially,
[136]
around 2000 and grew up around the, you know, what some
[141]
people might find, slightly unappetizing businesses
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of pornographic content and gambling
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and then turned themselves into a main player
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in the global payment facilitation business.
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Markus, when you look at Wirecard's
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share price, it's eye-watering.
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The incredible acceleration
[160]
in the valuation of your business.
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I think we are showing enormous growth,
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I have no fear at all in terms of evaluation.
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Starting in 2010, Wirecard's profits began to explode
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and show a very, very solid
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and almost too good to believe growth.
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Wirecard at some point replaced Germany's second largest
[179]
lender, Commerzbank, and its market value of over 22 billion
[184]
was more than Deutsche Bank, the biggest lender,
[186]
and Commerzbank combined. Which showed the significance
[191]
and how things have changed in the German economy.
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There's a chap called Jan Marsalek,
[196]
who was the chief operating officer.
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There is another guy called Markus Braun, the CEO.
[202]
And while we know some elements
[204]
of what led to the fall of this company,
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there were some elements that we didn't know about.
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I met Jan Marsalek just for a background chat,
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and he was quite frank about his youth,
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that he was mostly interested in IT and programming.
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I can only assume he was a classical nerd
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when he was younger.
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When he rose through the ranks at Wirecard,
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he developed a taste for the extravagant.
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He lived the life of a high roller,
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looking back he spent more money
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than what he was earning as a Wirecard executive.
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Jan Marsalek was close to a commander
[243]
of a Russian mercenary army who took him to the Syrian city
[247]
of Palmyra right after that Russian mercenary army
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expelled ISIL from the city.
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He flew in there, he went to the beach
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and fired around Kalashnikovs I was told.
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He even took a small piece of an ornament back to Germany.
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I saw it, I held it in my own hands.
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Part of the Wirecard story that we've uncovered
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is a little bit sort of boys' fantasies - you know
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men in expensive suits and fancy watches, champagne parties.
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Investors are impressed, Markus, by the growth.
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If you look of the last 15 years your up 40,000 percent.
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Interestingly, the collapse of Wirecard
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starts around the time where Wirecard is at its peak.
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And that is when they joined the DAX Index.
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And that's really a huge achievement
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to be among the 30 biggest companies of Germany.
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At their height, its market value was at 20,
[303]
22 and a half billion euros.
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The illegitimate part of Wirecard was, in large parts,
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a business that happened far away from headquarters.
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So these were businesses that were in Asia
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or in the Middle East, businesses largely
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where Wirecard had no sort of operating license
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of its own and, therefore, relied on partners
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to work with them.
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Unknown to the public and wider audience,
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Wirecard faked profits and transactions.
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How did they do this?
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They had a business that was called
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third party providing business.
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They did business with outside partners
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that processed transactions in countries
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where they had no license.
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And these businesses provided Wirecard
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with fake profit statements
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and fake balance sheet statements.
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Wirecard in reality didn't turn out a profit.
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If you stripped the profits from the fake business
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which provided fake revenue and profit statements,
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it was unprofitable at least since 2016.
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Basically the entire company was a smoke screen.
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The trouble of the way Wirecard was set up
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was that nobody, or very few people,
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had a global overview of the company.
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A lot of people knew a little sliver.
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The auditors, Ernst & Young, for years,
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signed off on their accounts.
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And so there doesn't seem to be anything untoward there.
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There didn't seem to be anything illegitimate,
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but the questions kept coming,
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particularly from the Financial Times
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that started publishing reports around 2018
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saying that there were problems with accounting in Asia.
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And every turn Wirecard said,
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"No, this is not true, this is legitimate."
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They often would raise their forecasts
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as to appeal investors
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and they managed to wiggle out of this, time and again.
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Let me ask about the scandals
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that we've seen in the stock market.
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I do not, too much, look into controversies.
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In the Philippines, they had an account with two banks
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on which about $2 billion were sitting.
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It got from the bank fake balance sheet confirmations,
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and this is how the entire smoke screen worked.
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There did, however, come a point
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around the time of 2019, 2020,
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where they enlisted the help of a second auditor,
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and that was KPMG.
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And KPMG was asked for a special audit of the books.
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They flew down to Manila
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and initially nobody doubted the money was there.
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They just wanted to see, can this be tapped at any time,
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is this free liquidity?
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What we now know is that a lot of this was fictitious,
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that some documents were outright forged,
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that some employees at these banks
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were not who they said they would be.
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Knowing now that this money never existed,
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that obviously posed a huge problem for Jan Marsalek,
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who was faced with a daunting task of coming up
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with several hundred millions of euros
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that he could transfer from Asia to Europe.
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As we know, that never happened.
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And that was sort of the beginning of the end of Wirecard,
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as we know it.
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The scandal that has been brewing
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over the last week is now definitely deepening.
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The initial employees said no money,
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none of Wirecard's missing 2.1 billion
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ever entered into the Philippines.
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The company has temporarily suspended
[499]
its outgoing COO, Jan Marsalek,
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but it seems there will be further questions
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for the business to answer.
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Jan Marsalek was suspended on June 18.
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Marsalek went into Braun's office for one last time
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and someone who happened to stumble into the room
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said there were intense discussions.
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Braun kept talking at Marsalek,
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and soon thereafter Marsalek went missing.
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We're looking at a space of a week,
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from Marsalek existing Wirecard HQ
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to Wirecard going up in smoke.
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More details on this to come, but again,
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a clearly unusual scandal.
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In some ways, Jan Marsalek
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is sort of a mirror image of Wirecard.
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There is the visible, the legal part,
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if you want, of Jan Marsalek,
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which is he's the chief operating officer
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of a large German company,
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and then there is the murkier, opaque part of Jan Marsalek,
[555]
which is dealing with mercenaries, traveling to Syria.
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There is one place where it's easy to get a sense
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of who Wirecard and Marsalek was,
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and that is this opulent villa
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that sits in the middle of Munich.
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This is a place where Jan Marsalek had his residence.
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He didn't formally live there,
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but he had all the fripperies that you might want.
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I was granted access to the building
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by someone who was authorized
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and I developed my own little obsession of finding out
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what was going on.
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There's a room with some artwork,
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but it also has that kind of appearance now of being a place
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that was hastily and quickly abandoned.
[598]
Most of the furniture was removed from the place
[601]
but there was still two intensive care bed units.
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In the basement, there was a huge locker
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with drugs inside uppers, downers, stimulants.
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Its quite extraordinary to have 2 billion
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lost and not know where it is.
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I was told that Marsalek and his gang
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funneled out 1.5 billion of the company.
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We know he milked the company dry
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by transferring a lot of loans that the company provided
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to entities that he then secretly controlled abroad.
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Investors and creditors,
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they're seeking more than 12 billion euros in repayments.
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How can a error, a mistake,
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a scandal of that size, happen in a DAX corporation.
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We have many questions that we want to ask the government
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in the following weeks.
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These guys, these companies have auditors, right?
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Is it time to audit the auditors?
[659]
The decline of Wirecard is obviously a huge embarrassment
[662]
for a lot of constituencies out there.
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There are the auditors, who signed off
[667]
on these accounts for years.
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And the question that's out there
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and that remains unanswered is,
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why did they not detect what was going on?
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I mean, Ernst & Young is one of the big auditors.
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They should know what's going on at these companies.
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This company had all kinds of signs, reported by media
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going back a year or two now
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and yet people still gave the company the benefit
[689]
of the doubt, over and over and over again.
[693]
How did Wirecard get so much political support?
[697]
The prosecutors have for a long time
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turned a blind eye on Wirecard,
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and for the entire institution apparatus of Germany,
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it is very embarrassing.
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Investors, first and foremost, have lost out here.
[709]
And among the investors, spare a thought for Marcus Brown,
[713]
who was the biggest investor in the company
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and he went from billionaire to now sitting in jail.
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So quite a downfall for him.
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Most people might not have too much sympathy,
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but if we speak of losers, he's certainly among them.
[725]
Wirecard was fraud probably right from the beginning.
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It's the biggest financial scandal in Germany.
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And the amount of money that was lost,
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it was probably the biggest bank robbery
[737]
that happened in this country.